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Abstract 
This thesis in applied microeconomics consists of three chapters that are devoted 
to specific questions in the fields of subjective well-being (life and job satisfaction) and 
human capital formation. All three chapters aim at deepening our understanding of the 
determinants of human well-being by investigating causal medium and long-term 
effects of unexpected and exogenous political, institutional or environmental changes.  
The first chapter analyses the question whether different levels of job 
satisfaction between public and private sector workers represent public sector rents or 
merely a spurious correlation due to workers‘ self-selection across sectors. The novel 
identification strategy exploits the massive post-Soviet privatization process in Ukraine 
as a quasi-experiment based on which each individual can be assigned an ex ante, 
exogenous privatization probability. The results point to a causal public sector 
satisfaction premium which even slightly increases after correcting for self-selection.  
Chapter 2 is devoted to the assessment of the long-run effects of the Chernobyl 
catastrophe in 1986 on subjective well-being in post-Soviet Ukraine. The analysis is 
based on a nationally representative Ukrainian data set and reveals that even 20 years 
after the accident subjective well-being is negatively associated with self-reported 
assessments of being affected by the catastrophe. The causal long-term effect of the 
disaster on life satisfaction is being tested and supported by exploiting official radiation 
measures which are linked to survey respondents through information on their place of 
living in 1986. 
The final chapter turns to the question whether long-term cognitive child 
outcomes are affected by the duration of parental leave, i.e. by the time mothers spend 
at home after giving birth and before returning to work. Employing a difference-in-
difference approach, this chapter evaluates an unexpected reform in Austria which 
extended the maximum duration of paid and job protected parental leave from 12 to 24 
months for children born on July 1, 1990 or after. While the results based on the pooled 
sample suggest no significant overall impact of extended maternal leave taking on 
standardized PISA test scores of children aged 15, the subgroup of boys of highly 
educated mothers seem to have benefited. 
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1 Introduction 
This thesis in applied microeconomics consists of three chapters that are devoted 
to the empirical analysis of specific questions in the fields of subjective well-being (life 
and job satisfaction) and human capital formation. All three chapters aim at deepening 
our understanding of the determinants of human well-being in the broadest sense by 
investigating causal medium and long-term effects of unexpected and exogenous 
institutional (Chapter 2), environmental (Chapter 3) or policy changes (Chapter 4). In 
particular, the objective of this thesis is to answer the following research questions: 
(1) Do observed job satisfaction differences between public and private 
sector workers represent rents – i.e., genuine differences in objective 
job and workplace characteristics – or are they an artificial result 
caused by non-random self-selection of workers based on unobservable 
personality traits? 
(2) Does a large nuclear catastrophe like the one of Chernobyl in 1986 
affect subjective well-being and mental health in the long run (i.e. 
more than 17 years after the disaster)? If so, how big is the 
corresponding utility loss in monetary terms (compensating 
differential)? 
(3) Does prolonged paid and job protected parental leave (in combination 
with reduced maternal employment) up to a child‘s second birthday 
affect its cognitive skills in the medium run? 
All chapters of this thesis take advantage of various ‗natural‘ experiments in 
order to identify causal effects. Empirical research which cannot directly randomize the 
assignment into treatment ex ante faces the challenge of potential self-selection of 
individuals into treatment and control group. Not accounting for this endogenous 
allocation will bias the estimates. One solution to this empirical challenge is to exploit 
unexpected institutional, environmental or policy changes which induce an assignment 
into treatment and control group that is ‗as good as random‘. The virtue of using quasi-
experimental research designs is that they produce empirical results which are 
characterized by a high degree of internal validity. However, this benefit comes at the 
12 
costs of a usually limited external validity: due to the uniqueness and the particularity of 
such quasi-experiments (e.g., affecting only a subgroup of the population at a specific 
point in time and place) it is by and large problematic to generalise the findings to other 
institutional or geographic environments or other time periods. Yet, it should be kept in 
mind that even the ‗gold standard‘ of empirical research—randomised experiments—is 
always bound to time and place. 
The empirical analysis in Chapter 2 addresses a long-standing question in labour 
economics, namely whether public sector workers receive rents that give them a net 
advantage in the form of higher levels of job satisfaction compared to their colleagues in 
the private sector. Answering this question has potentially profound implications for the 
incentive structure and design of the public sector labour market (e.g., wage setting 
policies). However, the empirical analysis is generally non-trivial since the observed 
allocation of individuals across sectors is typically a result of choices and thus non-
random. This self-selection of certain types of workers (e.g. inherently happy or 
unhappy persons) into particular jobs could lead to a spurious correlation of sector 
affiliation and job satisfaction. The main contribution of the job satisfaction analysis in 
Chapter 2 is to solve the problem of self-selection into public and private sector jobs by 
using a natural experiment which induced a random allocation of workers across 
sectors. More specifically, the identification strategy rests on an instrumental variable 
approach which exploits the unique large-scale privatization process that emerged after 
the break-down of the Soviet Union and created a private sector. The empirical results 
suggest a significantly positive public sector satisfaction premium in Post-Soviet 
Ukraine which holds even after correcting for worker self-selection. This finding 
implies that public sector workers indeed seem to enjoy rents (i.e. comparatively better 
jobs). Furthermore, the public-private job satisfaction gap can be partly explained by 
sector differences in job and workplace characteristics, and in particular by more 
generous fringe benefits in the public sector. 
Chapter 3 is devoted to the assessment of the long-term subjective well-being 
and mental health toll of a major nuclear accident – the Chernobyl disaster of April 26, 
1986. While the previous research interest was mainly directed towards possible adverse 
implications for somatic health outcomes, primarily cancer, psychologists started to 
explore possible effects on mental health. Health and predominantly mental diseases are 
major determinants of life satisfaction – even more important than income (Layard 
2005). Hence, in order to grasp the full dimension of the long-term effects of the 
13 
Chernobyl catastrophe it is crucial to add to the existing evidence an evaluation of the 
disaster‘s causal implications for subjective well-being and mental health. The main 
contributions of Chapter 3 are to provide such an empirical assessment based on two 
large and nationally representative Ukrainian datasets from the years 2003 to 2007 and 
to compute the induced loss in life satisfaction in monetary terms.  
In order to identify the causal effect of the 1986 nuclear catastrophe, the 
empirical analysis takes advantage of the fact that the unique survey data from Ukraine 
allow to link 1986 official radiation doses to survey participants according to their 
places of residence in the year of the disaster. The results based on these regional 
radiation doses as well as on individual self-reported measures of affectedness indicate 
that the Chernobyl disaster has a significantly negative effect on subjective well-being 
and adverse implications for mental health more than 17 years after the event. There is 
furthermore suggestive evidence that individuals exposed to higher levels of radiation 
seem to engage in some precautionary health behaviour and appear to be more 
dependent on state transfers. Expressed in monetary terms, the estimated amount of 
income required to compensate for the experienced utility loss amounts to a tremendous 
annual cost of about ten percent of Ukraine‘s GDP. 
Chapter 4 sheds light on potential second order effects of parental leave policies 
on child outcomes. In many countries parental leave entitlements (including job 
protection and/or income compensation) belong to the main policy instruments aimed at 
helping young families reconcile working life with family life. However, up to now, the 
possible advantages and disadvantages of such policies for female labour market as well 
as family and child outcomes are still disputed. The main contribution of Chapter 4 is to 
add a further piece of evidence to the few causal empirical assessments of the effect of 
prolonged parental leave on medium-term child outcomes. To this end, the chapter 
presents estimations of the net reduced form or intention-to-treat effect of a twelve 
months expansion of paid and job-protected parental leave which came into effect in 
Austria on July 1, 1990. The analysed child outcomes are cognitive skills of 15 year old 
children – measured by standardized PISA test scores (Programme for International 
Student Assessment). The main empirical strategy is based on a Difference-in-
Differences (DID) design which exploits the variation in the duration of parental leave 
created by the specific cut-off date of the reform. The estimated results of this 
assessment suggest that the overall effect of the parental leave extension on test scores 
is close to zero and not statistically significant. However, separate regressions by 
14 
subgroups (educational level of mother; gender of child) reveal potentially important 
heterogeneity in the reform impact: the main DID estimates indicate a strong and 
statistically significant positive reform effect for children (especially for boys) of highly 
educated mothers. This finding appears to be robust to most – but not to all – sensitivity 
checks and thus has to be treated cautiously. 
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2 Job Satisfaction and Self-Selection into the Public or Private 
Sector: Evidence from a Natural Experiment 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter revisits the established research question on public-private wage 
differentials from a subjective well-being perspective. In particular, it focuses on 
differences in job satisfaction between state and private sector employees in Ukraine 
and thereby follows the comparatively recently emerging economics literature which 
has assessed public-private sector differentials in terms of subjective well-being 
outcomes in several Western European countries (see Clark and Senik 2006 for France 
and Great Britain; Demoussis and Giannakopoulos 2007 for Greece; Ghinetti 2007 for 
Italy; Heywood, Siebert and Wei 2002 for the UK; Luechinger, Meier and Stutzer 2008 
for 25 European and 17 Latin-American countries; Luechinger, Stutzer and 
Winkelmann 2006, 2010 for 19 European countries and a separate analysis for 
Germany). Strikingly, the majority of these studies find that public sector workers are 
on average more satisfied with their jobs than their private sector counterparts (this is 
true, for instance, for France, Germany, Greece, Italy and the United Kingdom).  
Taking this finding as a starting point, the main aim of this chapter is to 
investigate whether observed average public-private satisfaction gaps represent rents – 
i.e., genuine differences in objective job and workplace characteristics – or whether they 
are an artificial result caused by non-random self-selection of workers based on 
unobservable personality traits. In this context, the problem of self-selection would 
imply that workers with intrinsically higher satisfaction levels tend to sort into one 
particular sector, thus creating a spurious correlation between average satisfaction levels 
and sector affiliation. The empirical analysis in this study complements and extends the 
existing literature by applying a new empirical strategy to correct for this potentially 
endogenous selection of individuals into sectors. 
This research objective is not only motivated by the intention to shed more light 
on the functioning of the labour market in general. There is a long-standing research 
interest among labour economists in public sector labour markets due to the public 
sector‘s sizeable share in the total labour force in most countries (at least 15 percent in 
16 
developed countries) and its distinct particularities, like the collective wage setting 
mechanisms and the distinct objectives that guide decision making, e.g. affirmative 
action (Altonji and Blank 1999; Blank 1985; Ehrenberg and Schwarz 1987; Gregory 
and Borland 1999). For instance, according to OECD data, in 1995 the share of public 
sector employment in total employment was slightly above 30 percent in Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden, was around 25 percent in Finland and France, around 20 percent 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada and Iceland and around 15 percent in Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States (Gregory 
and Borland 1999). Public sector employment made up only about 10 percent of total 
employment in Luxembourg and the Netherlands and about 6 percent in Japan (Gregory 
and Borland 1999). Furthermore, the question of whether public sector compensation is 
too high is currently highly debated in the United Kingdom and other Western 
economies (see, for instance, Danzer and Dolton (2011) for the UK public debate). This 
political debate is not only fuelled by the fact that public sector wages represent costs 
that have to be ultimately borne by tax payers, but also because of their implications for 
private sector employers in terms of hiring and labour costs. 
To this date, the extensive economics literature – dating back as far as Adam 
Smith – has mainly focused on the phenomenon of substantial and long-term wage 
differentials between industries and sectors, and in particular between public and private 
sector workers. From a theoretical point of view, there are several explanations for why 
wage differentials between industries or sectors might exist and why it might be optimal 
for certain firms (or sectors) to pay higher wages than others. One the one hand, these 
wage differences could reflect compensating differentials (monetary compensation for 
unpleasant job aspects) implying market clearing wages (by equalizing a worker‘s 
utility across jobs or sectors).
1
 On the other hand, these differences could represent 
systematic ‗rents‘ (non-compensating differentials) which could be driven, for instance, 
by efficiency wages or rent-sharing motives, union bargaining power or political 
economy considerations related to elections (Katz and Autor 1999).  
                                                          
1
 According to the theory of compensating or equalizing wage differentials dating back to Adam Smith, 
such differences might simply reflect a higher remuneration for ‗unpleasant‘ job aspects (that employers 
have to offer in order to attract workers to these jobs e.g., hazardous jobs, night shifts) (Rosen 1987). The 
underlying idea is that when choosing employers employees tradeoff benefits (pecuniary and non-
pecuniary job aspects) against costs of particular jobs as to maximize their utility. For the marginal 
worker who chooses between two jobs, it is thus the net advantage from benefits and costs (effort) that 
tend to equalize. 
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However, the empirical analysis of inter-industry or inter-sector wage 
differentials faces at least two major challenges which the present analysis strives to 
overcome: first, the concept and measurement of wages and secondly, unobserved 
heterogeneity among workers (i.e. omitted variables like ability, productivity or 
personality traits). As regards the first challenge, a thorough investigation requires 
detailed information not only on worker, job and workplace characteristics, but also a 
good measure for total compensation, comprising not only wages but also other 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary components and fringe benefits, for instance, pension 
schemes, paid vacation, sick leave, and flexibility of working times. However, a 
comprehensive measurement and monetary expression of these fringe benefits and non-
pecuniary job aspects poses a serious challenge to the empirical research.
2
 The second 
challenge in analysing the wage gap is to account for possible self-selection into 
industries and sectors that is driven by unobservables.
3
 If certain sectors attract workers 
with higher productivity or ability (unobservable by the researcher) and these workers 
receive higher wages, then simple least squares estimates of the wage premium in this 
sector will be upward-biased (Gibbons and Katz 1992). Hence, the correction of the 
potential endogeneity of the sector variable is crucial in order to identify true wage 
differences.  
In the following empirical analysis, the first challenge of appropriate measures 
of total compensation and job disamenities is addressed by focusing on job satisfaction. 
The virtue of job satisfaction as a single measure is that it presumably represents a 
comprehensive assessment of all relevant job aspects, amenities and disamenities, and 
thus overcomes the problem of assessing total compensation and non-pecuniary job 
aspects. According to Hamermesh (2001, p. 2): ―Only one measure, the satisfaction that 
workers derive from their jobs, might be viewed as reflecting how they react to the 
entire panoply of job characteristics. Indeed, a potentially useful view is that job 
satisfaction is the resultant of the worker's weighting in his/her own mind of all the job's 
aspects.‖ Hence, to the extent that differences in job satisfaction reflect an unequal 
distribution of relative net advantages across sectors and jobs, the analysis of inter-
sector satisfaction differentials can be informative about the existence of sector specific 
                                                          
2
 See Hamermesh (1999) for an early account of the role of nonpecuniary aspects in the development of 
overall earnings inequality in the US. The most comprehensive attempt to measure total compensation in 
the public and private sectors is performed by Danzer and Dolton (2011) who combine various data 
sources to account for differences in e.g., pension schemes, fringe benefits, unemployment risks, in the 
UK. 
3
 In fact, the problem of self-selection is omnipresent whenever outcomes of groups are being compared 
and the group ‗membership‘ is a choice variable. 
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rents and thus extends and complements previous studies focusing on differences in 
measurable, objective earnings measures. However, the merit of job satisfaction as a 
single, comprehensive metric comes at the cost of its complexity, which is the result of 
relative assessments, prior expectations, adaptation/habituation and personality traits 
(for a detailed review see Clark, Frijters and Shields (2008)).  
As regards the empirical problem of self-selection, in an ideal experimental 
setting this question could be answered by comparing the average job satisfaction of 
individuals who were randomly assigned either to the public or the private sector (the 
average treatment effect).
4
 This would provide information on the counterfactual 
scenario, of how much more or less an average person would be satisfied by working in 
the either the private or the public sector. Since carrying out such a randomized 
experiment is unfeasible, the identification strategy in this study rests on a unique 
natural experiment which generated an exogenous variation in the share of public sector 
employment in total employment: a fraction of the workforce was de facto randomly re-
allocated from the public into the private sector.
5
 More specifically, the empirical 
strategy exploits the tremendous changes in enterprise ownership structure (from a 
situation of exclusive state ownership of all firms to a mixture of state and private 
ownership across firms) that were part of the transition process in Eastern European 
countries following the break-up of the Soviet Union. The data comes from a unique 
and nationally representative survey of Post-Soviet Ukraine (2003-2007) that contains 
almost complete retrospective individual work histories since Soviet times. This way, 
the data provides crucial information on pre-determined job and workplace 
characteristics (Soviet jobs) as well as on the privatization process during the 1990s. To 
correct for possible self-selection bias in the Post-Soviet public sector satisfaction 
premium, an instrumental variable approach is applied that assigns a certain 
‗privatization probability‘ to each individual based on his/her Soviet pre-transition job 
characteristics.  
This research contributes to the previous literature in several ways. First, in 
contrast to earlier studies on public-private sector satisfaction differentials, the empirical 
strategy of this research paper is to use for the first time an instrumental variable 
                                                          
4
 It has to be noted, that the results will always reflect the distribution of individual preferences for either 
of the two sectors. Imagine a situation where 70 percent of the population would be better off working in 
the private sector, but the share of private sector employment would only be 50 percent of total 
employment. A random assignment to the sectors would generate a situation in which 70 percent of the 
private, but only 30 percent of the public sector employees would be satisfied with their job. 
5
 In Section 3 it will be argued that this allocation is random conditional on observables. 
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approach to correct for worker self-selection between the public and the private sector 
and to thereby identify the causal effect of public sector employment on job satisfaction. 
The empirical approach exploits the exogenous changes in ownership structure during 
the transition process from planned to market economy. To the best of my knowledge 
this is the first study that strives to identify the pure sector satisfaction differential based 
on such an exogenous variation in the sector allocation of workers.  
Second, it adds further empirical evidence to the literature on inter-industry and 
inter-sector wage differentials by providing further indirect evidence for non-equalizing 
differences in total compensation as measured by significant public-private job 
satisfaction gaps.  
Third, detailed survey information on fringe benefits and payment schemes 
allows an assessment of whether the public sector satisfaction premium is driven by 
different wage levels and/or non-pecuniary job amenities like social benefits. This 
research thus contributes to the literature on the importance of job amenities and 
payment schemes for job satisfaction.
6
 
Fourth, to the best of my knowledge the present study is also one of the first to 
analyse job satisfaction in a country of the former Soviet Union based on a nationally 
representative dataset. It thus complements and extends the strand of literature that has 
analysed overall life satisfaction in Russia (e.g., Eggers, Gaddy, and Graham 2006; 
Frijters, Geishecker, Haisken-DeNew and Shields 2006; Graham and Pettinato 2002; 
Guriev and Zhuravskaya 2009; Senik 2004). However, by shifting the focus of the 
attention to job satisfaction, the present work highlights one of the domains that has 
been particularly affected by the transition process, namely the labour market. Against 
this background the results of the present study might yield important insights for any 
policies or reforms aimed at further fostering and establishing a market-based economic 
system which is closely connected with the development of a well-functioning private 
sector. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: the next section explains 
how job satisfaction is interpreted in the present analysis and provides a brief discussion 
of empirical approaches and findings of previous studies on job satisfaction differentials 
between public and private sector employees. Section 2.3 explains the empirical 
                                                          
6
  A recent study which determines the value of job amenities explicitly in the context of compensating 
differentials is Helliwell and Huang (2010) for Canada. 
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problem of self-selection and describes the identification strategy in greater detail. 
These considerations are complemented by further background information on the 
emergence of the private sector following the collapse of the Soviet Union (Section 
2.4). A description of the data set as well as the construction of the instrumental 
variables is provided in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 presents the main regression results 
(without and with correcting for self-selection) and discusses several robustness and 
sensitivity checks. The role of sector differences in the provision of social and financial 
benefits is assessed in Section 2.7. Section 2.8 concludes.   
2.2 Job satisfaction and previous findings on public-private sector 
satisfaction gaps 
2.2.1 The concept of job satisfaction 
The underlying interpretation of reported job satisfaction in the present analysis 
is derived from the theory of ‗Evolutionary Efficiency and Happiness‘ by Rayo and 
Becker (2007) and the theoretical considerations presented by Hamermesh (2001), 
Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette (2004) and Clark, Frijters and Shields (2008).
7
   
The model by Rayo and Becker (2007) centres on the key idea that happiness 
and satisfaction functions (utility in general) involve relative comparisons and that the 
optimal happiness function is a purely relative measure of success. In this way their 
model can also be related to the growing evidence of the importance of relative 
comparisons in subjective well-being assessments (intertemporal and interpersonal 
comparisons). ―In any given period, the agent‘s happiness depends exclusively on the 
difference between his output y and an endogenous reference point yˆ  which serves as a 
performance benchmark (the difference yy ˆ  is the carrier of happiness). This 
reference point yˆ  is positioned according to the current opportunities faced by the 
agent and is updated over time in tandem with changes in these opportunities.‖ (Rayo 
and Becker 2007, p. 306)  
This basic setup can be adapted to the context of job satisfaction in the following 
way: the ‗output y‘ is being replaced by a measure )( ji k , which reflects an individual 
                                                          
7
 Rayo and Becker (2007) present a theoretical model of happiness, in which the degree of happiness is a 
device, by which agents can successfully discriminate between different alternatives and thereby increase 
the efficiency of their choices. However, in my opinion, the main arguments can be applied to the 
analysis and interpretation of job satisfaction as well. 
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specific ‗net advantage‘ (rent or net utility) from a job with a given vector of job 
characteristics jk  (job amenities and disamenities). The benchmark *)(ˆ ji k  will in this 
case reflect a reference point or benchmark level of ‗net advantage‘ that the same 
individual could achieve in another job with an individually optimal vector of job 
characteristics *jk (among all combinations of realizations of the elements of jk  which 
are available on the labour market, *jk is the vector of job characteristics that 
maximizes )( ji k ). The distance *)(ˆ)( jiji kk   will affect the level of job 
satisfaction: the larger the distance, the less satisfied the individual. The function )(i
that translates the vector of job characteristics into a measure of ‗net advantages‘ is 
individual specific (i.e. dependent on ability, health and family situation).  
If the benchmark is endogenously determined and updated each period, what are 
the factors shaping *)(ˆ ji k  or the optimal vector of job characteristics *jk ? According 
to the large psychology and economics literature investigating the effect of absolute and 
relative income on life satisfaction and happiness, this reference point can be influenced 
by outcomes of others (social comparison) as well as by one‘s own past (habituation) 
(Clark, Frijters and Shields 2008). Hamermesh (2001) emphasizes the important role of 
prior expectations for overall job satisfaction. In this sense, the size of *)(ˆ ji k  could 
also be interpreted as a prior expectation which is formed based on one‘s own 
experience and the achievement of others. Any shortfall in realized ‗net advantages‘ 
from this prior expectation will then result in lower satisfaction. In the model by Lévy-
Garboua and Montmarquette (2004) a worker‘s reported job satisfaction reflects the 
experienced preferences for his/her job. In their framework job satisfaction ―indicates 
how one‘s own experienced sequence of jobs compares with mentally experienced 
alternatives‖ and thus reflects whether the individual would ―wish to repeat his past 
career if he now had to choose again‖ (Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette 2004, p. 136). 
This notion can be incorporated into the above framework by interpreting )( ji k  and 
*)(ˆ ji k  as mirroring the complete sequences of realized ‗net advantages‘ versus 
potential ‗net advantages‘ since the beginning of the working life.  
To sum up, in the following analysis job satisfaction will be interpreted as an 
indicator of the distance of an individual‘s current job (vector of job aspects) from his 
benchmark job (generating a shortfall from the potential ‗net advantage‘). The 
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implication for labour market outcomes is that unsatisfied workers will aim at attaining 
a higher job satisfaction by switching jobs (if the benefit of higher job satisfaction 
outweighs the switching costs). In this sense, job satisfaction can be seen as an 
economic variable that is informative about the processes and situations preceding 
decisions and choices in the labour market. For instance, Freeman (1978) demonstrates 
that lower job satisfaction is associated with a higher quit probability (see also Clark, 
Frijters and Shields (2008) for examples of panel data studies demonstrating the 
predictive power of job satisfaction for future behaviour). 
2.2.2 Previous literature on public-private satisfaction differentials 
Recent empirical studies have shown that many countries exhibit substantial 
differences in job satisfaction levels between the public and the private sector (Table 
2-1 provides a list of all recent economic studies with an explicit focus on public-private 
sector job satisfaction differentials). Although the size and the sign of the public-private 
satisfaction gap are likely to depend on the country specific institutional framework 
which typically varies a lot across nations, surprisingly, the majority of these studies 
find a public sector satisfaction premium (e.g., in Germany, Greece, Italy and the United 
Kingdom).  
 
Table 2-1: Empirical studies on public and private sector job satisfaction 
differentials  
Study Country and sample Empirical Method Findings 
Heywood, 
Siebert and Wei 
(2002) 
UK; British Household 
Panel Study (BHPS) 
1991-94; employed 
workers with complete 
information in the 4 
waves (men and women) 
OLS (with pooled 
panel data), Panel 
fixed effects and first 
difference estimates of 
job switchers  
[Dependent Variable 
(DV): job satisfaction] 
OLS and First 
difference: significant 
public sector 
satisfaction premium 
Panel FE: insignificant 
effect 
Clark and Senik 
(2006) 
France and Great 
Britain; French part of 
the European 
Community Household 
Panel (ECHP) – 1994 to 
2001; British Household 
Panel Survey (BHPS) –  
1991 to 2001 
OLS and fixed effects 
panel estimation  
[DV: job satisfaction 
and wages] 
France: significant 
public sector 
satisfaction premium in 
OLS and Panel FE  
UK: OLS: insignificant 
effect; Panel FE: 
significant satisfaction 
premium 
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Table 2-1 continued   
Demoussis and 
Giannakopoulos 
(2007) 
Greece; Greek 
component of the 
European Community 
Household Panel 
(ECHP) from 1995 to 
2001  
Random effects 
ordered probit model 
[DV: total job 
satisfaction; 
satisfaction with 
earnings, job security, 
working hours, 
working time] 
Significant public sector 
satisfaction premium in 
overall job satisfaction 
as well as in each other 
job aspect 
Ghinetti (2007) Italy; Household Survey 
from the Bank of Italy 
1995 
Ordered probit model 
(and ordered probit 
switching model) 
[DV: satisfaction with 
six different types of 
non-pecuniary job 
amenities] 
Ordered probit model: 
significant public sector 
premium on satisfaction 
with constructed 
indicator for overall 
non-pecuniary aspects 
Luechinger, 
Stutzer and 
Winkelmann 
(2006) 
19 European countries 
(no  Central and Eastern 
European transition 
countries); European 
Social Survey (ESS) 
2002 and 2004 (waves 1 
and 2); GSOEP 2004 
Ordered probit models 
and endogenous 
ordered probit 
switching models 
[DV: ESS: life 
satisfaction; GSOEP: 
job satisfaction] 
Pooled sample, simple 
ordered probit: public 
sector satisfaction 
premium; authors find 
significant aggregate 
gains from sorting as 
opposed to a random 
allocation of workers 
Luechinger, 
Meier and 
Stutzer (2008) 
25 European countries 
and 17 Latin-American 
countries; ESS 2002 and 
2004; Latinobarometer 
1997, 2000, 2001, 2003; 
Eurobarometer (14 
waves, 1989-1994)  
Estimation of country 
specific satisfaction 
differentials that are 
then included as DV 
in a cross-country 
macro estimation 
[DV: life satisfaction] 
Cross country variation 
in sign and size of 
public sector 
satisfaction premium. 
The majority of 
countries show a 
positive public sector 
premium. 
Luechinger, 
Stutzer and 
Winkelmann 
(2010) 
Germany; German 
Socio-Economic Panel 
(GSOEP) 2004; male 
workers aged 25-60 in 
West Germany 
Ordered probit with 
endogenous binary 
variable and 
endogenous ordered 
probit switching 
models  
[DV: job satisfaction] 
Without controlling for 
self-selection: small 
public sector premium; 
Correcting for self-
selection, the gap 
increases; Evidence for 
negative selection into 
public sector 
 
For example, expressed in terms of foregone wages, an average Greek public 
sector employee would be willing to accept a wage cut by 4.5 percent in order to avoid a 
job in the private sector – holding initial job satisfaction levels constant (Demoussis and 
Giannakopoulos 2007). In Italy, public sector workers are on average 3.5 percent more 
likely to be very satisfied with their jobs than their private sector colleagues (Ghinetti 
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2007). The papers by Clark and Senik (2006), Luechinger, Meier and Stutzer (2008) 
and Luechinger, Stutzer and Winkelmann (2010) interpret and assess these satisfaction 
gaps with an explicit reference to the existence of rents in the labour market. Potential 
underlying factors behind these satisfaction premiums in the public sector could involve 
higher wages, monetary and nonmonetary fringe benefits as well as bribes (Luechinger, 
Meier and Stutzer 2008).  
Furthermore, sector differences in job and income security may also play an 
important role. Job security as a job amenity might be especially valuable during 
economic recessions or in generally more volatile economic circumstances in 
developing countries: using German panel data and European cross-sectional data, 
Luechinger, Meier and Stutzer (2010) demonstrate that life satisfaction of public sector 
workers is less affected by economic downturns and increasing rates of unemployment 
rates than life satisfaction of private sector workers. The authors interpret their findings 
as evidence for the fact that public sector employees are better shielded from economic 
shocks and that this higher economic security is valued by public sector workers. 
Further evidence on higher levels of job security of public sector workers is provided by 
Clark and Postel-Vinay (2009). Using data on satisfaction with job security for 12 
European countries from the European Community Household Panel the authors show 
that perceived job security is also related to the extent of employment protection as well 
as to the generosity of unemployment insurance benefits. In addition, Rodrik (2000) 
argues that especially in developing countries which are vulnerable and exposed to 
external risks, higher levels of comparatively secure public sector jobs might reflect 
partial insurance of households against income risks (private sector workers can benefit 
indirectly from these secure jobs through economic spill-over effects). 
However, the empirical research on public-private sector satisfaction gaps has to 
deal with and overcome the same empirical challenges caused by the sorting of workers 
as the research on wage differentials. If unobserved heterogeneity of workers leads to 
systematic self-selection into the public or private sector then simple OLS estimates of 
the satisfaction differential will be biased. Much in line with the literature on wage 
differentials, the empirical studies on job satisfaction have accounted for the problem of 
self-selection by either panel methods, controlling for individual fixed effects (Clark 
and Senik 2006; Heywood, Siebert and Wei 2002) or by estimating endogenous 
switching regression models (Luechinger, Stutzer and Winkelmann 2010). In the case of 
panel estimations either individual fixed effects were included or first difference 
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(within) estimators were applied to the subsample of sector switchers. In both cases 
estimation of the public sector coefficient relies on individuals who switch between 
sectors. Although this approach improves the simple cross-sectional estimates by 
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity between individuals, results might still be 
biased as long as the decision to switch is still endogenously determined and thus the 
subsample of switchers represents a non-random sample of the population.
8
 
Furthermore, if levels of job satisfaction prior to a voluntary leave are particularly low 
(and thus foster the actual switching) then the immediate gain in satisfaction after 
switching jobs might overstate the true effect (similar to the Ashenfelter dip in the 
evaluation literature).
9
 Hence, panel data methods are ultimately limited in shedding 
light on random counterfactual outcomes to evaluate causal effects. This can instead be 
achieved with credible and valid instrumental variables which cause an exogenously 
determined allocation of workers across sectors.  
The second approach that has been used in empirical studies on the public-
private job satisfaction differential, endogenous switching regressions, strives to 
account for the selection by explicitly modelling and estimating the selection equation 
based on observables into the two sectors and by correcting the sector specific 
coefficients for the self-selection bias (Ghinetti 2007; Luechinger, Stutzer and 
Winkelmann 2006, 2010). This approach has been widely used in the analysis of public-
private wage differentials. Its focus is on the question whether individual and job 
characteristics generate different satisfaction returns in the two sectors. Although this 
empirical strategy loosens the restrictions on the coefficients by allowing for sector 
specific variation, the identification (correction for self-selection) rests on particular 
functional form assumptions (as well as valid instruments to act as exclusion restrictions 
in the selection equation).  
                                                          
8
 Luechinger, Stutzer and Winkelmann (2006) stress this point in their discussion. This problem of fixed 
effects panel estimations has also been addressed in the literature on wage differentials (e.g. Gibbons and 
Katz 1992).  
9
 This would correspond to the problem of the Ashenfelter dip or pre-programme dip in the evaluation 
literature (referring to the seminal article by Ashenfelter 1978). In fact, a study by Boswell, Boudreau and 
Tichy (2005) furthermore shows that levels of job satisfaction do not only tend to be lower prior to 
voluntary job changes but also ‗too‘ high immediately after the job change and declining afterwards (the 
authors call this effect the honeymoon-hangover effect). However, a panel data study by Clark, Diener, 
Georgellis and Lucas (2008) demonstrates that there are substantial anticipatory and adaptation effects of 
certain life events on life satisfaction, e.g., unemployment, marriage, and that both ‗lead‘ and ‗lag‘ effects 
can go in the same direction. If this was also true for job satisfaction and voluntary job changes fixed 
effects models focusing on job switchers would underestimate the true job satisfaction differential. 
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In the previous job satisfaction literature, the main debate in terms of self-
selection thus far focused on the question whether low levels of job satisfaction of union 
workers reflect endogenous sorting or not (see, e.g. Bender and Sloane 1998; Borjas 
1979; Bryson, Cappellari, and Lucifora 2004; Heywood, Siebert and Wei 2002). Apart 
from panel data methods these studies have attempted to solve the problem of self-
selection into union membership by using instrumental variable techniques, although 
credible instruments for union membership are difficult to find (for instance, these 
studies used attitudes towards unions, occupational or industry sector dummy variables 
as instrumental variables).  
2.3 Identification strategy in the context of self-selection   
This section explains the problem of self-selection into the public and the private 
sector in the context of job satisfaction in greater detail. It also presents the 
identification strategy of the empirical analysis and critically discusses the identifying 
assumptions. 
2.3.1 Possible bias through self-selection into the public and private sector 
To assess the causal effect of genuine differences in job characteristics between 
private and public sector jobs, one would ideally observe and compare each person‘s 
level of job satisfaction in similar jobs across the two sectors. Since such 
counterfactuals are generally not observable, one could simply compare the average 
levels of job satisfaction between sectors (controlling for observable characteristics) if 
the distribution of individuals across these two sectors was random with respect to 
intrinsic satisfaction levels (or at least random conditional on observable, exogenous 
characteristics). 
However, in free, market based economies the observed allocation of workers in 
the labour market is generally the outcome of a selection and sorting process through 
which individuals (and firms) search and find their best matching jobs (and employees) 
according to their characteristics, preferences and information set. For instance, several 
empirical studies show that employees report higher levels of job satisfaction the better 
their job matches their skills (Belfield and Harris 2002; Vieira 2005). As a result, there 
should be utility gains from sorting in the labour market (Luechinger, Stutzer and 
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Winkelmann 2006).
10
 In other words, individuals choose their jobs in order to maximize 
their personal ‗net advantage‘ from working (i.e., minimize the distance to their 
individual benchmark). However, a priori, there are no reasons why this sorting process 
should lead to systematic higher job satisfaction levels in the state than in the private 
sector (in a well-functioning labour market). And thus the question remains as to how 
the observed higher levels of job satisfaction among public sector workers can be 
explained. 
One possible explanation is that the public-private job satisfaction gap is caused 
by the fact that the public sector offers on average better remuneration packages 
(including non-pecuniary job amenities) and working conditions than the private sector. 
Such a situation would imply queues for public sector jobs (as suggested by Krueger 
(1988) for the US
11
). This should lead to a lower average satisfaction level among 
private sector employees, since they feel they would be better off in the public sector on 
average (i.e., they could achieve a higher level of ‗net advantage‘ in the public sector). 
If this is the case, the public sector satisfaction premium would indeed reflect ‗rents‘, 
i.e. non-compensating differentials in total compensation.
12
 Furthermore, if public 
sector jobs are indeed more attractive and there is queuing for these jobs, then a random 
reallocation of workers should not cancel out the observed satisfaction gap (i.e. the 
positive job satisfaction public-private satisfaction gap should remain after correcting 
for self-selection).  
The alternative explanation for the observed positive public-private satisfaction 
gap is that those worker characteristics which drive the sorting across sectors are 
correlated with unobserved intrinsic levels of happiness (in the absence of queuing for 
public sector jobs, i.e. public sector jobs are on average as attractive as private sector 
jobs). This would imply a non-random allocation of workers in terms of their inherent 
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 In fact, this ‗matching‘ process into the private and public sector should lead to a higher aggregate job 
satisfaction level as explained and shown by Luechinger, Stutzer and Winkelmann (2006) for Germany. 
Their analysis demonstrates that the share of ‗very satisfied‘ workers (among all workers) is significantly 
higher in the actual allocation of workers as compared to a purely random allocation of workers across 
sectors. However, it is not clear to what extent this re-allocation should affect the public-private job 
satisfaction gap, since this will depend on the distribution of preferences in the population as well as the 
size of the public vis-à-vis the private sector. 
11
 For an overview and a discussion of the distinct feature of the public sector labour market as well as 
differences in employment composition between public and private sectors see, e.g. Gregory and Borland 
(1999) and Krueger (1988). 
12
 The size of ‗bureaucratic rents‘ is likely to depend on country specific institutional settings that 
determine the ‗remuneration packages‘ of public sector employees (wages, fringe benefits, pension 
schemes, job and income security, etc.) as well as weak institutions or market imperfections, including 
corruption (Clark and Senik 2006; Luechinger, Meier and Stutzer 2008). Furthermore, the flexibility of 
labour contracts and the ease of mobility of workers (switching costs) will affect the size of the rents. 
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satisfaction levels. In this scenario, the positive public-private satisfaction gap would be 
a spurious result and not indicative of sector differences in job and workplace 
characteristics. This spurious satisfaction gap would be caused by the fact that 
individuals from the upper part of an underlying satisfaction distribution (those who are 
inherently more happy or more easily satisfied) sort into the public sector (Heywood, 
Siebert and Wei 2002). Correcting for this type of selection by randomly re-allocating 
workers across sectors should eliminate the spurious satisfaction premium.  
2.3.2 Identification strategy and identifying assumptions  
To correct for any self-selection bias, the identification strategy in the following 
analysis takes advantage of the dramatic changes in the ownership structure of firms in 
Ukraine which began after the collapse of the Soviet Union. More specifically, the 
fundamental restructuring process in the Post-Soviet era provides the researcher with 
information on the allocation of workers in two scenarios: a) the Soviet scenario in 
which all jobs are state sector jobs and b) the Post-Soviet scenario which is 
characterized by distinct private and state sector labour markets.  
 
Figure 2-1. Evolution of share of employment in state sector (budgetary 
organization, state enterprise, local municipal enterprise) and state or collective 
farms 
 
Source: ULMS 2003, own calculations based on all observations with the relevant retrospective information (N= 
7,058) 
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Within little more than 10 years the share of jobs in the Ukrainian private sector 
grew from virtually zero to over 50 percent (see Figure 2-1). This process of ownership 
restructuring creates a quasi-natural experiment in which workers in certain Soviet 
industries were reassigned from the state to the private sector.
13
 Despite the massive 
privatization and restructuring processes during the 1990s, there were still many 
industries with a substantially higher share of state sector ownership in 2003 than is 
typical for advanced market economies. Any sorting on the labour market that took 
place after the collapse of the Soviet Union and as a response to the development of a 
market economy with a distinct private and state sector can be measured and corrected 
for, since pre-transition and hence pre-determined information of worker allocation into 
what would be state sector or private sector jobs is available in the data. 
The empirical analysis strives to answer the question ―How big would the public 
sector utility premium be in Post-Soviet Ukraine in the absence of deliberate and non-
random sorting between the two sectors‖ (i.e., a random allocation across private and 
state sector conditional on observables). To this end, instrumental variable techniques 
will be implemented to correct for the possible non-random selection of certain 
personality types into the public sector and to identify the causal effect of potential 
differences in workplace characteristics. The constructed instrumental variable will 
assign to each worker a probability of working in the private sector in Post-Soviet 
Ukraine based on his/her pre-transition, Soviet job characteristics (industry sector and 
geographical location; the construction of the instrumental variable is described in more 
detail in Section 2.5.2 and in Appendix B at the end of this chapter). In this sense the 
instrumental variable represents an intention to treat (in the first stage), since not all 
individuals who were assigned to the treatment were actually treated. Some individuals 
in the treatment group might not have been ‗treated‘ because either their firm was never 
privatized or because they switched industries during the 1990s.
14
 However, this latter 
aspect will reduce the predictive power of the instrument (first stage results) only if it 
affects the allocation across treatment (private sector employment) and control group 
(state sector employment). Industry switchers within treatment and control group are not 
as problematic. The estimated effect represents a local average treatment effect (LATE) 
                                                          
13
  This is similar to the approach and identification strategy by Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln (2005), 
who exploit the German re-unification ‗experiment‘ to disentangle the estimation of precautionary 
savings from self-selection into low-risk occupations. In their setup the re-unification is interpreted as a 
‗re-assignment‘ of income risks for certain occupational groups. 
14
 In the sample used in the empirical analysis around 55 percent of the workers are still working in the 
same industry they used to work in during the Soviet Union.  
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since the identification of the effect is based on individuals who comply with their 
assigned treatment and switch sectors because of this assignment (Imbens and Angrist 
1994). 
In order to identify the causal effect of working in the public sector, the 
employed instrumental variables zi have to satisfy several conditions: (i) zi has to be 
sufficiently correlated with the endogenous state sector dummy variable 
0),( statezCov i , (ii) zi has to be uncorrelated with the error term 0),( izCov , and 
(iii) zi has to meet the monotonicity assumption (Imbens and Angrist 1994). While 
condition (i), the strength of the instrument, can be tested by inspecting the first stage 
regression results, conditions (ii) and (iii) are untestable and one has to specifically 
argue that the instruments meet these criteria. It is plausible that the monotonicity 
condition (iii) holds as follows: if a person would choose to work in the private sector 
anyways (even if the person was not assigned to the private sector) this person would 
also choose to work in the private sector if the instrument assigned the person to the 
private sector. In other words, having a higher likelihood of being assigned to the 
private sector should not reverse or reduce the original choice intentions of an 
individual. 
Condition (ii) requires that during the Soviet Union there was no sorting (of 
happy types) into industries according to whether a job/industry was likely to become 
private or public sector later on. It is very plausible that this condition is satisfied simply 
because in the Soviet Union there was no private sector or any sector with features 
similar to those of the Western private sector (e.g. profit maximizing firms, competition, 
hard budget constraints, job uncertainty, and fringe benefits). Instead, full employment 
was guaranteed by the state (due to the constitutional right to work), wages, working 
hours and working conditions were set by the government (centralized regulations) and 
the wage distribution was relatively compressed (see Brown 1973; Gregory and Collier 
1988). Furthermore, social security and social benefits as well as fringe benefits like 
enterprise kindergarten or hospitals were provided irrespectively of economic or 
industrial sector (Flemming and Micklewright 2000; Friebel and Guriev 2005).  
The labour force participation of women was extremely high in comparison with 
Western standards at that time (Linz and Samykina 2008). In fact, since the Soviet 
Union was run and organized along political motives and principles, individual 
educational paths, fields of specialization as well as advancement in the professional 
31 
career were more closely connected to political loyalty and political decisions rather 
than to individual ability or preferences (Titma and Roots 2006). For instance, it is 
estimated that about 60 to 70 percent of graduates starting their first job were allocated 
by the government to meet labour requirements in certain industries and regions 
(Haddad 1972). In addition, labour market choices and mobility of individuals were 
limited due to the internal passport system as well as to the administrative allocation of 
housing during the Soviet Union (Gregory and Kohlhase 1988). Choice options of 
individuals were also restricted by geographic availability of jobs and industries. The 
spatial segregation of production enforced by the planners limited the diversity of 
industries within certain regions (Friebel and Guriev 2005). In extreme cases, the entire 
population of an area was working in a single, large state-owned enterprise (one 
company towns). This evidence against a systematic self-selection of workers across 
sectors in the Soviet Union in terms of unobserved personality traits is similar to the one 
provided in the paper by Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln (2005). The authors use 
German re-unification as a natural experiment in order to analyse the importance of 
self-selection for precautionary savings. Although their empirical strategy is not based 
on an instrumental variable approach, their fundamental identification assumption has 
much in common to the one presented here: prior to the re-unification risk averse 
individuals living in the socialist German Democratic Republic (GDR) had no incentive 
to sort into particular sectors or occupations, since labour income risk was extremely 
low in all jobs and occupational choice was politically restricted.  
Another important assumption for the instrument to be valid in the current 
analysis is that it affects Post-Soviet job satisfaction only through the assignment into 
the state or private sector (i.e. that this assignment is uncorrelated with unobservable 
characteristics that might be associated with higher levels of job satisfaction and that the 
assignment in itself does not have a direct effect on job satisfaction). This aspect is 
further addressed in Section 2.6.3.1 discussing and testing the robustness of the 
empirical results and the instrumental variables. Since the assignment is mainly based 
on Soviet industry affiliation, this requires that workers were randomly allocated across 
industries (or at least randomly across ‗would be private‘ and ‗would be state‘ 
industries). Given the description of worker allocation in the Soviet Union above, it 
seems plausible that this condition holds, even more so when one considers a random 
allocation conditional on other pre-determined observable personal characteristics.  
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Last but not least, from the point of view of a Soviet employee during the 1980s 
the collapse of the Soviet Union as well as the large scale privatization and restructuring 
process during the transition process were unexpected and unforeseeable.
15
 Hence, one 
can rule out the possibility that Soviet worker allocation across industries was a result of 
anticipatory behaviour. 
Given these particular features of worker allocation in the Soviet Union, the 
analysis in this study treats the distribution of workers across different industries (within 
geographical regions) during the Soviet Union as a valid counterfactual scenario against 
which the post-Soviet allocation of workers across state and privately owned firms can 
be assessed. 
2.4 The evolution of the private sector in Post-Soviet Ukraine 
The transition process from planned to market economy which followed the 
collapse of the Soviet Union led to an enormous change in the ownership structure of 
enterprises and firms. The evolution of the private sector was a result of at least two 
processes: the privatization process, through which formerly state owned entities were 
transformed into private ownership, and the creation of completely new firms (de novo 
firms) which had never been owned by the state.  
The privatization process in Ukraine started in 1992 and was slower in pace than 
in most other Central and Eastern European countries including Russia (Brown, Earle 
and Telegdy 2006).
16
 Still, in the period from 1992 to 2004 more than 96,549 formerly 
state-owned entities were transformed into private ownership by means of privatization 
(overall there were 981,054 entities in the Unified State Register of Enterprises and 
Organizations of Ukraine in 2003; State Statistics Committee of Ukraine 2005, 2008). 
Figure 2-2 reveals that privatization became relatively more frequent during the 
second half of the 1990s. In terms of labour market outcomes in the year 2003, 19.8 
percent of the total workforce was employed in enterprises that had changed their type 
of ownership (this number excludes small businesses; State Statistics Committee of 
Ukraine 2010). Privatization took place in all industry sectors, but the extent of 
                                                          
15 
A large literature has assessed and evaluated the privatization process and its effects. See, for example, 
Bennett, Estrin, and Maw (2007), Brown, Earle, and Telegdy (2010), Brown, Earle and Vakhitov (2006), 
Estrin, Hanousek, Kocenda, and Svejnar (2009), and Megginson and Netter (2001). 
16
 The Ukrainian Parliament approved the law on the First Privatization Program in July 1992 (Verkhovna 
Rada. The State Privatization Program for 1992; see Grygorenko and Lutz 2007). 
33 
privatization varied across industries.
17
 The choice of privatization methods was 
influenced by political goals emphasizing the speed and social acceptability of the 
privatization process which led to large scale mass privatizations (involving the 
distribution of free privatization certificates to citizens or share transfers to employees), 
especially at the beginning of the privatization process (Pivovarsky 2001). As Brown, 
Earle and Telegdy (2006) point out, the privatization process that accompanied the 
transition process in Eastern Europe was universal, implying that firms were less 
selectively and carefully chosen than is typically true for Western countries.     
 
Figure 2-2. Share of workers experiencing privatization of their workplace over 
time in Ukraine (affected workers among all employed in a given year) 
 
 
Notes: These numbers are based on retrospective self-reported privatization experiences during job tenure 
of the participants of the ULMS (for more information on the survey and data set, see Section 2.5). 
Source: ULMS 2003, own calculations. 
 
Generally, the privatization process in Ukraine can be divided into several 
phases. In the first years, between 1992 and 1994, the privatization process was very 
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 Table B 2-1 in the appendix shows the share of employees whose enterprise was privatized during the 
1990s among 27 different industries. The figures refer to jobs/industries held by employees in December 
1991 and were calculated based on the retrospective information in the Ukrainian Longitudinal 
Monitoring Survey 2003 (a more detailed description of the variable generation is provided in the 
appendix). 
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slow and resulted in privatizations of very few enterprises (on a case-by-case basis). 
However, the process gained momentum after the Ukrainian government launched a 
revised mass privatization program at the end of 1994 which had been prepared with the 
support of Western donors and advisors (USAID, World Bank, European Union and the 
EBRD) (USAID 1999). The goal of the programme was to privatize the universe of 
Ukraine‘s approximately 10,000 medium and large industrial enterprises by 1998 using 
the following objectives: (i) rapid and equitable distribution of shares to Ukrainian 
citizens (political objective), (ii) development of capital markets and the respective 
infrastructure, and (iii) fast creation of a critical mass of privately owned enterprises to 
trigger relevant modernization processes in the economy (USAID 1999). Interestingly, 
generation of state revenues was not the prior aim of the mass privatization programme. 
The objective to generate state revenues by means of privatization was given more 
priority in the later stages of the process after 1999 (Grygorenko and Lutz 2007).  
The method of mass privatization in Ukraine was carried out by distribution of 
privatization certificates or vouchers to all citizens. These vouchers could then be used 
to purchase shares of enterprises. Preferential purchase rights were given to employees 
and managers and remaining shares were sold to other persons holding privatization 
certificates (USAID 1999). In the largest enterprises, about 25 percent of shares were 
sold to employees and the public, the state initially kept between 25 to 51 percent of 
shares (especially in so-called ‗strategic enterprises‘) and the remaining shares were 
sold through cash and/or investment tenders or local stock exchange sales (USAID 
1999).
18
 In addition to the mass privatization programme for medium and large scale 
enterprises, about 40,000 shops and retail establishments were privatized by means of 
buyout to employees or cash auctions. The design of Ukraine‘s mass privatization 
process fundamentally shaped the resulting ownership structure of enterprises: 
ownership became widely dispersed and dominated by insiders (managers and workers) 
(Grygorenko and Lutz 2007).  
Next to the privatization procedure the destruction of old and inefficient (state-
owned) enterprises and the creation of de novo private firms fostered further job flows 
and contributed to the growing share of employment in the private sector. Figure 2-3 
gives an overview of the reasons why jobs that started during the Soviet period were 
                                                          
18 In 1995 the Ukrainian Parliament issued a list of 5,200 ‗enterprises banned from privatization in view 
of their importance for the national economy‘, which were mainly enterprises in the energy sector (power 
networks and energy systems, hydro and nuclear power stations, combined heat and power stations) 
(USAID 2000). An additional list of strategic enterprises (mainly monopolies) was established in 1997 
(Grygorenko and Lutz 2007). 
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terminated during the transition process in the 1990s (based on the ULMS 2003). Again, 
industries were heterogeneously affected by the extent of ‗closing down‘, ‗bankruptcy‘, 
‗reorganizations‘ and ‗mass lay-offs/personnel reductions‘. Importantly, only very few 
job separations were caused by privatizations. Furthermore, when considering the 
evolution of these different reasons for job separations over time, ‗personnel 
reductions‘, ‗closing down of enterprise‘ and ‗reorganization of enterprise‘ became the 
most frequent reasons job termination in the late 1990s and early 2000s (see Figure A 
2-1 in the appendix).  
 
Figure 2-3. Reasons for end of employment related to industrial restructuring, by 
industrial sector 1986 (share among all types of end of employment, incl. retiring, 
voluntary leaves, etc.) 
 
 
Source: ULMS 2003, own calculations based on all persons who have worked during the Soviet time and for whom 
this retrospective information is non-missing (N= 4,650).  
 
It is likely that the process of destruction and creation of firms (and jobs) not 
only affected the share of private employment across industry sectors, but even caused a 
shrinking of some industries and growth of others (e.g. shrinking industrial sector, 
growing service sector). Hence, probably some individuals were forced to leave their 
state sector employment in one industry and seek new opportunities in other industries. 
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Since the creation of new firms and jobs took mainly place in the private sector, it is 
likely that these structural changes de facto reallocated individuals into the private 
sector labour market.
19
 However, as the analysis by Lehmann, Pignatti and Wadsworth 
(2006) for Ukraine demonstrates, only one third of workers who lost their jobs as a 
consequence of the restructuring process (due to mass lay-offs, plant closures, etc.) were 
able to find new employment immediately. For the majority of workers the job 
displacement resulted in long-term non-employment.  
These two processes motivate the construction of two different industry specific 
instrumental variables to correct for the self-selection of workers across sectors: one is 
based on the privatization process only, while the other captures both, the extent of 
privatization and the creation of new firms across industries.  
2.5 Data set, variables and sample description 
The analysis is based on the Ukrainian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey 
(ULMS), a panel data set of a nationally representative sample of individuals aged 15 to 
72 who were interviewed in three waves in the years 2003, 2004 and 2007.
20
 The 
original raw sample size in 2003 consists of 8,537 individuals in 4,056 households, out 
of which 7,200 and 6,774 individuals were (re-)interviewed in 2004 and 2007 
respectively (3,449 and 3,101 households). The survey provides detailed information on 
individual labour market activities, workplace and job characteristics plus all relevant 
and standard individual socio-demographic characteristics like education, marital status, 
children and health. Furthermore, information about the respondents‘ households, e.g., 
household size and composition, locality and quality of place of living, household 
income and household expenditure, is included. 
There are two special features that make this data set unique in comparison to 
other surveys and hence, especially suitable to address the research question. Firstly, the 
data provides detailed retrospective information on the individuals‘ labour market 
                                                          
19 
 Lehmann and Wadsworth (2000) analyse and compare the effect of tenure on the process of labour 
reallocation in Russia, Poland and the UK. For Russia, they find that turnover was lower in the state than 
in the private sector in the first decade of the transition process. If the same is true for Ukraine, then the 
instrumental variables could be ‗more exact‘ for the state sector employees, if these remain in the same 
job and hence industries. As mentioned in footnote 14 about 55 percent of all individuals in the sample 
are still in the same industry as during the Soviet period. 
20
  The survey was implemented by the Kiev Institute for Sociology (KIIS) following a multi-stage 
sampling procedure. Detailed information on the sampling procedure can be found in the technical reports 
provided by KIIS. 
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activities and job characteristics during the Soviet Union as well as their individual 
labour market histories during the transition process in the 1990s up to 2003. In 
particular, respondents were asked to provide labour market information for December 
1986 and December 1991 as well as the complete job history starting from 1997 up to 
the respective interview date. The years 1986 and 1991 were chosen as two special 
dates in Ukrainian history (Chernobyl catastrophe in 1986; 1991 as year before 
independence) in order to serve as reference and memory anchors to reduce potential 
recall error (Ganguli and Terrell 2006).
21
 This retrospective, pre-transition information 
on Soviet firm and job characteristics is the basis for the identification strategy.  
In particular, this analysis makes use of the information on the one- and two-
digit industry sector codes as well as on workplace location (five macro regions) in the 
Soviet era. Altogether there are 5,786 individuals in the cross-section 2003 for whom 
this Soviet labour market information is generally available. This implies that there is 
complete labour market information for almost all sampled individuals who were in 
working age at the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union (December 1991). Recall 
that there was no official unemployment in the Soviet Union. The retrospective 
information from these individuals is used to construct the two instrumental variables 
(see Section 2.5.2). Obviously, such Soviet information is not available for young 
persons who started their first job after December 1991, the independence of Ukraine. 
As regards the estimation sample, in the cross-section 2003 there are in total 3,583 
individuals who have a paid job at the time of the interview. Out of these, 2,441 are old 
enough to have worked in the Soviet Union so that the relevant retrospective Soviet job 
information exists (a more detailed overview on the sample structure and available 
retrospective Soviet information is given in Table A 2-1 in the appendix). However, 
missing values in several of the variables included in the regressions furthermore reduce 
number of observations from the 2003 survey wave to 1,491. The final estimation 
sample is based on observations from all three survey years and includes all individuals 
who have a paid job in any of the three survey years 2003, 2004, 2007 and for whom 
the retrospective information is available yielding a pooled sample size of 4,191 
observations (unbalanced panel).
22
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 Ganguli and Terrell (2006) as well as Brown, Earle and Vakhitov (2006) discuss potential problems, 
advantages and quality of retrospective data collection in the ULMS. For instance, the fact that wage 
structures etc. were highly regulated and determined by a wage grid during the Soviet Union increases the 
likelihood for correct recalls of Soviet wages. 
22
  In order to check for the sensitivity of the results to the sample size, the main regressions are re-
estimated based on a larger sample by dropping a variable measuring risk aversion that is only asked in 
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Secondly, the survey collects detailed ownership information of the respondents‘ 
workplaces (13 different categories) and thus allows an exact classification of 
respondents into state or private employment.
23
 Additionally, respondents were asked 
whether – and if so, when – their workplaces were privatized during their tenure at that 
specific firm or not.
24
 This privatization information will be used to construct one of the 
instrumental variables (see section on instrumental variables further below as well as 
Appendix B). 
In order to generate the second, alternative instrumental variable, another micro-
data set is employed, the Ukrainian Household Budget Survey (UHBS). The UHBS is 
an annual cross-section of around 9,000 households and about 25,000 individuals and is 
conducted by the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine (UkrStat). The construction of 
the instrumental variable is based on four survey years (2003-2006) and makes use of 
the available labour market participation, ownership of workplace and place of living 
information in order to calculate industry-region specific shares of private sector 
employment in total employment (a detailed description on how the instrumental 
variable was calculated is again provided in the section on instrumental variables further 
below as well as in Appendix B).  
2.5.1 Dependent and explanatory variables 
The dependent variable job satisfaction is measured by the question ―Tell me, 
please, how satisfied are you with your current job?‖ to which respondents can answer 
on a five-point Likert scale according to the following categories: 1–Fully dissatisfied, 
2–Rather dissatisfied, 3–Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, 4–Rather satisfied, 5–Fully 
satisfied.
25,26
 Since the question does not refer to any particular job facet it can be 
                                                                                                                                                                          
one survey year and has many missing values (this increases the pooled sample size to 5,142 
observations, while the 2003 sample increases from 1,491 to 2,059). 
23
 This is an advantage in comparison with some other studies which do not have direct information on 
firm ownership and thus classify public sector workers based on industry codes. 
24
 The reliability of self-reported ownership status in the ULMS is discussed by Brown, Earle and 
Vakhitov (2006), who use the ULMS to analyse wage and employment effects of privatization. They 
emphasize the careful wording and the fact that workers were directly involved in any privatization 
process which increases the likely accuracy of the answers. However, a measurement error in this variable 
(state sector employment) should lead to a downward bias in the estimated coefficients.    
25
 This is the author‘s translation of the Russian and Ukrainian questionnaire. The English version of 
these answers provided by the survey institute KIIS is 1–Not satisfied at all/2–Less than satisfied/3–
Rather satisfied/4–Satisfied/5–Fully satisfied, which is misleading. 
26 Detailed and critical discussions and assessments of the reliability and validity of such subjective, 
ordinal measures in empirical economic analyses can be found, for instance, in Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2001), Kahneman and Krueger (2006) and Krueger and Schkade (2008).  
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interpreted as a comprehensive judgment of all relevant aspects. The main analysis will 
employ this categorical dependent variable.
27
  
How satisfied are workers in the private and the state sector in Post-Soviet 
Ukraine? Figure 2-4 presents the raw and unconditional public-private job satisfaction 
gap for the pooled sample of workers (subsample used in the regressions; the respective 
graph based on the full ULMS sample including young individuals is provided in Figure 
A 2-5 in the appendix). Almost twice as many workers in the private sector are entirely 
dissatisfied with their job (12.3 versus 6.5 percent respectively). Looking at the other 
end of the spectrum of the satisfaction scale, the share of fully satisfied workers in the 
public sector surpasses the one in the private sector by 5 percentage points. These 
distributions imply that state sector workers are generally more satisfied with their jobs 
than their private sector counterparts. A similar pattern in raw differences between 
public and private sector employees has been found for other countries, like Germany 
and the UK (e.g., Luechinger, Meier and Stutzer 2008). When comparing the 
distribution of life satisfaction across sectors, the same picture emerges: state sector 
workers also tend to be more satisfied with their lives in general (see Figure A 2-2 in the 
appendix). 
Interestingly, the left-skewness of the job satisfaction distribution stands in 
contrast to the life satisfaction distribution in Eastern European countries, which is 
comparatively right-skewed.
28
 In other words, the relatively low levels of life 
satisfaction found in transition countries and also in Ukraine are not perfectly mirrored 
in the distribution of job satisfaction in Post-Soviet Ukraine as Figure 2-5 illustrates. 
These differences between job and life satisfaction are the same, when the sample is 
restricted to state sector workers only (see Figure A 2-3 in the appendix). 
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 There are two surveys that collect life and job satisfaction during the Soviet time. However, they do not 
cover any information on workplace details or job characteristics: the World Values Survey 1981 which 
was conducted in one Soviet region (Tambov), and the Consolidation of Democracy in Central and 
Eastern Europe survey of January 1991 that took place in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. 
Unfortunately, these surveys cannot be used to learn more about the relationship between job 
characteristics and job satisfaction before the transition process due to lack of relevant variables. 
28
 For recent multi-country analyses of life satisfaction in transition countries, see e.g., Guriev and 
Zhuravskaya (2009), Sanfey and Teksoz (2007). 
40 
Figure 2-4. Job Satisfaction in the Private and Public Sector in Post-Soviet Ukraine 
 
Source: ULMS 2003-2007, pooled sample of all individuals in working age with retrospective Soviet job information 
(extended regression sample; N=5,142); own calculations. A comparable diagram based on all observations in the 
original survey sample, i.e. including young workers, is given in the appendix. 
 
Figure 2-5. Job Satisfaction and Life Satisfaction in Post-Soviet Ukraine  
 
Source: ULMS 2003-2007, pooled sample of all individuals in working age with retrospective Soviet job information 
(extended regression sample; N=5,142); own calculations. A comparable diagram based on all observations in the 
original survey sample, i.e. including young workers, is given in the appendix.  
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The main explanatory variable is a binary state sector indicator, identifying 
individuals working in state owned as opposed to privately owned enterprises and 
organizations. The survey differentiates between 13 different types of ownership, out of 
which three can be unambiguously classified as state owned enterprises/organizations 
(i.e., budgetary organizations, state enterprises, and local municipal enterprises). The 
remaining categories are classified as private ownership (these are: newly established 
private enterprises, new private agricultural firms/farms, privatized enterprises, 
freelance work/self-employment, international organizations, public/religious/self-
financing organizations, collective or state farms, collective enterprises, cooperatives, 
other.
29
 Further control variables which are successively added to the regressions are (a) 
standard socio-demographic individual characteristics (including job related pre-
transition background information), (b) job characteristics, and (c) workplace 
characteristics. Two additional sets of variables are included to investigate whether 
sector job satisfaction differences are driven by (d) personality traits or (e) differences 
in wages and pecuniary and non-pecuniary fringe benefits. As regards the personality 
traits, the analysis exploits two measures of ―extroversion‖ and ―neuroticism‖ based on 
interviewer assessments and one self-reported measure of risk aversion. A detailed 
description of all variables is provided in Appendix A (Table A 2-2). Table 2-2 presents 
separate summary statistics for all variables by sector of employment. 
The descriptive statistics of the two sectors reveal differences in workplace 
characteristics as well as in the composition of the workforce that is much in line with 
the typical pattern for Western economies (see Gregory and Borland 1999): the share of 
women is higher in the state sector, state sector workers are on average more educated, 
slightly older, work fewer hours per week and are more concentrated in highly-skilled 
occupations (professional and technical occupations) as well as in larger establishments 
than their colleagues in the private sector. Interestingly, the two wage measures indicate 
that on average earnings tend to be lower in the state than in the private sector. 
Furthermore, state sector workers seem to be more open (extrovert) on average, but at 
the same time less risk loving. Finally, the mean comparisons show that present-day 
state and private sector workers also differ in their Soviet time characteristics, which 
might be partly driven by simple age and gender effects and partly by Soviet 
geographical and occupational (gender) segregation.    
                                                          
29
 The categories collective enterprise, new private agricultural firm/farm, and public/religious/self-
financing organization were added to survey in 2004.    
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Table 2-2: Summary statistics of estimation sample, by sector 
 Private 
sector 
State 
sector 
t-statistic  
from mean 
comparison test 
 Mean Mean  
Dependent variables 
    Job Satisfaction (std. dev.: 1.18) 3.23 3.55 -9.00 *** 
Satisfaction with job security  (std. dev.: 1.14) 3.40 3.86 -10.00 *** 
Instrumental variables 
    IV1_privatized (min.: 0.00; max.: 0.48) 0.17 0.11 18.97 *** 
IV2_privateshare (min.: 0.00: max.: 0.96) 0.67 0.44 23.98 *** 
Socio-demographic characteristics 
    Male 0.53 0.39 8.68 *** 
Age: 35 or less (omitted category) 0.11 0.10 1.80 * 
Age: 36 up to 40 0.19 0.17 1.52 
 Age: 41 up to 45 0.24 0.24 0.39 
 Age: 46 up to 50 0.24 0.25 -0.85 
 Age: 51 up to retirement age 0.22 0.25 -2.21 ** 
Primary education (omitted category) 0.09 0.05 4.82 *** 
General secondary education 0.46 0.39 4.71 *** 
Professional secondary education 0.29 0.31 -1.38 
 Higher education 0.16 0.25 -7.24 *** 
Individual height in cm. 169.42 168.07 5.38 *** 
At least one parent has higher education 0.13 0.12 0.71 
 Both parents have lower education 0.48 0.48 -0.46 
 Single (omitted category) 0.03 0.03 0.87 
 Married  0.81 0.80 0.37 
 Divorced  0.12 0.12 0.69 
 Widowed 0.03 0.05 -2.57 ** 
No children in household (omitted cat.) 0.49 0.50 -0.91 
 One child in household 0.33 0.34 -0.66 
 Two or more children in household 0.18 0.16 2.04 ** 
Chronic disease 0.51 0.55 -2.16 ** 
Urban settlement 0.57 0.55 1.06 
 
Job and workplace characteristics 
    Professional occupation 0.17 0.23 -4.72 *** 
Technician occupation 0.09 0.21 -11.06 *** 
Skilled blue collar occupation 0.52 0.37 9.77 *** 
Unskilled occupation (omitted cat.) 0.22 0.19 2.52 ** 
Working hours: 30 or less 0.08 0.13 -5.11 *** 
Working hours: 31 up to 50 (omit. cat.) 0.74 0.84 -7.56 *** 
Working hours: 51 or more 0.17 0.03 15.80 *** 
Firm size 1-9  (omitted category) 0.29 0.09 17.72 *** 
Firm size 10-99 0.30 0.41 -7.91 *** 
Firm size 100 and more 0.41 0.50 -5.78 *** 
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Table 2-2 continued 
     
Log earnings 5.83 5.79 2.07 ** 
Log average industry wage  6.30 6.26 2.83 *** 
Weekend work 0.54 0.37 10.75 *** 
Shift work 0.13 0.15 -1.96 ** 
Personality traits, risk aversion 
    Extrovert 0.13 0.17 -3.90 *** 
Neurotic  0.02 0.02 1.46 
 Never smoked 0.46 0.58 -7.35 *** 
Risk loving 0.24 0.19 3.89 *** 
Retrospective information from Soviet period 
    Place of birth: village 0.44 0.46 -1.64 
 Place of birth: urban settlement 0.07 0.11 -4.47 *** 
Place of birth: town/city 0.39 0.34 3.50 *** 
Place of birth: abroad (omitted cat.) 0.11 0.10 1.29 
 Place of work 1986: Kiev 0.05 0.06 -1.17 
 Place of work 1986: Centre 0.25 0.24 0.50 
 Place of work 1986: West 0.14 0.20 -5.26 *** 
Place of work 1986: East 0.23 0.25 -1.36 
 Place of work 1986: South 0.27 0.21 5.01 *** 
Place of work 1986: Russia (omitted cat.) 0.03 0.02 1.84 * 
Place of work 1986: other (omitted cat.) 0.02 0.01 1.49 
 Marital status in Dec. 1991: married 0.85 0.89 -3.55 *** 
Number of own children in Dec. 1991 1.43 1.50 -2.27 ** 
Log of wage in December 1986 -5.62 -5.86 1.88 * 
Log of wage in December 1991 -5.45 -5.56 0.84 
 Wage December 1986 missing 0.36 0.34 1.49 
 Wage December 1991 missing 0.37 0.36 0.58 
 Worked in Dec 1986 0.78 0.82 -3.34 *** 
Worked in Dec 1991 0.96 0.96 0.55 
 Soviet job 1986/91: white collar occupation 
A)
  0.30 0.46 -10.53 *** 
Soviet job 1986/91: has at least one subordinate 0.14 0.18 -2.77 *** 
Soviet job 1986/91: info subordinate - missing 0.20 0.13 6.25 *** 
Number of observations  2,035 2,156 
  Notes: Pooled sample of all individuals in working age during time of interview with full information on 
all variables, who were 16 or older in December 1991 and for whom information on their job during the 
Soviet time (December 1986 or December 1991) exist. Reported t-statistics refer to mean comparison 
tests between state and private sector; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The regressions include 
furthermore: 2 survey year dummy variables, 25 oblast dummy variables, 8 interview month dummy 
variables. 
A)
 Professionals and technicians. Source: ULMS 2003-2007; own calculations. 
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2.5.2 Instrumental variables 
Two instrumental variables were constructed to overcome the potential 
endogeneity of the state sector variable. In both cases the instrumental variable assigns 
to each individual based on his or her Soviet job characteristics (two digit industry 
sector and regional location in December 1986 or 1991) a probability of ‗whether the 
enterprise where he/she used to work during Soviet times would eventually be 
privatized and become a private sector workplace‘. These probabilities are cell 
probabilities within two-digit industry sector codes and regional location (only one of 
the instruments takes regional location into account).  
The cell probabilities for the two instruments were calculated based on two 
different data sources in the following way: The first instrument (IV_privatized) was 
constructed using the detailed retrospective labour market information on individual 
privatization experiences taken from the ULMS dataset. In the first step a dummy 
variable was created identifying those jobs/firms among all jobs that started in the 
Soviet era, i.e. in December 1991 or earlier, and that were privatized. Reported episodes 
of privatization were only counted as privatized, if the majority of shares of the 
enterprise/organization were transferred into private ownership.
30
 In a second step, the 
share of these privatizations within each of the 27 separate economic sector cells was 
computed. This categorization of industries into 27 economic sectors is more 
disaggregated than in the case of the second instrumental variable. However, the 
downside of this refined industry categorization is that regional variation cannot be 
taken into account since cell sizes would become too small. 
In the case of the second instrument (IV_privateshare), the contemporary share 
of jobs in the private sector (i.e. all jobs other than jobs in the national/local government 
or state-owned enterprises) in each cell was calculated based on the pooled data from 
the UHBS. In this case, the cells are defined by 16 industrial sectors and five macro 
regions of Ukraine (i.e. 16x5 different cells).
31
 Unfortunately, the UHBS data does not 
contain more disaggregated measures of industry affiliation. In contrast to the first 
instrumental variable which reflects the share of workplaces that were affected by 
privatization within each cell the second instrumental variable captures the share of 
                                                          
30
 This information is provided by the respondents in the survey. 
31
 A few respondents in the ULMS survey were not living or working on Ukrainian territory in December 
1986 or 1991. These respondents were assigned the ‗private sector shares‘ calculated from the UHBS 
based on industry affiliation only (instead of industry-region affiliation).  
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private sector jobs within each cell. The correlation between the two instrumental 
variables is 0.75. A more detailed description of the construction and the calculated cell 
probabilities is provided in the appendix. 
2.6 Empirical results: public sector satisfaction premium and self-
selection of workers 
At the core of the empirical analysis lies the estimation of a job satisfaction 
function of the following type: job satisfaction is explained by a binary variable 
indicating employment in the state sector, a set of individual present-day and Soviet 
time socio-demographic characteristics (Xi), job and workplace characteristics (Ji and 
Pli), and a normally distributed error term
32
:  
iiiii PlJstateJS   '''10  
 
Although the dependent variable job satisfaction is categorical, standard linear 
estimation techniques – assuming cardinality – will be applied and reported to simplify 
the interpretation of the coefficients (in particular, Random Effects Generalized Least 
Squares (GLS) and Generalized Two-Stage-Least Squares (G2SLS) for the pooled 
panel data sample; OLS and 2SLS for the sensitivity checks using the cross-section 
2003 only).
33
 Even if these estimates are less efficient than models taking into account 
the ordinal nature of the dependent variable, the GLS estimates are consistent (under 
classical assumptions).
34
 Furthermore, whether estimating cardinal (e.g., OLS, GLS) or 
ordinal (e.g., ordered probit or logit) models generally does not affect the results 
substantially (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters 2004). 
To determine whether state sector employees enjoy a significant satisfaction 
premium, the empirical analysis will proceed in the following steps: at first, the sector 
                                                          
32
 Since the main empirical analysis will employ panel data with repeated observations for participating 
individuals, the assumption of an independent and identically distributed error term is likely to be 
violated, since the individual error terms are correlated over time. In fact, in the panel data model the 
error term becomes iti   (a time-invariant component and a time-varying component). In this case, the 
instrument has to be uncorrelated with this composite error term in order for the instrumental variable 
random effects model to generate consistent estimates of the regression parameters (Cameron and Trivedi 
2005, chapter 22). 
33
 The GLS estimation accounts for the fact that the panel data has repeated observations on each 
individual and, hence, standard errors are likely to be correlated within units of observation (applying 
Ordinary Least Squares might be inefficient in this case). Fixed effects estimations cannot be conducted, 
since the relevant instrumental variables are time-invariant. 
34
 The qualitative GLS results hold when the equation is estimated by a more efficient Random Effect 
Ordered Probit model. 
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affiliation of a worker will be taken as exogenously determined. In order to help correct 
any bias stemming from composition effects, individual, pre-determined control 
variables will be successively added to the regression equation. Since the private and 
public sectors might also differ in their distributions of job and workplace 
characteristics which may be correlated with job satisfaction, further controls for 
occupation, working hours and firm size will be added. However, these variables could 
already capture ‗rents‘ (e.g., when a particular amount of working hours is seen as job 
amenity) and could be endogenous if workers self-selected into specific occupations or 
firms. In a next step, average industry wages (average wages at the one-digit industry 
classification level; data are from the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine) as well as 
individual earnings will be added to the regression. Again, differential wage levels 
might be part of the ‗satisfaction premium‘ and hence any change in the state sector 
coefficient accompanying the inclusion of wage information could be interpreted 
accordingly. However, individual income itself might also be endogenously determined 
(e.g., depending on positive or happy personality traits). Finally, further controls for 
potential job disamenities (shift work and weekend work) as well as several proxies 
aimed at capturing personality traits and risk aversion are added to the regression. 
Nevertheless, all specifications including these possibly endogenous variables should be 
interpreted cautiously.  
In the second part of the analysis the state sector variable is no longer assumed 
to be exogenously determined, since workers may self-select into sectors based on 
unobservables which would lead to a correlation of the error term with sector affiliation. 
The existence of a binary endogenous regressor in addition to a limited dependent 
variable theoretically complicates the econometric approach (due to non-linearities). 
However, following the arguments by Angrist (2001), the estimation will rely on simple 
two-stage least squares techniques for panel data models using the constructed 
instruments, since the main aim is the estimation of the causal treatment effect. 
Furthermore, although the estimation of linear probability models (instead of probit 
models) in the first stage is less efficient, the estimated coefficients are consistent 
(Angrist 2001).  
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2.6.1 Basic GLS results 
Table 2-3 reports the GLS-RE estimates of job satisfaction in Ukraine based on 
the pooled sample (2003-2007) for different specifications (the table shows only the 
most relevant coefficients; the full set of estimated regressors can be found in Table A 
2-3 in the appendix). The estimated coefficients of the state sector dummy variable are 
reported in the first row. The first column reveals that the raw difference between 
satisfaction levels in both sectors is 0.340 (significant at the 1 percent significance 
level), indicating that public sector employees are significantly more satisfied with their 
jobs than their private sector counterparts. As expected, the inclusion of covariates to 
control for composition effects gradually reduces the size of the coefficient and leads to 
an improvement in the overall model fit (increasing R
2
). More specifically, the inclusion 
of general socio-demographic background characteristics as well as pre-determined 
Soviet period variables, reduces the coefficient to 0.259 (Table 2-3, column 3). Even in 
the regression controlling for the maximum number of covariates, there remains a 
positive and highly statistically significant public sector satisfaction premium of 0.211 
(Table 2-3, column 8). The standard errors remain essentially constant across 
specifications.  
Moving from left to the right across the table, several interesting findings 
emerge. First, job satisfaction increases with educational attainment: individuals with 
higher education are significantly more satisfied with their jobs than persons with 
primary education only (base category). However, these significantly positive effects of 
more education vanish as soon as occupational information is added to the regression 
(column 4). This indicates that occupations are quite segregated in terms of educational 
achievement. Throughout all specifications the occupational dummy variables are 
highly significant. Furthermore, the higher the skill level of the occupation, the higher 
the return in terms of job satisfaction (professionals have a higher return than 
technicians or skilled-blue collar workers in comparison with the omitted category of 
basic, unskilled occupations). Job and workplace specific variables are also related to 
satisfaction levels (column 5): average job satisfaction is significantly lower among 
employees with less than 30 working hours in a typical week (i.e. part-time jobs) in 
comparison to employees with regular 40 hour jobs.  
 4
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Table 2-3: Job satisfaction regressions with stepwise inclusion of covariates (GLS-RE estimates; selected coefficients; ULMS 2003-2007) 
Dependent variable: Job satisfaction 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
State sector 0.340*** 0.277*** 0.259*** 0.240*** 0.217*** 0.219*** 0.212*** 0.211*** 
 (0.043) (0.042) (0.043) (0.042) (0.043) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
Male   -0.064 -0.038 -0.065 -0.073 -0.174*** -0.173*** -0.135* 
  (0.062) (0.066) (0.066) (0.065) (0.063) (0.063) (0.076) 
General secondary educ.  0.026 0.023 0.005 0.015 -0.005 -0.001 -0.004 
  (0.076) (0.076) (0.077) (0.078) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) 
Professional sec. educ.  0.197** 0.121 0.025 0.033 -0.003 0.000 -0.001 
  (0.081) (0.083) (0.085) (0.086) (0.084) (0.083) (0.084) 
Higher education  0.413*** 0.271*** 0.041 0.050 0.018 0.019 0.012 
  (0.088) (0.094) (0.103) (0.103) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) 
Chronic disease  -0.203*** -0.200*** -0.198*** -0.185*** -0.174*** -0.171*** -0.173*** 
  (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
Urban settlement  0.135*** 0.114** 0.086* 0.066 -0.003 -0.007 -0.005 
  (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) 
Professional occupation    0.583*** 0.611*** 0.423*** 0.420*** 0.412*** 
    (0.077) (0.076) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) 
Technical occupation    0.473*** 0.459*** 0.369*** 0.364*** 0.360*** 
    (0.075) (0.075) (0.073) (0.073) (0.074) 
Skilled blue collar occ.    0.264*** 0.250*** 0.141*** 0.138*** 0.139*** 
    (0.054) (0.054) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) 
Less than 31 hours      -0.348*** -0.189*** -0.194*** -0.196*** 
     (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) 
More than 50 hours     -0.086 -0.099 -0.077 -0.077 
     (0.062) (0.062) (0.063) (0.063) 
Medium-sized firm     0.089 0.092 0.078 0.077 
     (0.058) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) 
Large-sized firm     0.131** 0.059 0.044 0.044 
     (0.058) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) 
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Table 2-3 (continued);  
Dependent variable: Job satisfaction 
    
         
Log earnings      0.392*** 0.396*** 0.393*** 
      (0.047) (0.048) (0.048) 
Log ave. industry wage      0.190*** 0.175** 0.173** 
      (0.073) (0.074) (0.074) 
Weekend work       -0.081** -0.080** 
       (0.039) (0.039) 
Shift work       0.061 0.064 
       (0.053) (0.053) 
Extrovert         0.078* 
        (0.047) 
Neurotic         -0.158 
        (0.106) 
Never smoked        0.053 
        (0.057) 
Risk loving        0.026 
        (0.052) 
Constant 3.029*** 2.222*** 2.498*** 2.285*** 2.338*** -1.586* -1.484 -1.511 
 (0.058) (0.621) (0.881) (0.873) (0.870) (0.960) (0.962) (0.961) 
         
Chi-squared 194.7 475.1 517.2 618.0 653.2 859.4 860.5 879.7 
Region FE, age & birth place, marital 
status 
-        
Soviet period controls - -       
R-squared overall 0.0430 0.106 0.113 0.133 0.144 0.185 0.186 0.187 
Notes: Dependent variable: Five-point Likert scale of job satisfaction with 1 (fully dissatisfied) to 5 (fully satisfied). Omitted categories: ‗primary education‘, ‗single‘, ‗occupation: 
unskilled‘, ‗working hours: 31 to 50 hours‘, ‗small-sized firm‘, ‗village/rural settlement‘. All regressions control for year and interview month fixed effects. Columns (2) – (8) 
furthermore control for individual height, parental education to account for family background characteristics; however, none of these variables has a significant effect on job 
satisfaction. A more comprehensive table reporting further coefficients is presented in the appendix to this chapter (Table A 2-3). Number of observations 4,191 (Number of id: 
1,915). Standard errors are clustered on the individual level. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Source: ULMS 2003-2007; own 
calculations.  
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The inclusion of individual earnings and average industry wages (column 6) – 
both of which are positively associated with job satisfaction and are highly statistically 
significant – generates two surprising effects: the first is that the coefficient of the state 
sector dummy increases slightly. Thus, controlling for the wage levels increases the 
satisfaction gap. If sector satisfaction differentials simply reflected wage differentials 
one would expect the opposite effect. This also implies that public-private wage 
differences are not the main driving force behind the observed public sector job 
satisfaction premium. The second surprising effect is that gender differences become 
larger and significant only now, implying that the structurally higher wages for men hid 
a substantial gender gap in job satisfaction. In other words, the Ukrainian data reveal a 
gender gap in line with the ‗contented female worker‘ phenomenon once differences in 
earnings are controlled for. Such a positive utility premium for women has been found 
in several Western countries and attracted a large literature (e.g., Clark 1997; Sousa-
Poza and Sousa-Poza 2000; Bender, Donohue and Heywood 2005).  
Furthermore, the average industry wage variable can also be interpreted as a 
crude measure for relative or reference group income which has often been found to be 
negatively correlated with job satisfaction in Western market economies (i.e., holding 
constant the individual income level, job satisfaction decreases with increasing levels of 
comparison income) (Clark and Oswald 1996; Clark, Frijters and Shields 2008). 
However, the positive coefficient of this variable in Table 2-3 is in line with evidence 
on a positive effect of comparison income on life satisfaction in Russia (Senik 2004). 
Senik (2004) explains these surprising findings as a ‗tunnel effect‘: in economically 
difficult and uncertain times, people interpret wage levels of others as signals for their 
own future (information content). 
Turning to the two measures of job disamenities, it seems that only weekend 
work has a significantly negative effect on job satisfaction. Last but not least, column 8 
presents the results when including the four different proxies for personality traits and 
risk aversion. However, while all estimated coefficients have the expected sign, only the 
estimate on extroverted types is significantly positive. Job satisfaction is also 
significantly lower among chronically ill, singles and persons who live in households 
where children are present (these last results are not reported in Table 2-3, but can be 
found in the more extensive Table A 2-3 in the appendix).  
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To test whether these estimated patterns are robust or specific to the particular 
estimation sample or estimation technique, the same set of specifications was re-
estimated based on the cross-section 2003 only (using OLS) as well as on an extended 
sample (using GLS-RE) in which the sample size was increased by dropping some 
variables with many missing values. The results of these additional regressions are very 
close to the estimates in Table 2-3 (results are reported in Table A 2-4 in the appendix). 
2.6.2 Results from the instrumental variable regressions (G2SLS-RE regressions) 
The results from the instrumental variable regressions in Table 2-4 help to better 
understand to what extent the previous findings are driven by a non-random self-
selection of workers into particular sectors. For ease of comparison, the upper panel A 
of the table restates the corresponding GLS-RE results from the previous section (no 
correction for self-selection). In order for the simple GLS-RE model to produce 
consistent estimates, it is crucial that the composite error term 
iti    (a time-invariant 
component and a time-varying component) and in particular 
i  be uncorrelated with 
the regressors (see also footnotes 32, 33). In the presence of self-selection based on 
fixed individual personality traits and preferences, however, this assumption is likely to 
be violated (omitted variable bias). However, the instrumental variable approach aims at 
correcting for this omitted variable bias. The corresponding results of these generalized 
two-stage least squares random effects estimations (G2SLS-RE panel data models) are 
shown in panel B, while the two lower panel report the reduced form and the first stage 
regression estimates. Three specifications from Table 2-3 were re-estimated using each 
instrumental variable separately: the simple raw mean comparison without any controls, 
the specification controlling for all pre-determined and exogenous individual 
characteristics and the specification controlling for the full set of variables, including 
wages and job and firm specific variables. These specifications correspond to columns 
1, 3 and 8 from Table 2-3 respectively. In all regressions standard errors are clustered 
on the individual level. 
For both instruments, the first stage results at the bottom of Table 2-4 point to a 
strong association between the instrumental variables and the endogenous binary state 
sector variable. The z- and the Chi-squared-statistics (which correspond to the t- and F-
statistics in simple 2SLS estimations) have high values indicating a substantial 
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predictive power of the instrument.
35
 The significantly negative effects confirm that a 
higher probability of privatization or having been employed in a Soviet industry that 
was less likely to remain dominated by state ownership reduces the likelihood of 
working in the state sector in Post-Soviet Ukraine. The estimated first stage coefficients 
(and the standard errors) using the first instrument (privatization) are almost twice as 
large as the estimates based on the second instrument (private sector share). This can be 
explained by the fact that the second instrument has a much larger variation (double in 
size): its values range from about 0.00 to 0.96 while the values of the first instrument 
(privatization) range only from about 0.00 to 0.48.  
The estimates of the reduced form regressions of job satisfaction on the 
instrumental variables are also highly significant across all specifications and show the 
expected sign. Conditional on individual pre-determined characteristics as well as on 
job and workplace characteristics, workers who used to work in Soviet industries 
(industries and regions) in which more firms were transformed into private ownership 
due to privatization (instrument 1) or general restructuring (instrument 2) report lower 
levels of job satisfaction.  
Turning to the upper part of Table 2-4, the results of the G2SLS-RE estimations 
confirm that the public sector satisfaction premium found in the simple GLS-RE 
regressions persists even after correcting for self-selection into sectors.
36
 More 
precisely, the estimated coefficients of the state sector dummy variable are more than 
double in size than the GLS-RE estimates and significantly positive on the 1 percent 
significance level throughout almost all three specifications (this is true for both 
instrumental variables). However, standard errors are also much larger in the 
instrumental variable regressions than in the simple regressions (panel A.). Given these 
large standard errors, the G2SLS-RE are generally not significantly different from the 
GLS-RE estimates (the GLS-RE coefficients of columns 2, 3, 5 and 6 lie within the 
95%-confidence interval of the G2SLS-RE estimates).  
 
                                                          
35
 See Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002) and Angrist and Pischke (2009) on the problem and test of weak 
instruments (as rough benchmark they mention 10 as a minimum critical F-value of the instrument in the 
first stage). 
36
 These results also hold when re-estimating these instrumental variable regressions using the cross-
section from 2003 only or the more extended sample (see Table A 2-5 in the appendix). In only one case 
(cross-section, instrument 1, specification in column 2) does the estimated coefficient become 
insignificant (the p-value is 0.156), but this is probably due to loss in precision because of the smaller 
sample size (in conjunction with generally larger 2SLS standard errors). 
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Table 2-4: Regression results (GLS-RE, G2SLS-RE, Reduced Form, First Stage) 
 Instrumental variable 1:  
Privatization probability 
 Instrumental variable 2:  
Private sector share 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
A. GLS-RE  DV: Job Satisfaction 
 
 DV: Job Satisfaction 
 
State sector 0.340*** 0.259*** 0.211***  0.340*** 0.259*** 0.211*** 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.041)  (0.043) (0.043) (0.041) 
        
        
B. G2SLS-RE  DV: Job Satisfaction 
 
 DV: Job Satisfaction 
 
State sector 0.687*** 0.391** 0.485***  0.940*** 0.548*** 0.515*** 
 (0.160) (0.186) (0.185)  (0.131) (0.148) (0.159) 
        
        
C. GLS-RE Reduced form  DV: Job Satisfaction  DV: Job Satisfaction 
Instrumental variable  -0.827*** -0.414** -0.501***  -0.475*** -0.249*** -0.207*** 
 (0.187) (0.188) (0.179)  (0.063) (0.067) (0.064) 
        
D. GLS-RE First Stage  DV: State sector (binary 
variable) 
 DV: State sector (binary 
variable) 
      
Instrumental variable  -1.207*** -1.066*** -1.036***  -0.504*** -0.456*** -0.403*** 
 (0.070) (0.074) (0.071)  (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) 
        
Z-statistic -17.18       -14.42 -14.66  -22.08 -18.64 -17.21 
Chi
2
-statistic 
A)
 161.1 100.5 110.8  290.9 183.0 170.8 
        
Socio-demographic Post-
Soviet & Soviet  
characteristics (incl. Soviet 
job) 
-    -   
Current job & firm 
characteristics (incl. log of 
earnings & average 
industry wages) 
- -   - -  
Personality traits, risk 
aversion 
- -   - -  
Observations 4,191 4,191 4,191  4,191 4,191 4,191 
Notes: Dependent variable (DV) in A.-C.: Job satisfaction. DV in panel D.: State sector (binary variable). 
The table reports only the estimated coefficients of interest (state sector; instrumental variables) from the 
following regression specifications: columns (1) and (4) correspond to the specification in Table 2-3, 
column (1); columns (2) and (5) correspond to Table 2-3, column (3); columns (3) and (6) correspond to 
Table 2-3, column (8). 
A)
 The Chi-squared test statistic from the weak instrument test in the first stage 
regression are calculated from a separate first stage regression in which results differ slightly from the 
first stage results based on the Stata build-in xtivreg command (reported coefficient and z-statistic in the 
table above). However, the Chi-squared test statistic cannot be computed using the xtivreg command. 
Standard errors are clustered on the individual level; robust standard errors are shown in parentheses; *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Source: ULMS 2003-2007; own calculations. 
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In the specifications that do not control for earnings or industry wages (columns 
2 and 4), the estimated public-private satisfaction gap is about 0.39 for the privatization 
instrument and 0.55 for the private sector-share instrument which corresponds to 
roughly one third and half of a standard deviation of job satisfaction respectively 
(standard deviation 1.18). Using the coefficients based on the full set of covariates 
(columns 3 and 6), the estimated public sector satisfaction premium takes the size of 
about 42 – 44 percent of a standard deviation. 
What can be inferred from these results about the process of self-selection? First 
of all, since the estimated coefficients increase after correcting for self-selection, it 
seems that the GLS-RE estimates were probably downward biased and thus 
underestimated the true public sector differential. This in turn implies that the positive 
satisfaction gap was not merely caused by a spurious correlation between state sector 
affiliation and individuals with inherently higher satisfaction levels. Secondly, the 
sorting and matching of worker across sectors has led to a reduction in the satisfaction 
gap, since the observed gap in job satisfaction between private and state workers (GLS-
RE) is even larger under random assignment (G2SLS-RE). This sorting process was 
furthermore such, that workers from the lower part of the satisfaction distribution self-
selected into the public sector and workers with higher intrinsic levels of job satisfaction 
sorted into the private sector (negative selection into the public sector). Interestingly, 
these results are in line with those found by Luechinger, Stutzer and Winkelmann 
(2010) for Germany. In the context of an emerging private sector in Ukraine it could be 
that more extroverted and optimistic individuals discover their entrepreneurial talents 
and sort into the private sector. This would be in line with the literature on public-
private wage differentials in Western economies which suggests that high ability and 
very productive workers might find it beneficial to exit the public sector as the wage 
distribution is typically more compressed in the public than in the private sector 
(Gregory and Borland 1999). Accordingly, those who are unhappy in the private sector 
and cannot or are unwilling to cope with the new market structure and risks, self-select 
into the more stable (and possible more traditional) state sector. In both cases, the self-
selection process increases the individual degree of job satisfaction if the new jobs 
generate a better match.  
What can be learnt about the role of equalizing differentials in total 
compensation in Post-Soviet Ukraine? Following the theoretical considerations in 
Sections 2.2 and 2.3, the estimated satisfaction premium of state sector employees 
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indicates that a larger fraction of workers in the private than in the public sector is 
unsatisfied with their jobs. Against the background of a continuously shrinking state 
sector this satisfaction gap potentially points to an increasing ‗shortage‘ of public sector 
jobs, in the sense that a growing fraction of private sector workers would be better off in 
the public sector (‗queuing‘). In this case the satisfaction premium would indeed 
represent a ‗rent‘ that one and the same person received by working in the state rather 
than the private sector. If total remuneration in the public (private) sector was reduced 
(increased) this should lower the satisfaction differential. 
2.6.3 Sensitivity and robustness checks 
In order to test the strength and reliability of the main findings several sensitivity 
and robustness checks were carried out. The results of these additional regressions are 
reported in Table 2-5 (the table reports only the estimated state sector coefficients from 
the instrumental variable regressions). 
2.6.3.1 Excluding recent privatizations 
For each of the variables zi to be valid instruments, two critical identifying 
assumptions have to hold: the instrument has to be sufficiently correlated with the 
endogenous variable 0),( statezCov i  (to prevent a weak instrument problem) while 
being uncorrelated with the error term 0),( izCov (see discussion in Section 2.3.2). 
This implies that the instrumental variable should affect the outcome of interest (job 
satisfaction) solely through its effect on the endogenous variable (state sector 
affiliation). In other words, having worked in a Soviet industry that was more likely to 
be affected by privatization or restructuring during the transition process should affect 
post-transition job satisfaction only through the fact that certain individuals have a 
higher probability of working in a privately owned enterprise, i.e. the privatization or 
restructuring process should have no additional, direct effect job satisfaction.  
Although it is not possible to actually prove this claim, it is possible to provide 
suggestive evidence in support of the instruments. First, in contrary to the general public 
notion that privatization hurts workers, Brown, Earle and Vakhitov (2006) and Brown, 
Earle and Telegdy (2010) show for Ukraine and other transition countries that 
privatization did not lead to job losses and had either only very small or no effects on 
wages (in fact, in some cases privatization even caused an increase in firm employment 
and wages). Second, managerial turnover (on higher management levels) that could 
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potentially trigger unpleasant organizational change or a general restructuring of firms 
and thus might lower job satisfaction was actually less common in de novo or privatized 
firms than in state-owned enterprises (see Warzynski 2003 using a sample of 300 
Ukrainian firms in 1997). Warzynski (2003) explains this finding by the fact that the 
particular privatization process in Ukraine predominantly led to insider ownership (by 
workers and managers). Third, general changes in the economic and political system 
during the transition process, e.g., more competitive pressure from foreign firms, 
liberalization of consumer prices, affected all employees in Ukraine. Debardeleben 
(1999) analyses the attitudes of Russians towards the privatization process based on 
Russian survey data from 1993 to 1997. Surprisingly, individuals with personal 
privatization experiences are neither more nor less supportive of the privatization 
process and market liberalizations than persons without such experiences. The author 
concludes that disillusion with the political process and market transition as a whole led 
to a general negative assessment of single transition measures in the population. If 
similar mechanisms have taken place in Ukraine this would furthermore support the 
notion that privatization in itself did not affect satisfaction levels of individuals.  
In addition to these arguments in support of the general validity of the 
instruments, it is possible to perform a simple test on whether the main estimation 
results are driven by recent – and possibly unpleasant – privatization experiences of 
some ULMS participants. Since the ULMS collects information on whether respondents 
ever experienced privatization of their workplace and if so, when, it is possible to 
identify individuals whose workplace has been privatized in the recent past. If 
privatization has a direct negative effect on job satisfaction, it seems reasonable to 
assume that this effect should be strongest immediately around or after the date of 
privatization and should gradually fade out over time. This is why the main G2SLS-RE 
regressions from Table 2-4 are repeated after dropping all observations that have 
experienced privatization within the last four years before the survey interview. As can 
be seen in Panel A in Table 2-5 the estimated state sector premium does not diminish 
after excluding these recent privatizations. In contrary, the estimates become even 
slightly larger thereby giving further support to the claim that the main regression 
results are not simply driven by possibly negative privatization experiences of 
workers.
37
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 These results hold also when excluding only individuals having experienced privatization within the 
last, the last two or the last three years (results not reported). 
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Table 2-5: Sensitivity and robustness checks: Instrumental variable estimates 
(G2SLS-RE) 
 Instrumental variable 1:  
Privatization probability 
 Instrumental variable 2:  
Private sector share 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable: Job satisfaction  Job satisfaction 
Original G2SLS-RE regression results (Table 2-4; N=4,191)   
State sector 0.687*** 0.391** 0.485***  0.940*** 0.548*** 0.515*** 
 (0.160) (0.186) (0.185)  (0.131) (0.148) (0.159) 
        
Sensitivity and robustness checks      
        
A. Excluding privatizations in last 4 years (N=4,134)     
State sector 0.708*** 0.430** 0.512***  0.947*** 0.562*** 0.523*** 
 (0.161) (0.189) (0.189)  (0.133) (0.150) (0.163) 
        
B. Excluding ‘Soviet social jobs’ (N=3,465)   
State sector 0.384 0.456* 0.459**  0.864*** 0.639*** 0.478** 
 (0.262) (0.262) (0.230)  (0.194) (0.201) (0.198) 
        
C. Using only industry stayers (N=2,309)   
State sector 0.532*** 0.360** 0.474***  0.806*** 0.585*** 0.595*** 
 (0.138) (0.161) (0.149)  (0.112) (0.126) (0.129) 
        
D. More refined education measure (N=4,191) 
A)
   
State sector 0.687*** 0.383** 0.479***  0.940*** 0.546*** 0.513*** 
 (0.160) (0.187) (0.186)  (0.131) (0.148) (0.160) 
        
E. Dependent variable: Satisfaction with job security (N=2,448) 
B)
 
State sector 0.923*** 0.719*** 0.794***  1.029*** 0.676*** 0.616*** 
 (0.177) (0.213) (0.219)  (0.148) (0.171) (0.185) 
        
Socio-demographic Post-
Soviet and Soviet 
characteristics 
-    -   
Current job and firm 
characteristic (incl. earnings 
& average industry wages) 
- -   - -  
Personality traits, risk 
aversion 
- -   - -  
Notes: Dependent variable: Five-point Likert scale of job satisfaction with 1 (fully dissatisfied) to 5 (fully 
satisfied). The table reports only the estimated coefficients of interest (state sector; instrumental variables) 
from the following regression specifications: columns (1) and (4) correspond to the specification in Table 
2-3, column (1); columns (2) and (5) correspond to Table 2-3, column (3); columns (3) and (6) 
correspond to Table 2-3, column (8). A) To better capture possible differences in skills and ability, a more 
refined measure of education is included in the regression: a set of 11 dummy variables for the highest 
educational attainment (from ‗grades 1-6‘ to ‗Candidate of Science/Post-doctoral lecture qualification‘). 
B) The question on ‗satisfaction with job in terms of job security‘ was only asked in the survey years 
2004 and 2007, not in 2003, leading to a smaller sample size. The dependent variable ‗satisfaction with 
job in terms of job security‘ in panel E. is a categorical variable based on a five-point Likert scale (as in 
job satisfaction). Standard errors are clustered on the individual level; robust standard errors are shown in 
parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Source: ULMS 2003-2007; own calculations.  
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2.6.3.2 Excluding „social Soviet jobs‟ 
Another possible threat to the validity of the instrumental variables would exist 
if Soviet workers actually could and did self-select into specific occupations and 
industries and if particular types of individuals (happy types, unobservable traits) were 
attracted to ‗typical Western‘ public sector jobs even in the Soviet Union (i.e. public 
administration, education, health). However, in this context it is important to recall that 
during the Soviet time employees in the public administration, education or health care 
system (typically dominated by white-collar occupations) did not benefit from 
additional job amenities (like job security) which are typically attributed to public sector 
jobs in Western market economies vis-à-vis workers in the manufacturing or 
construction sector. Hence, any self-selection of workers into ‗typical‘ public sector 
industries during the Soviet period on the basis of job characteristics which are 
commonly ascribed to Western public sector jobs (e.g. job amenities, job security) can 
be excluded. In fact, in the 1980s skilled manual workers received an official wage 
premium thereby earning more than managers and some professionals (Gerber and Hout 
2004). Furthermore, apart from higher salaries, Soviet workers in blue-collar 
occupations generally benefited from better working conditions and incentives – much 
in line with Soviet ideology and its emphasis on manual labour (Zajda 1980). This 
ideologically motivated preferential treatment of blue collar workers (i.e. not ‗typical 
public sector‘ jobs) seems to work against the idea that Soviet workers selected into 
‗typical public sector‘ industries due to beneficial job attributes. 
However, to account for possible differences in skills and ability of blue- and 
white collar Soviet workers the main regressions in Table 2-4 already controlled for 
white or blue-collar Soviet occupations. As a further step, the sensitivity check in Panel 
B of Table 2-5, excluded all individuals who used to work in ‗typical social‘ jobs during 
the Soviet time to find out whether the state sector satisfaction premium is merely 
caused by socially oriented personality types. The problem with this approach is that it 
is theoretically possible that people enjoy doing social or service work and that this type 
of job content might actually represent job amenities leading to higher job satisfaction. 
One would need extremely large sample sizes and a sufficient share of public and 
private sector jobs in each industry to learn more about within industry differences 
between public and private sector workers. Individuals are classified as ‗Soviet social 
job‘ holders based on their Soviet 4-digit ISCO occupational codes whenever these are 
related to education, health and safety services, social and social security workers 
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(overall 58 different occupations). Excluding these observations from the estimation 
tends to reduce the estimated public sector premium coefficient as well as the 
significance level slightly (especially in the regressions using the privatization 
instrument). However, the previous findings of a significantly positive job satisfaction 
premium of state sector workers are confirmed in these regressions, suggesting that the 
positive effect of working in the public sector is not driven by socially oriented worker 
types.  
2.6.3.3 Using only „industry stayers‟ 
By assigning the privatization probabilities according to Soviet industry or 
industry-region affiliation, the instrumental variables should be more powerful for those 
individuals who currently work in the same industry as they used to do during the 
Soviet period (workers might have changed jobs and firms, but remain in the same 
industry). Since this subsample of workers might generally differ from those workers 
who have switched industries, it is problematic to run the regression on this selected 
sample. Nevertheless, this exercise should help to test whether the instrument is 
‗functioning‘ in the right way, i.e. whether results become more precise even though the 
sample size is diminished. The results in Panel C of Table 2-5 show that this is indeed 
the case which is reassuring: while the point estimates change slightly in size (become 
slightly smaller/larger using instrument 1/2), the standard errors become smaller and the 
estimated coefficients are all highly significant.  
2.6.3.4 More refined education measure 
The original regressions distinguished only between four levels of education in 
order to limit the number of included variables (primary education, general secondary 
education, professional secondary education, and higher education). However, to better 
capture possible differences in skills and ability the main regressions were re-estimated 
using a more refined measure of education by including a set of dummy variables for 11 
different possible educational attainments (from ‗grades 1-6‘ to ‗Candidate of 
Science/Post-doctoral lecture qualification‘). As Panel D of Table 2-5 demonstrates, the 
main results remain virtually unchanged and are not sensitive to the type of education 
measure used in the regressions. 
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2.6.3.5 Satisfaction with job security 
In order to account for the possibility that especially risk averse individuals are 
attracted to the public sector the main regressions included several proxies like 
subjective assessment of one‘s own willingness to take risks or an indicator for risky 
behaviour (i.e. smoking). This hypothesized self-selection of risk-averse individuals 
into the public sector implicitly assumes that state sector jobs are (at least perceived) 
more secure than private sector jobs. The ULMS waves 2004 and 2007 contain an 
additional job satisfaction question which provides a subjective measure of job security: 
Tell me, please, how satisfied are you with your current job in terms of job security? 
There are five answer possibilities to the question ranging from fully dissatisfied to fully 
satisfied. Panel E of Table 2-5 reports the effect of working in the state sector on this 
measure of satisfaction with job security. Across all specifications and instrumental 
variables the estimated effects are strikingly large (larger than in the job satisfaction 
regressions) and positively significant implying a substantial satisfaction premium in 
terms of job security in the state sector (even after correcting for self-selection into the 
public and private sector). The coefficients range between 0.54 and 0.90 of a standard 
deviation. These results seem to indicate that public sector jobs in the Ukraine are 
indeed perceived as more secure than private sector jobs and that this job facet might be 
a part of the overall public sector job satisfaction premium. This finding of higher 
satisfaction with job security among public sector workers is in line with the evidence 
shown by Clark and Postel-Vinay (2009) using data from the European Community 
Household Panel for 12 European countries. Another relevant finding of their analysis is 
that while perceived job security in the private sector seems to be influenced by the 
extent of granted Unemployment Insurance Benefits and the level of Employment 
Protection, there appear to be no such associations among public sector workers. 
2.7 Empirical results: the role of monetary and non-pecuniary fringe 
benefits 
There could be many reasons why average job satisfaction levels differ between 
the state and the private sector (e.g., the possibility that workers value job security has 
been discussed in the previous section). One potential driver might be utility rents 
generated from differences in job amenities. Since the ULMS asks respondents a long 
battery of questions on whether the employer provides social benefits and financial 
incentive schemes, it is possible to shed more light on this channel.  
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As regards the ULMS information on social benefits, there are 13 different 
possible answers (multiple answers are also allowed) to the question: In this job do 
employees receive any of the following social benefits? An advantage of this general 
question is that it is informative about the workplace and not about whether a particular 
person receives benefits during a particular period of time. This way, part of the 
individual level endogeneity problem (if there is individual heterogeneity in benefit 
receipt within firms) is alleviated, although it is still possible that workers sort into 
particular enterprises offering these types of job amenities. In order to reduce the 
dimensionality and complexity of the information, the 13 different social benefit types 
were grouped into three categories: social security (covering, e.g., regular paid vacation, 
paid sick leave), subsidies (among others free child care, discounted food, transportation 
or housing subsidies), and training (human capital enhancing measures like paid 
training or payment for trips to sanatoria).
38
  
The information on financial benefits is based on the question whether 
respondents received any amount of money in addition to their regular salary in the past 
year. Since receipt of this additional money is measured on the individual level the 
problem of endogeneity is more pronounced again. Three different types of payments 
are distinguished: non-performance related benefits (i.e. 13
th
 salary), performance 
related benefits (bonus payments or profit-sharing payment schemes) and risk 
compensation (compensation for non-normal work conditions). 
A first descriptive analysis in Table 2-6 demonstrates that both, social benefits as 
well as financial benefits are much more common in the state than in the private sector. 
For instance, almost all state sector employees (97 percent) report that their workplace 
provides them with at least one of the following social security type of benefits: regular 
paid vacation, paid sick leave, paid maternity leave/child care leave, coverage of health 
related expenses (or treatment in enterprise polyclinic). The corresponding figure for the 
private sector is much lower (only 62 percent). The same pattern is true for the 
provision of training or subsidy type of benefits, like discounted food, transportation 
and housing subsidies, partial payment of child care, etc. It is important to note that 
these types of social benefits were generally available to all workers during the Soviet 
period – irrespective of their industry or occupation. Against this background the Post-
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 A more comprehensive description of these variables is provided in the appendix. 
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Soviet discrepancy in the provision of these benefits between the state and the private 
sector is even more striking.  
 
Table 2-6: Incidence and differences in social benefits and payment incentive 
schemes between private and state sector 
 Private sector  State sector    
Variable 
(1) 
Mean 
 
(2) 
Mean 
 Difference 
(1)-(2) 
t-statistic 
 
Social benefits        
   
SB: Social security  0.62   0.97  -0.34*** -30.90 
SB: Subsidies  0.17   0.33  -0.16*** -11.74 
SB: Training  0.11   0.28  -0.17*** -14.12 
Financial incentive pay scheme 
 
        
 
FB: Non-performance related  0.06   0.14  -0.08*** -9.03 
FB: Performance related  0.18   0.27  -0.10*** -7.38 
FB: Risk compensation  0.02   0.06  -0.03*** -5.55 
Source: ULMS 2003-2007; own calculations. Number of observations: 2,035 (private sector), 2,156 (state sector). 
Pooled sample of all individuals in working age during time of interview with full information on all variables, who 
were 16 or older in December 1991 and for whom information on their job during the Soviet time (December 1986 or 
December 1991) exist. Reported t-statistics refer to mean comparison tests between state and private sector. 
 
To analyse whether the estimated public job satisfaction premium can be 
explained by the variation in benefits across sectors, the GLS-RE and G2SLS-RE 
regressions from Section 2.6 are further extended by including sets of dummy variables 
for different types of benefits successively (only social benefits, only financial benefits, 
both types of benefits). Several interesting findings emerge: firstly, adding controls for 
the provision of fringe benefits reduces the size of the estimated GLS-RE coefficients of 
the state sector dummy variable (Table 2-7, columns 1 to 3). Recall that the GLS-RE 
state sector coefficient in the most elaborate regression specification was 0.211 and it 
drops to 0.141 once all types of benefits are included in the regression. In the GLS-RE 
regressions, the coefficients on social benefits as well as pay schemes show the 
expected positive sign and are significantly different from zero. However, despite the 
inclusion of these variables, there remains an unexplained positive satisfaction gap. 
Secondly, re-running the regression by G2SLS-RE, reveals the same pattern: the 
estimated coefficients drop in size, but stay significant. Interestingly, the positive effect 
of social security type benefits on job satisfaction becomes insignificant in the G2SLS-
RE regression. This might be driven by the almost universal coverage of these types of 
benefits in state sector jobs.  
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To sum up, the public-private job satisfaction differential can be partly related to 
the different levels of provision of social and financial fringe benefits in the two sectors. 
However, the explanatory power of these non-wage components of total compensation 
is limited, since there remains a significant public sector premium even after controlling 
for these types of benefits. Apparently, there are further aspects related to state sector 
employment that make employees in state owned enterprises/organizations better off 
than their private sector counterparts. For instance, such aspects could be related to 
sector differences in job and time flexibility (including formal as well as informal rules, 
e.g. specific firm culture and attitudes), risk of job loss (see Section 2.6.3.5) or 
differences in wage compression across sectors, which would matter if individuals cared 
about wage inequality and relative wages within firms.   
 
 6
4
 
Table 2-7: The role of fringe benefits; GLS-RE and G2SLS-RE estimates; Dependent variable: Job Satisfaction 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
 GLS-RE  G2SLS-RE, IV 1:  
Privatization probability 
 G2SLS-RE, IV 2:  
Private sector share 
            
State sector 0.154*** 0.187*** 0.141***  0.453** 0.471** 0.452**  0.480*** 0.496*** 0.472*** 
 (0.044) (0.042) (0.044)  (0.199) (0.188) (0.200)  (0.170) (0.163) (0.172) 
 
Social benefits 
           
Social security 0.159***  0.144**  0.054  0.037  0.045  0.030 
 (0.060)  (0.060)  (0.090)  (0.089)  (0.082)  (0.082) 
Subsidies  0.073*  0.054  0.058  0.042  0.057  0.041 
 (0.044)  (0.044)  (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.045) 
Training  0.140***  0.118**  0.112**  0.092*  0.110**  0.091* 
 (0.046)  (0.047)  (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.049) 
 
Financial benefits 
           
Non-performance rel.  0.151*** 0.124**   0.112* 0.094   0.109* 0.093 
  (0.058) (0.058)   (0.065) (0.063)   (0.063) (0.062) 
Performance related  0.156*** 0.136***   0.145*** 0.133***   0.144*** 0.133*** 
  (0.042) (0.042)   (0.043) (0.043)   (0.043) (0.043) 
Risk compensation  0.155* 0.133   0.119 0.100   0.116 0.099 
  (0.082) (0.082)   (0.089) (0.089)   (0.088) (0.088) 
            
Observations 4,191 4,191 4,191  4,191 4,191 4,191  4,191 4,191 4,191 
            
Full set of controls            
Notes: Dependent variable: Five-point Likert scale of job satisfaction with 1 (fully dissatisfied) to 5 (fully satisfied). Full set of controls include all control variables from Table 
2-3, column (8). Standard errors are clustered on the individual level. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Source: ULMS 2003-2007; own 
calculations.
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2.8 Conclusions 
This chapter analysed differences in job satisfaction between public and private 
sector employees in Post-Soviet Ukraine. The main research question asked whether the 
raw public-private sector satisfaction gap observed in Ukraine reflects genuine 
differences in job characteristics (i.e. rents in the public sector) or whether it is driven 
by self-selection of workers according to unobserved heterogeneity (i.e. personality 
types). The present study is the first to address this particular research question using 
instrumental variable techniques. The identification strategy rests on a quasi-natural 
experiment generated by the fundamental changes in ownership of enterprises during 
the transition process, during which workers were randomly reallocated from state into 
private sector jobs.  
The empirical results reveal that the significantly positive public sector 
satisfaction premium in the naïve GLS-RE regressions holds even after correcting for 
self-selection. In fact, accounting and correcting for the non-random sorting into state 
and private sector in the G2SLS-RE regressions leads to an increase in the size of the 
gap. These findings indicate a possible downward bias in the GLS-RE estimates, 
suggesting a negative selection of workers into the public sector. The same pattern of 
negative selection has been found for Germany using structural switching regression 
models (Luechinger, Stutzer and Winkelmann 2010). However, the results are in 
contrast with the conclusions from Heywood et al. (2002), who find a positive selection 
into public sector employment in the UK based on panel fixed effects estimations. The 
fact that the public-private satisfaction gap is even larger under random allocation 
(G2SLS-RE) suggests that sorting of workers led to an equalization of job satisfaction 
levels between the public and the private sector in Ukraine. 
Against the background of the theory of equalizing differentials, the regression 
results point to a significant satisfaction premium or rents of public sector employees in 
Ukraine which in turn could be related to queues for state sector employment. Assessing 
the potential drivers of the satisfaction differential reveals that a certain fraction of the 
state sector premium can be explained by different levels of fringe benefits in the two 
sectors. However, as the significant public sector satisfaction premium remains even 
after controlling for fringe benefits and self-selection, the open question is as to which 
additional factors might explain the gap. For example, there could be sector differences 
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in job flexibility which in turn could affect the ability to combine working with private 
life (family obligations). Another explanation could be differences in perceived job and 
income uncertainty in the two sectors. In absence of functioning financial markets 
public sector employment could act as insurance mechanism (Rodrik 2000). 
Furthermore, public sector rents could be related to unofficial payments or bribes to 
public sector employees (Luechinger, Meier and Stutzer 2008). Such a hypothesis 
would find empirical support from the study by Gorodnichenko and Sabirianova Peter 
(2007) which demonstrates significant levels of unofficial payments to public sector 
employees in Ukraine. Nevertheless, having established the causality of the public 
sector job satisfaction premium and having investigated one potential source of 
satisfaction difference, i.e. fringe benefits, the study of other relevant job attributes and 
differences creating the public sector satisfaction premium remains for future research. 
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2.9 Appendix to Chapter 2 
Appendix A 
Figure A 2-1: Reason for end of job held in December 1986 (or 1991) 
 
Source: ULMS 2003, own calculations based on full sample with retrospective information. 
 
Figure A 2-2: Life Satisfaction in the Private and Public Sector in Ukraine based 
on regression sample (ULMS 2003-2007) 
 
Source: ULMS 2003-2007, regression sample with non-missing life satisfaction (N=5,083); own 
calculations. 
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Figure A 2-3: Job and Life Satisfaction State Sector in Ukraine based on 
regression sample (ULMS 2003-2007) 
 
Source: ULMS 2003-2007, regression sample (life satisfaction: N=5,083; job satisfaction: N=5,142), own 
calculations. 
 
Figure A 2-4: Job Satisfaction in the Private and Public Sector in Ukraine based 
on old and young workers (all available observations from the original survey; 
ULMS 2003-2007) 
 
Source: ULMS 2003-2007, pooled sample of all individuals in working age (N=9,510); own calculations.  
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Figure A 2-5: Job and Life Satisfaction in Ukraine based on old and young 
workers (all available observations from the original survey; ULMS 2003-2007) 
 
Source: ULMS 2003-2007, pooled sample of all individuals in working age (N=9,510); own calculations.  
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Table A 2-1: Overview on final sample size and labour market composition of 
original sample 
 Cross section 2003 
 Absolute 
numbers 
Percentage 
   
Information on final sample size   
Total sample 8,537 100.0% 
Working 
A)
 3,583 42.0% 
out of which   
Working 
A)
 and with Soviet Job Information  2,441  
Working 
A)
 and with Soviet Job Information 
and non-missing information in included 
variables 
B)
 
1,491  
Unemployed, ILO 783 9.2% 
Out of labour force/student, working age 1,990 23.3% 
Out of labour force, pension age 1,827 21.4% 
Out of labour force, other 354 4.1% 
Source: ULMS 2003; own calculations. 
A) 
In official working age (younger than official pension age). 
B)
 
Excluding some specific variables with fewer observations, the regression sample size becomes 2,059 
observations. 
 
 
Table A 2-2: Variable definitions 
  
Variable name Variable definition Comments 
Satisfaction measures 
Job satisfaction Job Satisfaction based on the 
question: Tell me, please, how 
satisfied are you with your current 
job? Answer option: 1 Fully 
dissatisfied/ 2 Rather dissatisfied/ 
3 Neither satisfied, nor 
dissatisfied/ 4 Rather satisfied/ 5 
Fully satisfied 
 
Life satisfaction Life Satisfaction: To what extent 
are you satisfied with your life in 
general at the present time? (Five 
answer possibilities as in job 
satisfaction.) 
 
Satisfaction with job 
security 
Based on the question: Tell me, 
please, how satisfied are you with 
your current job in terms of job 
security? (Five answer 
possibilities as in job satisfaction.) 
 
This question was only asked 
in the survey years 2004 and 
2007. 
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Sociodemographic and household characteristics 
Age_35 (omitted cat.) 
Age_3640 
Age_4145  
Age_4650  
Age_51ret 
Age group dummy variables 
according to age calculated using 
birth year, month, day and 
interview year, month, day 
(Last age group: 51 to official 
retirement age: 55/60 for 
women/men) 
‗Corrected age information‘; 
Birth year, month and day 
have corrected based on 
cross-year consistency 
checks 
Male  = 1, if male; =0 otherwise  
Marital status   
Single  = 1, if single  
Married  = 1, if married (lives in registered 
or unregistered marriage) 
 
Divorced  = 1, if separated or divorced  
Widowed    = 1, if widowed    
Education 
 
  
Primary education = 1, if person has primary or 
unfinished secondary education 
Coded according to Kupets 
(2006) 
General secondary 
education 
= 1, if person has diploma of high-
school or PTU with secondary 
education (vocational secondary 
education) 
Coded according to Kupets 
(2006) 
Professional secondary 
education 
= 1, if person has diploma from 
college (technical, medical, music, 
etc.) or incomplete professional 
education (at least 3 years in 
institute, university, etc.) 
Coded according to Kupets 
(2006) 
Higher education = 1, if person has diploma from 
institute/university (bachelor, 
diploma, Master, Doctor of 
science) 
Coded according to Kupets 
(2006) 
Parents have higher 
education 
= 1, if at least one parent has 
diploma from institute/university 
(bachelor, diploma, Master, 
Doctor of science) 
 
Parents have primary 
education 
= 1, if both parents have primary 
or unfinished secondary education 
 
Chronic disease = 1, if person has at least one of 
seven chronic diseases (self-
reported): heart disease, illness of 
the lungs, liver disease, kidney 
disease, gastrointestinal disease, 
spinal problems, other chronic 
illnesses. 
 
Height Individual height in cm Corrected based on 
consistency checks across 
survey years. 
One child in HH = 1, if there is one child younger 
than 18 in the HH 
Calculated from household 
file 
Two or more children in 
HH 
= 1, if there are two or more 
children younger than 18 in the 
HH  
Calculated from household 
file 
Place of birth: village 
Indicating that birth place was 
village 
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Place of birth: urban 
settlement 
Indicating that birth place was 
urban settlement 
 
Place of birth: town/city 
Indicating that birth place was 
town/city 
 
Place of birth: abroad 
(omitted cat.) 
Indicating that birth place was 
abroad (not on Ukrainian territory) 
 
Never smoked = 1, if person has never smoked  
Extrovert  Personality trait indicator 
generated on the basis of 
interviewer assessment at the end 
of the interview. Answer ‗3‘ to 
question: Assess the sincerity and 
openness of the respondent. The 
respondent was: 1 – very 
introverted, insincere; 2 – as 
sincere and open as most 
respondents; 3 – more sincere and 
open than most respondents. 
  
Neurotic Personality trait indicator 
generated on the basis of 
interviewer assessment at the end 
of the interview. Answer ‗1‘ to 
question: Assess the respondent‟s 
behaviour during the interview. 
The respondent: 1 – was nervous; 
2 – was occasionally nervous; 3 – 
felt comfortable. 
 
Risk loving Indicator variable for all persons 
who answered 6 or higher on the 
question: Are you generally a 
person who is fully willing to take 
risks or do you try to avoid taking 
risks? Please give me a number 
from 0 to 10, where the value 0 
means: “Completely unwilling to 
take risks” and the value 10 
means: “Completely willing to 
take risks”. 
This question was asked only 
in one wave of the survey (in 
2007). Hence, the 
individual‘s answer to the 
2007 question was assigned 
to the other survey years.  
Job characteristics 
   
Occupation   
Professional 
 
= 1, if the worker‘s occupation is 
in the one-digit ISCO categories of 
legislators, senior officials, and 
managers (1) or professionals (2). 
Categories based on one-digit 
ISCO codes as in Brown, 
Earle and Vakhitov (2006) 
Technician = 1, if the worker‘s occupation is 
in the one-digit ISCO category of 
technicians and associate 
professionals (3). 
Categories based on one-digit 
ISCO codes as in Brown, 
Earle and Vakhitov (2006) 
Skilled blue-collar 
 
= 1, if the worker‘s occupation is 
in the one-digit ISCO categories 
of clerk (4), service workers and 
shop and market sales workers (5), 
skilled agricultural and fishery 
workers (6), craft and related 
Categories based on one-digit 
ISCO codes as in Brown, 
Earle and Vakhitov (2006) 
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workers (7), or plant and machine 
operators and assemblers (8). 
Unskilled (omitted 
category) 
=1, if the worker‘s occupation is in 
the one-digit ISCO category of 
elementary 
occupations (9).  
Categories based on one-digit 
ISCO codes as in Brown et 
al. (2006) 
Less than 31 hours  Indicating respondents working 30 
hours or less in a typical week  
 
31 to 50 hours (omitted 
category) 
Indicating respondents working 
between 31 to 50 hours in a typical 
week 
 
More than 50 hours Indicating respondents working 51 
hours or more in a typical week 
 
Log wage Monthly wage (contractual wage) 
or earnings from primary job (after 
tax), deflated to Dec 2003 
Ukrainian Hryvna 
Missing wage information 
was imputed based on a 
standard Mincer equation 
controlling for gender, age, 
schooling, marital status, 
weekly working hours, 
occupational group, 
settlement type and year 
dummy variables. 
Log average monthly 
industry wage 
Average monthly wages for one 
digit industry groups; deflated to 
Dec 2003 Ukrainian Hryvna 
Source: Monthly industry 
wages from Ukrainian State 
Statistics Office 
Weekend work Indicator variable for person 
having worked at least once on 
Saturday and/or Sunday in the past 
four weeks. 
 
Shift work Indicator variable for persons 
having worked more than one shift 
in the past four weeks. 
 
   
Firm characteristics   
State sector firm Dummy variable with value 1 if 
ownership type is any of the 
following: Budgetary organization, 
State enterprise, Local municipal 
enterprise.  
Takes value 0 for ‗Privatized‘,  
‗De-novo, private (incl. new 
agric)‘, ‗Freelance, Self-
employed‘, ‗Collectives, 
Cooperatives‘, ‗Intl' organization; 
other organization‘, missings. 
The variable has been 
extensively cleaned based on 
consistency checks across 
waves and information on 
enterprise names. 
 
 
Small size firm (om. cat.) 
Medium sized firm 
Large sized firm 
Indicating firms with  
- less than 10 employees 
- 10 to 99 employees 
- 100 and more employees 
 
   
Fringe benefits   
Social benefits 
 
 
 
Three dummy variables based on 
the survey answers on the 
following question: In this job do 
employees receive any of the 
Social benefit answer 
categories: 
1 Regular paid vacation 
2 Paid sick leave 
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SB: Social security 
 
 
 
 
SB: Subsidy 
 
 
 
 
 
SB: Training 
 
following social benefits? 
=1, if answered ‗yes‘ to at least 
one of following security type 
benefits (cat: 1, 2, 3, 4) 
 
 
=1, if answered ‗yes‘ to at least 
one of following subsidy type 
benefits (cat: 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 
13) 
 
 
=1, if answered ‗yes‘ to at least 
one of following quality 
enhancement type benefits (cat: 9, 
5) 
 
 
3 Paid maternity leave, child 
care leave     
4 Free treatment in an 
enterprise polyclinic, full 
or partial payment for 
treatment in other medical 
institutions   
5 Payment for trips to 
sanatoria, rest homes, 
tourist bases, or children 
camps      
6 Free child care in an 
enterprise kindergarten, or 
full or partial payment for 
child care in another 
kindergarten 
7 Free or discounted 
food/subsidies 
8 Transportation subsidies 
9 Training paid for by the 
organization 
10 Loans and credit 
11Possibilities to 
rent/purchase garden and 
land plot at below market 
prices 
12 Equipment for additional 
earnings and private needs 
13 Housing subsidies 
Financial benefits 
 
 
 
FB: non-performance 
related 
FB: Performance related 
 
FB: Risk compensation 
Based on the survey answers on 
whether respondent received ‗any 
amount of money in addition to 
your regular salary‘ in the past 
year: 
=1, if received 13
th
 salary 
=1, if received performance-based 
bonus or payment scheme 
involved profit-sharing 
=1, if received compensation for 
non-normal work conditions 
 
 
 
   
Control variables from the Soviet period (December 1986 or 1991) 
Place of work 1986: Kiev, 
Center, West, East, South, 
Russia, Other country 
Set of 6 dummy variables 
indicating place of work in 
December 1986.  
Where this information is not 
available or the respondent 
started his working life after 
December 1986, the 
respective information from 
December 1991 is used. 
Log of wage in December 
1986 
Expressed in real terms in July 
2004 Hryvnia 
 
Log of wage in December 
1991 
Expressed in real terms in July 
2004 Hryvnia 
 
Wage December 1986 
missing 
Indicator variable for missing 
wage information 
 
Wage December 1991 
missing 
Indicator variable for missing 
wage information 
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Worked in Dec 1986 Indicator variable for working 
status in December 1986 
 
Worked in Dec 1991 Indicator variable for working 
status in December 1991 
 
   
Other controls 
Oblast A set of dummy variables for each 
of the 26 oblasts of Ukraine 
 
Urban = 1, if settlement has status of 
small town or more, = 0, if village 
 
Year 2004, year 2007 Year fixed effects for survey years 
(omitted category: year 2003) 
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Table A 2-3: Job satisfaction regressions with stepwise inclusion of covariates (a more complete representation of Table 2) (GLS) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable    Job satisfaction    
State sector 0.340*** 0.277*** 0.259*** 0.240*** 0.217*** 0.219*** 0.212*** 0.211*** 
 (0.043) (0.042) (0.043) (0.042) (0.043) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
Male   -0.064 -0.038 -0.065 -0.073 -0.174*** -0.173*** -0.135* 
  (0.062) (0.066) (0.066) (0.065) (0.063) (0.063) (0.076) 
General secondary educ.  0.026 0.023 0.005 0.015 -0.005 -0.001 -0.004 
  (0.076) (0.076) (0.077) (0.078) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) 
Professional sec. educ.  0.197** 0.121 0.025 0.033 -0.003 0.000 -0.001 
  (0.081) (0.083) (0.085) (0.086) (0.084) (0.083) (0.084) 
Higher education  0.413*** 0.271*** 0.041 0.050 0.018 0.019 0.012 
  (0.088) (0.094) (0.103) (0.103) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) 
Individual height  0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Parents: primary educ.  0.110 0.100 0.083 0.089 0.099 0.101 0.101 
  (0.068) (0.068) (0.067) (0.067) (0.065) (0.065) (0.064) 
Parents: higher educ.  -0.009 -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 0.000 0.003 0.003 
  (0.049) (0.048) (0.047) (0.047) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) 
Married   0.367*** 0.452*** 0.410*** 0.427*** 0.416*** 0.421*** 0.425*** 
  (0.114) (0.123) (0.123) (0.123) (0.116) (0.116) (0.117) 
Divorced  0.305** 0.378*** 0.347*** 0.354*** 0.365*** 0.371*** 0.380*** 
  (0.121) (0.128) (0.129) (0.128) (0.121) (0.122) (0.123) 
Widowed  0.413*** 0.509*** 0.476*** 0.492*** 0.477*** 0.482*** 0.487*** 
  (0.147) (0.154) (0.154) (0.154) (0.148) (0.148) (0.149) 
1 child in HH  -0.084* -0.078* -0.091** -0.080* -0.069 -0.068 -0.071* 
  (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
2+ children in HH  -0.155*** -0.128** -0.125** -0.111* -0.090 -0.089 -0.094* 
  (0.057) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) 
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Chronic disease  -0.203*** -0.200*** -0.198*** -0.185*** -0.174*** -0.171*** -0.173*** 
  (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
Urban settlement  0.135*** 0.114** 0.086* 0.066 -0.003 -0.007 -0.005 
  (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) 
Professional occupation    0.583*** 0.611*** 0.423*** 0.420*** 0.412*** 
    (0.077) (0.076) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) 
Technical occupation    0.473*** 0.459*** 0.369*** 0.364*** 0.360*** 
    (0.075) (0.075) (0.073) (0.073) (0.074) 
Skilled blue collar occ.    0.264*** 0.250*** 0.141*** 0.138*** 0.139*** 
    (0.054) (0.054) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) 
Less than 31 hours      -0.348*** -0.189*** -0.194*** -0.196*** 
     (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) 
More than 50 hours     -0.086 -0.099 -0.077 -0.077 
     (0.062) (0.062) (0.063) (0.063) 
Medium-sized firm     0.089 0.092 0.078 0.077 
     (0.058) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) 
Large-sized firm     0.131** 0.059 0.044 0.044 
     (0.058) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) 
Log earnings      0.392*** 0.396*** 0.393*** 
      (0.047) (0.048) (0.048) 
Log average industry wage      0.190*** 0.175** 0.173** 
      (0.073) (0.074) (0.074) 
Weekend work       -0.081** -0.080** 
       (0.039) (0.039) 
Shift work       0.061 0.064 
       (0.053) (0.053) 
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Extrovert         0.078* 
        (0.047) 
Neurotic         -0.158 
        (0.106) 
Never smoked        0.053 
        (0.057) 
Risk loving        0.026 
        (0.052) 
Constant 3.029*** 2.222*** 2.498*** 2.285*** 2.338*** -1.586* -1.484 -1.511 
 (0.058) (0.621) (0.881) (0.873) (0.870) (0.960) (0.962) (0.961) 
         
Chi-square test 194.7 475.1 517.2 618.0 653.2 859.4 860.5 879.7 
Prob > chi2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Region FE -        
Age & birth place  -        
Soviet period controls - -       
R-squared overall 0.0430 0.106 0.113 0.133 0.144 0.185 0.186 0.187 
Notes: Dependent variable: Five-point Likert scale of Job satisfaction with 1 (fully dissatisfied) to 5 (fully satisfied). Omitted categories: ‗primary education‘,  ‗single‘, ‗occupation 
: unskilled‘, ‗works 31 to 50 hours in typical working week‘ ‗small-sized firm‘, ‗village or rural settlement‘. All regressions control for year fixed effects and interview month fixed 
effects. Number of observations 4,191 (Number of id: 1,915). Standard errors are clustered on the individual level. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1; Source: ULMS 2003-2007; own calculations. 
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Table A 2-4: Robustness checks I.: A. OLS estimates of job satisfaction based on 
cross-section 2003 only; B. GLS Random effects estimates based on larger 
sample (ULMS 2003-2007) 
 
 A.  
OLS estimates based on  
cross-section ULMS 2003 
 B.  
GLS Random effects estimates 
based on  
larger sample (ULMS 2003-2007) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
        
State sector 0.308*** 0.221*** 0.192***  0.321*** 0.250*** 0.208*** 
 (0.064) (0.066) (0.066)  (0.038) (0.039) (0.038) 
Male   0.013 -0.038   -0.012 -0.154** 
  (0.100) (0.119)   (0.060) (0.067) 
General secondary 
educ. 
 0.199* 0.133   0.050 0.015 
  (0.116) (0.114)   (0.066) (0.064) 
Professional sec. educ.  0.184 0.028   0.145** 0.018 
  (0.127) (0.126)   (0.073) (0.072) 
Higher education  0.209 -0.032   0.271*** -0.014 
  (0.145) (0.155)   (0.084) (0.088) 
Individual height  -0.008 -0.009*   0.001 0.001 
  (0.006) (0.006)   (0.003) (0.003) 
Parents: primary educ.  0.123 0.139   0.102 0.091 
  (0.112) (0.108)   (0.063) (0.059) 
Parents: higher educ.  -0.015 0.001   0.005 0.010 
  (0.075) (0.072)   (0.044) (0.041) 
Married   0.402** 0.377**   0.367*** 0.297*** 
  (0.200) (0.187)   (0.109) (0.105) 
Divorced  0.351 0.371*   0.303*** 0.261** 
  (0.221) (0.208)   (0.115) (0.111) 
Widowed  0.580** 0.550**   0.346** 0.280** 
  (0.243) (0.234)   (0.140) (0.135) 
1 child in HH  0.022 0.018   -0.102** -0.098** 
  (0.077) (0.075)   (0.041) (0.039) 
2+ children in HH  -0.034 -0.019   -0.136** -0.106** 
  (0.099) (0.095)   (0.053) (0.052) 
Chronic disease  -0.145** -0.120*   -0.209*** -0.177*** 
  (0.066) (0.064)   (0.034) (0.033) 
Urban settlement  0.141* -0.026   0.167*** 0.027 
  (0.083) (0.081)   (0.047) (0.046) 
Professional occ.   0.246*    0.467*** 
   (0.136)    (0.071) 
Technical occ.   0.307**    0.383*** 
   (0.120)    (0.067) 
Skilled blue coll.    0.063    0.180*** 
   (0.089)    (0.049) 
Less than 31 hours    -0.194*    -0.168*** 
   (0.113)    (0.060) 
More than 50 hours   -0.048    -0.093 
   (0.119)    (0.057) 
Medium-sized firm   0.054    0.048 
   (0.097)    (0.051) 
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Large-sized firm   -0.024    0.053 
   (0.096)    (0.052) 
Log earnings   0.582***    0.410*** 
   (0.066)    (0.044) 
Log ave. industry 
wage 
  0.210**    0.181*** 
   (0.102)    (0.065) 
Weekend work   -0.105    -0.072** 
   (0.067)    (0.035) 
Shift work   0.065    0.046 
   (0.104)    (0.048) 
Extroverted    -0.009    0.091** 
   (0.098)    (0.043) 
Neurotic    -0.295    -0.236** 
   (0.234)    (0.100) 
Never smoked   0.151*    0.007 
   (0.092)    (0.050) 
Risk loving   0.049    -- 
   (0.082)     
Constant 3.065*** 3.590** -2.530*  3.072*** 2.622*** -1.757** 
 (0.067) (1.433) (1.534)  (0.050) (0.799) (0.868) 
        
Socio-demographic 
Post-Soviet & Soviet  
characteristics (incl. 
Soviet job) 
-    -   
Current job & firm 
characteristics (incl. 
log of earnings & 
average industry 
wages) 
- -   - -  
Personality traits, risk 
aversion 
- -   - -  
Observations 1,491 1,491 1,491  5,142 5,142 5,142 
R-squared 
A)
 0.0157 0.0986 0.185  0.0381 0.103 0.182 
Notes: Dependent variable: Five-point Likert scale of job satisfaction with 1 (fully dissatisfied) to 5 
(fully satisfied). The table reports selected estimated from the following regression specifications: 
columns (1) and (4) correspond to the specification in Table 2-3, column (1); columns (2) and (5) 
correspond to Table 2-3, column (3); columns (3) and (6) correspond to Table 2-3, column (8). 
Omitted categories: ‗primary education‘, ‗single‘, ‗occupation: unskilled‘, ‗works 31 to 50 hours in 
typical working week‘, ‗small-sized firm‘, ‗village or rural settlement‘. A) Standard R-squared in 
columns (1)-(3); R-squared overall in columns (4)-(6). Number of id in columns (4)-(6): 2,566. All 
regressions control for year fixed effects and interview month fixed effects. Standard errors are 
clustered on the individual level. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: columns (1)-(3) ULMS 2003, columns (4)-(6) ULMS 2003-2007; own 
calculations. 
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Table A 2-5: Robustness checks II: Instrumental variable regressions based on 
cross-section 2003 (A) and (B) pooled sample with more observations (ULMS 
2003-2007) 
 Instrumental variable 1:  
Privatization probability 
 Instrumental variable 2:  
Private sector share 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable Job Satisfaction  Job Satisfaction 
A. OLS estimates based on cross-section ULMS 2003   
OLS regressions     
State sector 0.308*** 0.221*** 0.192***  0.308*** 0.221*** 0.192*** 
 (0.064) (0.066) (0.066)  (0.064) (0.066) (0.066) 
        
2SLS regressions     
State sector 0.635*** 0.325 0.516**  0.858*** 0.529*** 0.567*** 
 (0.224) (0.229) (0.252)  (0.183) (0.177) (0.184) 
        
First stage t-statistic -8.87 -9.40 -9.83  -12.55 -11.60 -9.49 
First stage F-statistic 78.60 88.43 96.61  157.44 134.63 90.06 
Observations 1,491 1,491 1,491  1,491 1,491 1,491 
B. GLS Random effects estimates based on larger sample (ULMS 2003-2007) 
GLS regressions     
State sector 0.321*** 0.250*** 0.208***  0.321*** 0.250*** 0.208*** 
 (0.038) (0.039) (0.038)  (0.038) (0.039) (0.038) 
        
G2SLS regressions     
State sector 0.553*** 0.300* 0.413**  0.812*** 0.456*** 0.444*** 
 (0.148) (0.174) (0.173)  (0.115) (0.132) (0.143) 
        
First stage z-statistic -18.48 -15.59 -15.76  -24.81 -21.09 -19.28 
First stage chi-2-statistic 161.1 100.5 110.9  290.9 183.0 170.6 
Observations 5,142 5,142 5,142  5,142 5,142 5,142 
Socio-demographic Post-
Soviet and Soviet  
characteristics (incl. Soviet 
job) 
-    -   
Current job and firm 
characteristic (incl. log of 
earnings & average industry 
wages) 
- -   - -  
Personality traits, risk 
aversion 
- -   - -  
Notes: Dependent variable: Five-point Likert scale of job satisfaction with 1 (fully dissatisfied) to 5 
(fully satisfied). The table reports only the estimated coefficients of interest (state sector; instrumental 
variables) from the following regression specifications: columns (1) and (4) correspond to the 
specification in Table 2-3, column (1); columns (2) and (5) correspond to Table 2-3, column (3); 
columns (3) and (6) correspond to Table 2-3, column (8). In panel (A) the estimation procedure allows 
to cluster standard errors on industry-macro region level; in panel (B) standard errors are clustered on 
the individual level. In the top panel A, the p-value for the state sector coefficient from the 2SLS 
regression in column (2) is 0.156. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1; Source: ULMS 2003-2007; own calculations.   
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Appendix B. Construction of instrumental variables 
First Instrumental Variable: Share of Employees experiencing privatization in 
27 industries 
The first instrumental variable reflects the probability of privatization for a 
worker who started her working life during the Soviet Union in a specific industry 
sector. The calculation of the instrumental variable exploits the retrospective 
information of the ULMS conducted in 2003 and is based on the sample of 
individuals who started their job during the Soviet period, i.e. before December 
1991, and who were working in this job at least until January 1992 (‗transition 
jobs‘). (This drops all individuals who used to be in the labour force during the 
Soviet Union, but retired or left the workforce before December 1992 and thus could 
not possibly experience privatization.) The calculation of industry specific 
privatization probabilities involved two steps: (1) In the first step a binary indicator 
was generated for each individual that took the value ‗1‘, if the work place was 
privatized during the tenure of the job that started during Soviet time and lasted at 
least until January 1993 and if most of the shares of the enterprise/organization were 
owned by private entities after the privatization, and ‗0‘ otherwise. (2) The share of 
these privatization incidences within a certain industry sector was then calculated for 
27 different industry sectors (see Table B 2-1). These industry specific privatization 
probabilities were then assigned to all workers with non-missing Soviet work history 
information based on the industry affiliation of their work place held in December 
1986. For the subsample of workers who did not work in December 1986, but started 
to work before December 1991, the industry specific privatization probability is 
assigned based on the December 1991 work place industry sector. It should be noted, 
that there are two aspects that potentially reduce the exactness of this instrumental 
variable in reflecting the true industry specific privatization probability. First, the 
ULMS survey was originally designed to be representative of the Ukrainian 
population aged 15 to 72 in 2003 and not in 1986/1991. This implies that the true 
privatization probabilities might differ to the extent that the distribution of workers 
across industries based on the retrospective information of the sample 2003 differs 
from the actual distribution (if, for instance, mortality rates or migration vary across 
industries). Second, the construction of the instrumental variable is based only on 
those jobs that started during the Soviet period and thus neglects all possible 
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privatization experiences after a job change in the Post-Soviet period. However, this 
will only bias the estimates if the workers propensity to leave a ‗still state-owned‘ 
enterprise before its privatization differs systematically across sectors. Table B 2-1 
presents the calculated privatization probabilities and the respective cell sizes for the 
27 industry sectors (for the sample used to construct the probabilities, i.e. all 
‗transition jobs‟). 
Table B 2-1: Overview of industry categories and industry specific share of 
privatization episodes in the ULMS 
Industry sector categories I (ULMS) Privatization 
probability 
(IV_privatized) 
Number of 
observations  
per cell 
1 Agriculture, forestry, fishing 14.76% 725 
2 Mining 6.27% 257 
3 Manufacture of foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco 24.60% 189 
4 Manufacture of textiles and leather products 34.62% 132 
5 Manufacture of cellulose and paper industry; wood; 
printing 
35.94% 64 
6 Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and 
nuclear fuel 
28.57% 14 
7 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 23.91% 46 
8 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 48.39% 31 
9 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 29.17% 24 
10 Metallurgy and production of finished metal products 32.27% 223 
11 Manufacture of machinery and equipment 24.79% 123 
12 Manufacture of electrical, electronic and optical 
equipment 
21.28% 189 
13 Manufacture of transport vehicles and equipment 29.66% 119 
14 Manufacture other 26.32% 19 
15 Production and distribution of electricity, gas and 
water 
16.46% 79 
16 Construction 12.66% 242 
17 Trade; repair of motor vehicles, household appliances, 
personal demand items 
15.77% 283 
18 Activity of hotels and restaurants 13.51% 37 
19 Transport 11.32% 318 
20 Post and Telecom 6.67% 60 
21 Financial intermediaries 8.82% 68 
22 Public administration and defence 1.01% 198 
23 Education 0.24% 419 
24 Health care and provision of social aid 1.48% 341 
25 Provision of communal and individual services 8.19% 172 
26 Communal and individual services: culture, sport, 
leisure, entertainment 
5.26% 57 
27 Other activities 0.00% 22 
  Total 13.99% 4,451 
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Second Instrumental Variable: Share of Private Sector Employment in 16 
industries in 5 macro regions in Post-Soviet Ukraine (2003-2006) 
The construction of the second instrumental variable is based on a pooled 
sample of the Ukrainian Budget Household Survey for the years 2003, 2004, 2005, 
2006, restricted to individuals who work at the time of the interview (excluding 
unpaid family helpers) and who have non-missing information on industry category 
and ownership type of work place (N=34,344). The information on ownership 
distinguishes 7 categories: (1) Public/State enterprise, organization, office/institute; 
(2) Collective enterprise, cooperative; (3) Joint stock enterprise; (4) Leased 
enterprise; (5) Joint venture or foreign enterprise; (6) Private enterprise or private 
individual/person; (7) Other. 17 industry sectors are distinguished in the 
questionnaire (16 categories are used for constructing cell shares as two categories 
were merged due to few observations per cell). The candidate instrumental variable 
reflects the share of individuals who answered ‗(1) Public/State enterprise, 
organization‘ in a specific industry sector and in a specific macro-region of Ukraine. 
This allows for possible regional variation in state or private sector employment. The 
result are 80 industry sector-macro region cells (16 industries x 5 macro regions). All 
cell shares are calculated using individual sampling weights. 
  
Table B 2-2: Overview of industry-region categories and industry-region 
specific shares of private sector employment in the UHBS 
Region Industry sector categories II (UHBS) Private sector 
share 
(IV2_private-
share) 
Number of 
observations 
per cell 
Kiev Agriculture, hunting and forestry 30.94% 15 
Kiev Fishery 75.65% 5 
Kiev Mining 44.48% 17 
Kiev Manufacturing 55.85% 225 
Kiev Production and distribution of electricity, gas and water 34.39% 33 
Kiev Construction 72.66% 207 
Kiev Wholesale and retail trade; sale of transportation means; 
repair services 
88.61% 339 
Kiev Hotels and restaurants 89.82% 44 
Kiev Transport and communications 52.64% 222 
Kiev Financial intermediation 61.71% 87 
Kiev Real estate transactions, lease and services to legal 
persons 
35.55% 86 
Kiev Public administration 1.27% 166 
Kiev Education 6.62% 218 
Kiev Health care and social aid 14.50% 144 
Kiev Collective, social and individual services 64.50% 264 
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Kiev Extra-territorial organizations and bodies 51.30% 12 
Centre Agriculture, hunting and forestry 83.25% 1587 
Centre Fishery 84.55% 15 
Centre Mining 70.72% 132 
Centre Manufacturing 87.32% 1249 
Centre Production and distribution of electricity, gas and water 44.90% 276 
Centre Construction 80.92% 466 
Centre Wholesale and retail trade; sale of transportation means; 
repair services 
95.21% 917 
Centre Hotels and restaurants 85.53% 90 
Centre Transport and communications 42.68% 674 
Centre Financial intermediation 55.06% 130 
Centre Real estate transactions, lease and services to legal 
persons 
58.49% 62 
Centre Public administration 0.53% 624 
Centre Education 0.41% 1010 
Centre Health care and social aid 5.34% 793 
Centre Collective, social and individual services 59.55% 271 
Centre Extra-territorial organizations and bodies 51.30% 12 
West Agriculture, hunting and forestry 77.86% 839 
West Fishery 91.72% 5 
West Mining 47.45% 202 
West Manufacturing 82.37% 1122 
West Production and distribution of electricity, gas and water 43.37% 334 
West Construction 81.20% 714 
West Wholesale and retail trade; sale of transportation means; 
repair services 
93.88% 1046 
West Hotels and restaurants 90.14% 160 
West Transport and communications 38.69% 681 
West Financial intermediation 42.68% 117 
West Real estate transactions, lease and services to legal 
persons 
55.36% 49 
West Public administration 0.66% 793 
West Education 0.60% 1215 
West Health care and social aid 7.10% 863 
West Collective, social and individual services 55.36% 339 
West Extra-territorial organizations and bodies 51.30% 12 
East Agriculture, hunting and forestry 92.14% 423 
East Fishery 92.48% 9 
East Mining 20.93% 565 
East Manufacturing 84.37% 1368 
East Production and distribution of electricity, gas and water 33.82% 301 
East Construction 86.23% 358 
East Wholesale and retail trade; sale of transportation means; 
repair services 
95.74% 891 
East Hotels and restaurants 91.76% 64 
East Transport and communications 46.50% 505 
East Financial intermediation 49.50% 93 
East Real estate transactions, lease and services to legal 
persons 
42.81% 97 
East Public administration 0.52% 399 
East Education 1.80% 640 
East Health care and social aid 10.14% 515 
East Collective, social and individual services 58.07% 170 
East Extra-territorial organizations and bodies 51.30% 12 
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South Agriculture, hunting and forestry 82.46% 1146 
South Fishery 88.99% 41 
South Mining 73.95% 212 
South Manufacturing 79.56% 1492 
South Production and distribution of electricity, gas and water 33.47% 290 
South Construction 87.98% 622 
South Wholesale and retail trade; sale of transportation means; 
repair services 
96.11% 1254 
South Hotels and restaurants 91.88% 144 
South Transport and communications 46.84% 800 
South Financial intermediation 55.19% 155 
South Real estate transactions, lease and services to legal 
persons 
62.32% 76 
South Public administration 0.17% 579 
South Education 2.25% 865 
South Health care and social aid 8.38% 734 
South Collective, social and individual services 65.69% 332 
South Extra-territorial organizations and bodies 51.30% 12 
Total   52.77% 33,994 
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3 The long-term effects of Chernobyl on Subjective Well-Being 
and Mental Health 
3.1 Introduction 
Natural and man-made disasters produce fear and desperation. Victims of 
such events suffer from anxiety, posttraumatic stress and depression (Goenjian, 
Steinberg, Najarian, Fairbanks, Tashjian and Pynoos 2000) – not only in the 
immediate aftermath of the event but also in the medium- to long-run (Havenaar, 
Rumyantzeva, van den Brink, Poelijoe, van den Bout, van Engeland and Koeter 
1997).
39
 This chapter evaluates the long-term effects of the Chernobyl catastrophe, 
the largest civic nuclear accident to date which took place on April 26, 1986, in terms 
of subjective well-being and mental health.
40
  
Similar to such rare aggregate shocks like natural catastrophes (floods, 
hurricanes, tsunamis and earthquakes), terrorist attacks and other man-made 
accidents (like the chemical catastrophe of Bhopal, India, in 1984), the Chernobyl 
disaster represents a non-insurable ‗public bad‘. This implies that it is ultimately the 
state which has to bear the costs by paying for disaster relief and recovery work. 
Against this background, it seems to be highly relevant to provide an assessment of 
the aggregate utility loss caused by such an event (Luechinger and Raschky 2009). 
Up to now, no large scale analysis based on a nationally representative 
sample has evaluated the long-term effect of the Chernobyl disaster on subjective 
well-being and the mental health of the Ukrainian population. The empirical analysis 
of this chapter aims at filling this gap. The scientific research on Chernobyl so far 
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 ―The concept of stress is invoked to explain the widespread damage to general health and well-
being. Stress can be defined as the process by which adverse mental experiences have negative effects 
on bodily functions. The mechanism is physiological, mediated through the autonomic nervous 
system and the endocrinological system.‖ (Lee 1996, p. 283) 
40
 Despite the fact that nuclear accidents seem relatively rare, several events during the past 60 years 
were categorized as accidents according to the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES scale 4-7): 
Chalk River 1952 (USA), Kyshtym 1957 (USSR), Sellafield 1957 (UK), Los Alamos 1958 (USA), 
Simi Valley 1959 (USA), Idaho Falls 1961 (USA), Charlestown 1964 (USA), Monroe 1966 (USA), 
Lucens 1969 (Switzerland), Rocky Flats 1969 (USA), Sellafield 1973 (UK), Leningrad 1974 (USSR), 
Belojarsk 1977 (USSR), Bohunice 1977 (CSSR), Three Mile Islands 1979 (USA), Saint-Laurent 1980 
(France), Chernobyl 1982 (USSR), Buenos Aires 1983 (Argentinia), Wladiwostok 1985 (USSR), 
Chernobyl 1986 (USSR), Goiânia 1987 (Brazil), Sewersk 1993 (Russia), Tokaimura 1999 (Japan), 
Fleurus 2006 (Belgium), and Fukushima 2011 (Japan). 
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has mainly focused on health effects and the relationship between radiation and 
cancer (see the summary of the findings of the medical literature in, for instance, two 
United Nations reports from 2001 and 2002 (United Nations 2001, 2002), two 
UNSCEAR reports from 2000 and 2008 (UNSCEAR 2000, 2008) as well as a 
national report from Ukraine (Baloga, Kholosha and Evdin 2006)). In general, the 
evidence on cancer and the total health toll of the disaster seem inconclusive albeit 
moderate—with the important exception of a significant rise of the incidence of 
thyroid cancer in children.  
In economics, three recent papers have used the catastrophe of Chernobyl to 
investigate various effects. The first two use an identification strategy that exploits 
regional variation in radiation levels—a method which will also be employed in the 
current chapter: Lehmann and Wadsworth (2011) focus not only on health outcomes 
but also on long-term labour market consequences of the 1986 nuclear accident using 
the Ukrainian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (ULMS). While they find 
substantially worse health perceptions among the affected population in Ukraine, the 
effect on somatic health and risky behaviour (drinking, smoking) seems weak and is 
mostly not significantly different from zero. Yet, their empirical evidence seems to 
suggest that Chernobyl victims have a lower attachment to the labour market which, 
however, does not translate into income losses. Almond, Edlund and Palme (2009) 
evaluate the effect of low-dose pre-natal radiation exposure caused by the Chernobyl 
disaster on cognitive and health child outcomes in Sweden. While they do not find 
any causal effect on health outcomes at birth or incidence of hospitalisation during 
childhood, there seem to be significant adverse consequences on cognitive ability 
measured by schooling outcomes in secondary school (around age 16). Finally, 
Berger (2009) analyses the impact of the Chernobyl catastrophe on life satisfaction 
and on being concerned about the protection of the natural environment in Germany 
by taking advantage of the fact that the 1986 wave of the German Socio-Economic 
Panel was collected between March and August. Her empirical approach is to 
compare average levels of life satisfaction of respondents who were randomly 
interviewed shortly before with those interviewed shortly after the nuclear accident. 
She finds a significant increase in the likelihood of being very concerned about the 
environment immediately after the catastrophe (by 20 percent), but life satisfaction 
remained unaffected. This empirical strategy – to exploit variation over time in 
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combination with randomly assigned interview dates – is similar to a US study using 
weekly data and finding a negative short term effect of hurricane Katrina on life 
satisfaction in 2005 (Kimball, Levy, Ohtake and Tsutsui 2006). The results of this 
latter study reveal that the negative effect on average US life satisfaction lasts 
slightly longer in regions close to the affected area. A refinement of this 
identification strategy is implemented by Metcalfe, Powdthavee and Dolan (2011) 
who assess the impact of the September 11 attacks on mental distress in the UK in 
2001. It is possible that average subjective well-being levels move systematically 
over the year, i.e. that there are underlying trends which are not related to a particular 
event. This is why simple before-and-after comparisons might be biased. Metcalfe, 
Powdthavee and Dolan (2011) apply a difference-in-difference method which 
accounts for such possible seasonality effects by including control years in which 
there was no attack. The difference-in-differences estimation is based on interviews 
randomly split by the attacks into two samples (treatment and control group). Their 
findings show a significantly lower subjective well-being immediately after 
September 11.  
While these latter studies have focused on short-term changes in life 
satisfaction, there is increasing evidence that certain shocks can also lead to long run 
changes in subjective well-being and thus a shift in the personal baseline level of 
happiness (Clark, Frijters and Shields 2008; Diener, Lucas and Scollon 2006; Heady 
2008; Oswald and Powdthavee 2008). 
The empirical analysis of this study will use a self-reported measure of ‗being 
affected by the Chernobyl catastrophe‘ – which will be referred to as ‗self-reported 
affectedness‘ in the remainder of this chapter – as well as objective radiation doses 
from 1986 to establish the causal link between the Chernobyl disaster and life 
satisfaction as well as mental health. The results indicate that having been exposed to 
Chernobyl has a significantly negative effect on subjective well-being in the long run 
and adversely affects mental health. The results prove robust to several sensitivity 
checks. Furthermore, there is suggestive evidence that responses vary by gender 
(women seem to be more adversely affected). On average, individuals exposed to 
higher levels of radiation seem to engage in some precautionary health behaviour and 
appear to be more dependent on state transfers. Following the recent literature using 
subjective well-being regressions to evaluate the monetary costs associated with 
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specific life events (life satisfaction approach) the amount of income required to 
compensate for their experienced utility loss is calculated (for other papers 
calculating such compensatory payments, see, for instance, Clark and Oswald 2002, 
Luechinger and Raschky 2009, van Praag and Baarsma 2005). 
This empirical study contributes to the literature on life satisfaction as well as 
the literature assessing the impacts of the Chernobyl disaster in several ways: First, it 
estimates the causal Chernobyl effect on long-term life satisfaction and mental health 
outcomes using large and nationally representative surveys. Second, it investigates 
the potential endogeneity of self-reported affectedness measures using objective 
radiation measures and instrumental variable techniques. Thus it contributes to the 
important question whether individuals overstate their true affectedness level (with 
implications for benefit claims). Third, the study computes the value of the utility 
loss caused by the Chernobyl catastrophe which corresponds to about ten percent of 
annual Ukrainian GDP – a tremendous amount considering the fact that the estimates 
refer to a period of 20 years after the accident. This implies that the psychological 
costs of this nuclear disaster are enormous. 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.2 provides 
relevant background information on the nuclear accident of Chernobyl and outlines 
potential transmission channels through which the catastrophe might have affected 
life satisfaction and mental health. Section 3.3 describes the two data sets employed 
for the empirical analysis of the paper, the Ukrainian Longitudinal Monitoring 
Survey (ULMS) and the Ukrainian Household Budget Survey (UHBS). The 
methodological approach is described in Section 3.4. This is followed by the main 
empirical results as well as several robustness checks (Section 3.5 and 3.6). Section 
3.7 presents the estimates of the required income compensation. The subsequent 
sections 3.8 and 3.9 present two extensions to the main empirical analysis – 
investigating gender differences as well as behavioural consequences of the 
Chernobyl effect. The final Section 3.10 concludes. 
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3.2 Background on the Chernobyl catastrophe and its 
consequences  
The following sections provide detailed information on the nuclear accident 
and the size of the affected population in Ukraine. Furthermore, potential channels 
through which the Chernobyl catastrophe might affect subjective well-being in the 
long-run are outlined with reference to the previous literature. 
3.2.1 The accident of Chernobyl41 
On April 26, 1986 one block of the nuclear power plant in Chernobyl, 
nowadays in Ukraine and close to the Belorussian border, exploded leading to the 
biggest civil nuclear accident ever recorded (UNSCEAR 2000). After the initial 
explosion, a nuclear cloud formed and contaminated substantial areas of Belarus, 
Ukraine and western Russia with radioactive fallout. Later more western and 
northern parts of Europe were also affected due to strong eastern winds. Inside the 
power plant the fight against the fire lasted for a fortnight and the Soviet government 
reacted on a broader basis to the accident only after the global measurement of the 
parts-per-trillion concentration of radioactive isotopes in the atmosphere prevented 
the incidence from being kept secret. In early May 1986, several ten thousand 
inhabitants from the immediate vicinity to the reactor were evacuated and in the 
following month approximately 170,000 residents were resettled from inside a 30 
kilometre zone of alienation. Medical treatment with iodine drugs which could 
prevent the absorption of radioactive iodine started only days after the catastrophe 
and control of milk and foodstuff remained insufficient. Taken together, several 
hundred thousand people in Ukraine were exposed to significant levels of radioiodine 
(iodine-131) and radiocaesium-137 (caesium-137) either as clean-up workers (fire 
fighters, liquidators, construction workers of the concrete shield) or nearby 
inhabitants (see footnote 41). 
  
                                                          
41
 This section is based on diverse national and international reports on the nuclear accident of 
Chernobyl. More detailed accounts of the timeline of the events as well as technical details can be 
found, for instance, in the following publications: the 1998 European Commission Atlas of caesium 
deposition on Europe after the Chernobyl accident (European Commission 1998), two United Nations 
reports from 2001 and 2002 (United Nations 2001, 2002) and two UNSCEAR reports from 2000 and 
2008 (UNSCEAR 2000, 2008) as well as a national report from Ukraine (Baloga, Kholosha and Evdin 
2006). 
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Given contradictory statements about the humanitarian and environmental 
damage caused by the disaster in the scientific literature, the losses and costs are still 
hard to quantify: In the early period, liquidators and close inhabitants were most 
strongly affected by radiation exposure. However, only 31 deaths were officially 
registered by the Soviet government as a direct consequence of the catastrophe. On a 
long term basis, many more people suffered from internal radiation through 
inhalation or the consumption of contaminated food. According to the United 
Nations more than eight million people were and are affected by this catastrophe in 
the three most affected countries Belarus, Russia and Ukraine (United Nations 2001). 
The number of immediate casualties is highly debated and varies substantially 
between nuclear power proponents and critiques. However, the impact of the 
accident on strong increases in the incidence of thyroid cancer among children in 
Belarus, Russia and Ukraine is less disputed (Demidchik, Mrochek, Demidchik, 
Vorontsova, Cherstvoy, Kenigsberg, Rebeko and Sugenoya 1999; UNSCEAR 2000).  
(Demidchik, Mrochek, Demidchik, Vorontsova, Cherstvoy, Kenigsberg, Rebeko and 
Sugenoya 1999; UNSCEAR 2000). Vast areas of natural resources became unusable 
for agricultural production.
42
 Government spending to alleviate the consequences in 
Ukraine alone are estimated at 148 billion USD from 1986-2015 (currently, five to 
seven percent of Ukraine‘s annual budget are spent on the alleviation of long term 
consequences; Oughton, Bay-Larsen and Voigt 2009).
43
 The social costs related to 
stigma, anxiety and the perception of risk have only started to be understood. The 
disaster has affected almost every dimension of human life: For instance, women 
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 The total area removed was 784,000 ha of agricultural land and 694,000 ha of forest in Belarus, 
Ukraine and Russia together (United Nations 2002). This is equivalent to the size of Kuwait and larger 
than the state of Connecticut.  
43
 Unfortunately, the source from which the information of the 5-7 percent of GDP expenditure on 
Chernobyl-related benefits and programmes does not contain a more detailed breakdown of the cost. 
The overall economic costs of the Chernobyl catastrophe which have to be covered by the national 
budget comprise a complex and extensive benefit programme (containing more than 50 different types 
of privileges and benefits in the late 1990s), expenditure on resettling families from contaminated 
zones, expenditure on physical infrastructure and housing (new buildings for resettled and evacuated 
families), expenditure on clean-up work and sealing off the reactor, radiation monitoring and research 
(Chernobyl Forum 2006). According to another source, a UNDP report from 2002 (UNDP 2002), the 
share of Chernobyl-related budget expenditures in Ukraine devoted to resettlement and improvement 
of living conditions has gradually decreased during the 1990s, while the proportion spend on ―social 
protection‖ made up to 87 percent in 2000. In the years 2002 to 2004 about 77 percent of central 
government spending related to Chernobyl were allocated to ―social assistance‖ (incl., e.g., food 
subsidies and free food for children of Chernobyl sufferers, pension payments, transport and 
communication services subsidies), between 9 to 13 percent were devoted to ―medical assistance‖, 
between 2 to 5 percent were given to ―resettlement related construction outlays‖ and between 5 and 13 
percent were allocated towards ―nuclear safety measures‖ (Osiatynski 2004). 
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who were resettled from the most affected regions hide their origin as they would be 
facing difficulties in finding a partner due to widespread fears of congenital 
anomalies (Oughton, Bay-Larsen and Voigt 2009). Also, resettlement itself had 
devastating psycho-social consequences so that some people who stayed behind in 
the most affected areas are in better psychological conditions than those resettled 
from the same areas (United Nations 2002). 
3.2.2 Quantifying the amount of affected persons in Ukraine  
Determining who has been affected by the nuclear disaster of Chernobyl is 
not an easy task. It is not clear whether to only define someone as a victim whose 
health has already deteriorated (and even so, by how much?). What about those who 
were exposed to a radioactive dose without having – physically – suffered so far? 
The problem of radiation lies in the fact that people were supposedly ‗treated‘ with a 
specific dosage a long time ago, but that the effect of this treatment might or might 
not have manifested itself in potentially adverse somatic health outcomes and that 
there is uncertainty as to whether one eventually will suffer from long-term effects. 
Furthermore, there might be psychological effects leading individuals to actually feel 
negatively affected in their daily life and in their health (apart from officially 
diagnosed mental disease this form of affectedness might be difficult to capture using 
standard somatic health outcomes). Therefore, this study applies and compares two 
measures of affectedness: first, a self-assessment of respondents about whether their 
or any of their family members‘ health was affected by the disaster and second, 
official effective radiation doses in humans according to their place of living in 1986. 
Before discussing these two measures in more detail further below (see Section 
3.3.2), this section will provide an overview of the scale of the disaster based on 
official numbers published by the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine (UkrStat) 
and the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation 
(UNSCEAR). 
According to UkrStat, the number of Ukrainian adults with the status of 
having been seriously affected by the Chernobyl catastrophe (recognized by the state 
as Chernobyl victim) was around 2 million adults on January 1, 2004 (this number 
excludes children, see Table 3-1), which corresponds to about 4.2 percent of the 
Ukrainian population of that year (overall 47.6 million inhabitants at the beginning of 
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2004). This number is very close to self-reported affectedness in the survey, which 
will be used in the following empirical analysis (UHBS data, wave from December 
2002): in the sample, around 1,850,000 adults claim to have been seriously affected 
by Chernobyl.
44
 Including children defined as Chernobyl disaster victims the number 
of officially registered Chernobyl victims rises to over 2.7 million persons (5.8 
percent of the total population, see Table 3-1). The figures also show that the number 
of liquidators were about 320,000 in these years (about 0.68 percent of the total 
population). Although this is a large number, the liquidators make up only for a small 
fraction in the total number of registered victims. 
 
Table 3-1: Persons registered as victims of the Chernobyl nuclear power station 
disaster, by type (absolute numbers and population shares) 
  
January 1, 2004 
 
January 1, 2005 
  
absolute 
number 
% of total 
population 
 
absolute 
number 
% of total 
population 
Total victims, persons 
 
2,772,060 5.82% 
 
2,646,106 5.60% 
out of which 
      Chernobyl disaster liquidators 
 
324,332 0.68% 
 
318,016 0.67% 
Chernobyl disaster victims 
 
1,689,941 3.55% 
 
1,682,280 3.56% 
Children defined as Chernobyl 
disaster victims 
 
754,934 1.59% 
 
643,030 1.36% 
Other persons eligible for benefits 
 
2,853 0.01% 
 
2,780 0.01% 
Families receiving benefits due to 
loss of breadwinner (whose death is 
related to Chernobyl disaster)   15,801 
 
  17,448 
 Source: Information on absolute numbers from State Statistics Committee of Ukraine (2004, 2005); 
figures on the population shares are based on own calculations using population numbers for the 
present population at the beginning of each year (from the same source). 
 
An UNSCEAR publication from the year 2000 has provided a somewhat 
lower estimate of the number of persons affected by Chernobyl (Table 3-2). 
However, this can partly be explained by the fact that evacuation and resettlements 
after 1986 are not accounted for and that the number of recovery operations workers 
was underestimated. Specifically, the complexity and difficulty in counting the 
number of affected persons can be seen from a more recent UNSCEAR report 
(UNSCEAR 2008) which adjusted the previous number of recovery operation 
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 The questionnaire does not specify what ‗seriously‘ means. 
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workers (liquidators) upwards by 40 percent. Overall it is important to note that the 
comparability of numbers across studies and years is difficult due to different 
definitions of affected and base populations (numerator and denominator). 
 
Table 3-2: Number of Chernobyl affected persons in Ukraine (UNSCEAR 2000) 
Recovery operation workers (liquidators)
a 
170,000 
Evacuated in 1986
b
 91,406 
Inhabitants of contaminated areas, >=37 kBq/m
2
 (until 1995)
c
 1,295,600 
Total 1,557,006 
Source: UNSCEAR 2000; 
a
 See Table 18 of the report. The numbers refer to the years 1986-1989 in 
the Soviet Republic of Ukraine only. This number was raised in subsequent reports, however only 
giving aggregate numbers for the three affected countries (Belarus, Russia, Ukraine). 
b
 See Table 20 
of the report. 
c 
See Table 26 of the report (distribution of  inhabitants in 1995 of areas contaminated by 
the Chernobyl accident). The measurement unit kBq/m
2
 is a measure of ground contamination with 
radioactive material. „Radioactivity from radionuclides (unstable atoms) is measured in becquerel 
(Bq) where 1 Bq = 1 disintegration per second and kBq/m2 = 1000 Bq of radionuclides over an area 
of 1 square metre.‖ (WHO 2006). According to a publication by the European Commission (European 
Commission 1998), in Ukraine more than 11569 data points were used to construct a contour mapping 
of different levels of caesium-137 for the entire country (many of the data points for Ukraine 
represented aggregated values obtained from several thousands of original measurements). The 
measurements were based on soil sample analysis in the laboratory (soil depth of 200 mm) and 
airborne gamma spectrometry. 
 
Over time, the number of registered victims initially rose but then has 
decreased steadily decreasing since the year 2000 (in absolute and relative terms). 
The numbers in Figure 3-1 reveal that the total number of registered victims went 
down to 2.5 million by 2007 and is likely to fall in the future due to the ageing of the 
most affected cohorts. Nevertheless, for the time being the number of official 
Chernobyl victims is still substantial and makes up a non-negligible part of the 
population. 
When summarizing these aggregate numbers it is also crucial to clarify that 
there was and is a substantial regional variation in the number of affected individuals 
– related to regionally heterogeneous radiation levels. The regions with by far the 
highest numbers of affected persons in absolute and relative terms are the Northern 
oblasts of Kiev (48.4 percent of the population are registered victims, i.e. almost 
900,000 persons), Rivne (35.3 percent), Zhytomyr (28.2 percent), Volyn (15.6 per-
cent) and Cherkasy (11.8 percent). In the most Western and Southern regions 
(Zakarpattya, Crimea, Odessa), the share of Chernobyl victims is less than half a 
percent.  
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Figure 3-1: Development of number of Chernobyl victims over time 
Source: State Statistics Committee of Ukraine (2007) 
 
Figure 3-2: Chernobyl victims by Oblast (region), 2004 
 
Source: State Statistics Committee of Ukraine (2004)  
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3.2.3 Possible channels on subjective well-being and mental health 
The aim of this study is to analyse whether there are long-lasting effects of 
the Chernobyl accident on subjective well-being and mental health 17 to 21 years 
after the event. Overall, there are at least three theoretical channels through which the 
1986 nuclear catastrophe might have affected subjective life satisfaction and mental 
health. Since the catastrophe of Chernobyl was a truly exogenous and unanticipated 
event, the affected and unaffected populations should be on average comparable, as 
they were not systematically selected.
45
 In other words, there should be no non-
random selection into radiation exposure based on unobserved heterogeneity (see 
Section 3.4). 
First, the exposure to radioactive fall-out (external exposure) and the intake of 
radionuclide through consumption of contaminated food or inhalation (internal 
exposure) might weaken the immune system of the body and lead to deteriorated 
physical health (physical health channel).
 46
 It is a highly debated issue whether the 
catastrophe of Chernobyl had long-term adverse somatic effects. In the health 
literature, higher cancer incidence rates, higher stillbirth incidence and higher 
mortality rates were recorded and controversially discussed (Ivanov, Gorski, 
Maksioutov, Tsyb and Souchkevitch 2001; Ivanov, Chekin, Parshin, Vlasov, 
Maksioutov, Tsyb, Andreev, Hoshi, Yamashita and Shibata 2005). Remennick 
(2002) shows in a study of immigrants from the former Soviet Union to Israel that 
health status of immigrants from contaminated regions was much lower than of 
immigrants from non-contaminated Soviet regions and that social adaptation was 
significantly poorer. The Chernobyl Forum, a group of eight United Nations 
organizations and the three most affected countries Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, has 
however reported that measurable health effects are of much lower scale than 
expected by common perception once one accounts for the intensified medical 
screening (United Nations 2002). Nevertheless, there seems to be consensus on a 
higher prevalence of thyroid cancer among children and adolescents in Belarus, 
Russia and Ukraine (UNSCEAR 2000). Lehmann and Wadsworth (2011) find a 
                                                          
45
 In the empirical analysis liquidators and evacuees will be excluded from the sample as they might 
have been a selected subsample of the population (e.g., military personnel). This will probably 
underestimate the size of the true effect. 
46
 Radionuclides are atoms characterised by the instability of their nucleus. The instability implies 
radioactive decay through which gamma rays and subatomic particles are emitted.  
98 
negative association between Chernobyl exposure and subjective health status in 
Ukraine, while the association with objective health measures appears much weaker.  
Second, the information policy of the Soviet government which deliberately 
concealed the scale and the danger of the accident in 1986 and thereby gave room to 
rumours about disastrous health consequences (Baloga, Kholosha and Evdin 2006; 
Gould 1990), the unresolved scientific debate on expected long-term health 
consequences as well as the inability to assess one‘s own type of affectedness have 
provoked deep rooted fears and uncertainty in the population (Abbott, Wallace and 
Beck 2006).
47
 As a consequence, even physically healthy individuals might be afraid 
of falling ill. This worry and anxiety might manifest itself in lower subjective well-
being, psychological distress or mental disease (psychological channel). Mental 
distress of people exposed to Chernobyl was found in numerous psychological 
studies, for both people still residing in affected areas (Havenaar, Rumyantzeva, van 
den Brink, Poelijoe, van den Bout, van Engeland and Koeter 1997) and those who 
emigrated abroad (Zilber and Lerner 1996; Cwikel, Abdelgani, Rozovski, Kordysh, 
Goldsmith and Quastel 2000). Symptoms related to the accident and the following 
events included, for instance headache, depression, sleep disturbance and emotional 
imbalance (UNSCEAR 2000). Significantly higher suicide rates among the 
Chernobyl affected population indicate the high mental toll associated to the 
catastrophe (Bromet and Havenaar 2007). However, psychological effects are also 
present when people care about others. Bridge (2004) finds that emotional stress of 
parents of disabled children in Ukraine is substantial and may cause second-order 
effects on their well-being and behaviour. Bromet, Goldgaber, Carlson, Panina, 
Golovakha, Gluzman, Gilbert, Gluzman, Lyubsky and Schwartz (2000) show that 
mothers of young children suffer from serious psychological trauma concerning the 
health status of their children. Self-abandonment, feeling of helplessness and 
lethargy have been described as mental reactions to uncertainty about one‘s own 
health status and the fear of suffering from cancer unknowledgeably (United Nations 
2002). Overall, mental health stress has been less contradictory debated in the 
literature although studies have often used small samples. 
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 The study by Abbott, Wallace and Beck (2006) rests on qualitative case studies carried out in three 
different Chernobyl regions Belarus, Russia and Ukraine in 2003. 
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Third, there are potential second-order effects on economic success resulting 
from Chernobyl related impairment of physical or psychological health: for instance, 
worse labour market outcomes, lower income, deprivation or poverty. As Almond, 
Edlund and Palme (2009) show Swedish children exposed to the fallout have 
significantly lower educational outcomes – which in turn might lead to poorer labour 
market outcomes in the long-run. Thus, the catastrophe could also affect subjective 
well-being indirectly through these labour market and income channels (indirect 
channel). Perceived poverty is higher among those with lower mental well-being 
(Viinamäki, Kumpusalo, Myllykangas, Salomaa, Kumpusalo, Kolmakov, Ilchenko, 
Zhukowsky and Nissinen 1995). Loganovsky, Havenaar, Tintle, Guey, Kotov and 
Bromet (2008) find that affected clean-up workers are more often absent from their 
workplace due to mental stress.  
3.3 Data and variables 
The following subsections describe in more detail the two Ukrainian datasets 
as well as the variables used in this study. It also provides an overview of the basic 
descriptive statistics of the estimation sample. 
3.3.1 Survey data 
To analyse the long-term effects of a catastrophe like Chernobyl on subjective 
well-being requires data providing crucial retrospective information on place of 
living at the time of the accident (to identify the victims) as well as measures of 
radio-active irradiation and personal well-being. The Ukrainian Longitudinal 
Monitoring Survey (ULMS), a rich nationally representative panel data set, is a 
unique source fulfilling all these requirements. The survey was carried out in the 
summer months of 2003, 2004 and 2007 by the Kiev International Institute of 
Sociology (KIIS) comprising initially more than 8,500 adults aged 15 to 72 (see 
further information on the ULMS data in Section 2.4). The survey comprises an 
individual questionnaire covering information on socio-demographic characteristics, 
labour force participation and occupation, subjective well-being and health status as 
well as a household questionnaire focussing on household composition, incomes and 
expenditures. One of the main features of the ULMS which will be exploited in the 
analysis is a detailed coverage of the retrospective labour market history (and place 
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of living history) of each individual starting in 1986 – the year of the Chernobyl 
catastrophe. The retrospective information is comparatively reliable in the Ukrainian 
context because employment details in the Soviet Union and later have been 
recorded in a worker specific labour booklet. Interviewers made use of these labour 
booklets whenever available.  
The sample is restricted to individuals who were born before January 1987 – 
this includes all persons born before the catastrophe in April 1986 as well as those 
children in utero at that time (as Almond, Edlund and Palme 2009 demonstrate 
prenatal exposure was potentially harmful). Furthermore, persons who either acted as 
liquidators or who were evacuated from within the 30km exclusion zone or resettled 
as a consequence of the accident are not included in the regressions.
48
 The latter two 
groups were exposed to the highest doses of external radiation—some of them with 
lethal doses of 6 Sv and more. The reasons for excluding these groups are that the 
aim is to shed light on the average population affected by low or moderate levels of 
radiation (and having a lower likelihood of suffering from somatic diseases) and that 
these particular persons received special treatment and attention (e.g., extra health 
checks and welfare supplements, see Lehmann and Wadsworth (2011)) so that they 
are likely to differ from the ordinary population.
49
 Moreover, this approach 
circumvents the problems of selective assignment into clean-up work as well as 
selective survival of these strongly exposed individuals. The final sample amounts to 
12,000 person-year observations. To be precise, the estimation results will be 
representative for the part of the current Ukrainian population which was not subject 
to evacuation or Chernobyl related liquidation work and will thus potentially 
underestimate the true costs of the catastrophe. It should also be noted that even 
within this part of the population it is possible that the most affected individuals will 
have had a lower survival probability until the year 2003 and hence a higher 
probability of being unavailable for the ULMS interviews (also because of 
potentially higher morbidity rates or being in hospitals or nursing homes; it could 
also be that affected individuals emigrated to other countries). Their absence from 
the sample should also generally weaken the results.  
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 Questions on whether individuals took part in the liquidation process (70 persons) or whether they 
were evacuated or resettled due to the Chernobyl catastrophe (52 persons) were only included in the 
ULMS survey in 2007.   
49
 Evacuated and resettled persons also differ from other (inner) migrants who moved voluntarily, 
because they are likely to experience very different problems and chances in their new place of living.  
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A shortcoming of the ULMS is that it does not contain information of mental 
health status of the respondents. However, this information is available in another 
large Ukrainian micro-data set – the Ukrainian Household Budget Survey (UHBS) 
conducted by the Ukrainian Statistical Committee. This annual cross-sectional 
survey comprises household and individual level data and takes place each year in 
December. Each year around 24,000 individuals in about 9,500 households are 
interviewed. The survey contains an individual as well as a household questionnaire.  
Questions on mental health were included in the years 2004 to 2008, yielding a 
substantial sample size of more than 95,500 observations for the analysis. 
Importantly, in the UHBS survey, each individual is asked whether his/her health 
was not at all, somewhat or seriously affected by the Chernobyl catastrophe. The 
drawback of the UHBS data is that it lacks retrospective information on place of 
residence in 1986. To assure comparability between the two datasets, the UHBS 
sample is also restricted to respondents born before 1987 and not older than 72 years 
at the time of the interview.
50
  
3.3.2 Self-reported and objective measures of being affected by the Chernobyl 
catastrophe 
The ULMS 2003 wave contains the following question which is used to 
construct a binary measure of being affected by the catastrophe (self-reported 
affectedness): “Was your health or the health of a family member affected by the 
catastrophe in Chernobyl?” 51  The generated variable takes a value of unity for 
having been affected and zero otherwise. However, this self-reported measure of 
affectedness has to be treated with caution for at least two reasons: First, given the 
wording of the question, it is not clear whether the interviewed person was directly 
affected by the Chernobyl accident or not. Since the definition of family is rather 
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 A basic check of the similarity of the two samples was carried out by comparing specific variables: 
the results seem to suggest that the samples are rather similar. For instance, the share of smokers (see 
analysis of smoking behaviour in Section 3.9) in the UHBS (26.1 percent) is almost the same as in the 
ULMS (27.9 percent). 
51
 Respondents could answer either yes or no. The question is located at the very end of the individual 
questionnaire (next to last question) in the subsection on ecology (containing four questions in total). 
Hence, since the question on life satisfaction (as well as on health and work) is covered earlier in the 
interview, it is highly unlikely that these answers are biased by having reminded respondents of the 
Chernobyl catastrophe (the ordering of the questions makes such emotional spill-overs impossible). 
Furthermore, since this question was only included in the 2003 ULMS wave, this 2003 answer is 
assigned to each individual in the other survey years as well (thus, emotional spill-overs due to the 
order of questions should be also highly unlikely for the life satisfaction answers in 2004 and 2007).    
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diffuse (the definition of family does not necessarily coincide with the definition of 
household in the survey) this self-reported variable provides a slightly blurred 
measure of affectedness (while the variable will measure direct individual 
affectedness with an error, it additionally captures possible indirect effects through 
affectedness of relatives and therefore provides a more comprehensive measure).
52
  
Second, it is possible that the answers provided by interviewees are correlated 
with factors unobservable to the researcher (unobserved heterogeneity, e.g., omitted 
personality traits, household or family fixed effects). If these unobservable 
characteristics systematically and jointly determine the probabilities of reporting 
certain levels of life satisfaction as well as of reporting being affected by the 
Chernobyl catastrophe this will lead to biased estimates. Therefore, one of the main 
goals of this study is to analyse and test the validity and reliability of these self-
reported measures of affectedness. 
The corresponding Chernobyl question in the UHBS data is very similar: 
―Has your health been affected by the Chernobyl catastrophe?”53 Respondents could 
answer either “not at all”, “somewhat affected” or “seriously affected”. The 
advantage of this variable is that it is actually more refined than the ULMS question 
and more precisely targeted at the individual (rather than the family). However, it can 
still be influenced from omitted personality traits. 
To this end, results based on the self-reported variable will be contrasted with 
estimations using official regional radiation and exposure data that can be matched to 
individuals based on their place of residence in the year 1986 (oblast level 
information).
54
 This procedure follows the approach by Lehmann and Wadsworth 
(2011) who also use the retrospective location information to assign to each 
individual the corresponding measure of radioactive exposure. However, while 
Lehmann and Wadsworth (2011) employ settlement-level concentrations of caesium-
137 deposition in their main analysis (surface contamination measured in 
kilobequerels per square metre, kBq/m
2
), this study uses a measure of average 
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 If the variable of interest was direct individual affectedness, measurement error of the explanatory 
variable should lead to an attenuation bias (underestimation of the true effect).  
53
 Translation by the author (the survey questionnaires are available in Ukrainian only. 
54
 In the final estimation sample, there are about 500 person-year observations (4.5 percent of the 
sample) which did not used to life on Ukrainian territory in 1986. These individuals are assigned zero 
exposure doses. 
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effective total exposure doses (external and internal)
55
 of iodine-131 and caesium-
137 reflecting the energy absorbed by matter and measured in millisievert (mSv) 
(variable name: radiation dose).
56
 While external exposure refers to irradiation from 
outside of the body, internal exposure denotes intake of radioactive material into the 
body through ingestion of food or inhalation. The relative importance of the external 
and internal exposure varied widely across regions in 1986: while the relative 
contribution of internal to total exposure was less than 30 percent in several 
settlements in Zhytomyrska oblast, it was almost 70 percent at the points of 
measurement in Vinnitska, Volynska and Cherkaska oblast (see Table 3.3.4 in the 
National Report by Baloga, Kholosha and Evdin 2006). Hence, the advantage of 
using a measure of the effective total dose (measured in millisievert, mSv) which 
combines all different types of radiation into a weighted dose taking into account the 
sensitivity of tissues and organs to get a measure reflecting the overall potential for 
causing harm to the human body (WHO 2011) is that it might capture the actual level 
of radioactive exposure and potential damage more comprehensively than a the 
measure of ground contamination by caesium-137 alone. This is especially true since 
household farming activities were widespread in the Soviet Union so that internal 
radiation was an important source of exposure. It should be noted, that Chernobyl-
related radiation levels in our sample (as mentioned before we exclude liquidators 
and evacuees for several reasons) are modest and do mostly not exceed the amount 
of twice the natural background radiation. For the most affected children, the iodine-
131 doses were stronger and equalled about 100 abdominal x-rays (for adults). 
One caveat of radiation data in general is that it is only measured in certain 
location points (discrete sampling) and is then extrapolated to larger areas by the 
scientists.
57
 In other words, individual level doses (based on individual medical 
examinations) are not available for the entire population and hence, the radiation 
variables reflect regional averages (data for the 26 Ukrainian oblasts). These 
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 Although iodine-131 was the most important source of exposure immediately after the accident 
while caesium-137 was relatively important, this relative importance changed over time due to the 
relatively short half-life of iodine-131 (about 8 days) and the comparatively long half-life of caesium-
137 (half-life of 30.8 years). 
56
 See also explanations in Almond, Edlund and Palme (2009) who use both types of measures in their 
analysis. 
57
 The effective internal exposure was estimated based on almost 30,000 WBC measurements in 1986 
(whole body counter; caesium-137 content in residents' organism; see Baloga, Kholosha and Evdin 
2006). The average effective external exposure to caesium-137 takes into account measurements at all 
rural and urban settlement points. 
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averages hide intraregional variation in radioactive exposure (loss of precision in the 
measurement) which was caused by meteorological conditions (speed and direction 
of wind and rain) as well as natural borders and the roughness of the underlying 
surface (European Commission 1998). In an additional analysis, gender specific 
average thyroid doses absorbed by children and adolescents due to the fallout of 
radioiodine (especially iodine-131) will be used to investigate the long-run effect on 
individuals aged one to 18 years at the time of the accident.
58
 Table 3-3 provides an 
overview of the radiation measures used in this study. 
 
Table 3-3: Official exposure doses used in the empirical analysis 
Measures of radiation 
1. Average total (internal + external) exposure doses, accumulated in 1986, mSv  
    [Variable name: Radiation dose] 
2. Average total (internal + external) exposure doses, accumulated 1986-2005, mSv 
3. Average thyroid doses (mGy) due to fallout of iodine-131, females aged 1-18 in 1986 
4. Average thyroid doses (mGy) due to fallout of iodine-131, males aged 1-18 in 1986 
Notes: Data taken from the official report ‗20 years after Chornobyl Catastrophe. Future outlook: 
National Report of Ukraine‘, Tables 3.3.7 and 3.3.9 (Baloga, Kholosha and Evdin (2006), pages 45, 
47, 48). While radiation doses of ground contamination measure the radioactivity of the material (in 
bequerel), the dose equivalent of ionising radiation measures the biological effects in the human 
organisms (in sievert; mSv – millisievert). The deposited energy is measured in gray (mGy - 
milligray).  
 
The unconditional relationship between these official doses and the self-
reported measure of affectedness is illustrated in the two graphs in Figure 3-3. These 
graphs plot estimates from smoothed kernel regressions of regional shares of self-
reported affected individuals on objective average exposure doses. If self-reported 
measures were good representations of objective radiation one would expect a 
positive relationship. Indeed, both diagrams show a strong positive relationship 
between the two types of measures. These strong correlations will be the basis for the 
first stage in the instrumental variable approach, where the official radiation levels 
will be used to test for possible biases in the self-reported measure.   
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 These average regional absorbed thyroid doses are estimated based on 150,000 direct measurement 
of radioiodine activity in the thyroid gland of individuals living in the most contaminated regions 
(Baloga, Kholosha and Evdin 2006). 
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Figure 3-3: Relationship between official and self-reported measures of 
affectedness 
 
 
Notes: The deposited energy for the most affected children is equivalent to 100 abdominal X-ray 
scans for adults. Number of observations is 12,003. Source: ULMS 2003-2007, own calculations.  
 
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 c
la
im
in
g
 a
ff
e
c
te
d
n
e
s
s
0 2 4 6
Exposure doses
 Dose mSv, 1986 
 Cumul. Dose mSv, 1986-2005 
kernel = epanechnikov, degree = 0, bandwidth = .45
Local polynomial smooth
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 c
la
im
in
g
 a
ff
e
c
te
d
n
e
s
s
0 20 40 60 80 100
Exposure doses
 Thyroid dose, females 1-18, mGv, 1986-2005 
 Thyroid dose, males 1-18, mGv, 1986-2005 
kernel = epanechnikov, degree = 0, bandwidth = 5
Local polynomial smooth
106 
3.3.3 Outcome variables 
Generally, subjective-wellbeing (utility) is not observable to the researcher. 
Therefore survey questions on the personal assessment of life satisfaction have been 
used as approximations in the literature. The justification for using these proxies rests 
on research during the past decades which has shown that life satisfaction is 
responsive to changes in external factors (Clark, Frijters and Shields 2008). The main 
dependent variable of individual subjective well-being used in the following analysis 
is measured on a five-point Likert scale from fully dissatisfied (1) to fully satisfied 
(5) and is based on the question: “To what extent are you satisfied with your life in 
general at the present time?‖  
 
Figure 3-4: Distribution of life satisfaction of affected and non-affected persons 
(self-reported measure; %) 
 
Source: ULMS 2003-2007, estimation sample (number of observations: 11,065); own calculations. 
 
The distribution of the responses to this question by self-reported affectedness 
is shown in Figure 3-4. The dark grey columns represent the answers of persons who 
say that they were affected by Chernobyl. Respondents in this group report being 
fully dissatisfied with their life in the period 2003 to 2007 more often than not 
affected persons (23.8 versus 17.6 percent). Conversely, individuals who say that 
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they were not affected by Chernobyl have a higher likelihood to be satisfied or fully 
satisfied with their lives. Hence, this graph points to a negative relationship between 
self-reported affectedness and life satisfaction. A simple mean comparison test 
reveals that the difference between untreated persons (average life satisfaction: 2.68) 
and treated persons (average life satisfaction: 2.48) is highly significantly different 
from zero (difference: 0.20, std. error: 0.02; t-value: 10.74). 
In addition to the five-point life satisfaction variable, a binary dependent 
variable (unhappy) was generated identifying all individuals who answered being 
fully dissatisfied with their life. 
The assessment of the effect of the 1986 nuclear accident on subsequent 
mental health relies on two alternative outcome variables from the UHBS dataset: 
depression and trauma. These two variables are available in the UHBS surveys 2004 
to 2008. Depression is a binary variable indicating persons reported to have ‗chronic 
anxiety or depression‘ as a 6 months or longer illness or health problem. Trauma 
indicates respondents who have been diagnosed by a physician as suffering from a 
psychological trauma (post-traumatic stress).  
In an extension to the main analysis, possible changes in subjective 
perceptions as well as behavioural consequences are investigated using the following 
additional dependent variables: (i) own survival probability to a specific age (ULMS 
2007), (ii) currently smoking (binary variable indicating risky health behaviour; 
ULMS, UHBS) and (iii) dependency on social state transfers (UHBS). The latter 
variable represents the share of government transfers in personal income and is used 
to estimate the transfer dependency of a person affected by Chernobyl (these 
regressions control for employment status and the receipt of Chernobyl assistance). 
3.3.4 Control variables 
To control for possible differences in group composition as well as possible 
confounding effects (i.e., omitted variables), several sets of control variables relating 
to individual demographic and household characteristics, health status, work and 
wealth as well as personality traits will be included in the regressions. Furthermore, 
all regressions include a set of basic controls like survey year, interview month and 
region fixed effects. The standard socio-demographic controls are gender, age, 
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marital status, education
59
 and household size. In the literature age has been regularly 
found to exhibit a U-shaped impact on happiness (Blanchflower and Oswald 2008). 
Therefore a quadratic term is added to the regressions as well as a cubic in age which 
seems to further improve the fit of our regressions. Furthermore, log of per-capita 
household income and living space per capita (as a proxy for permanent income) are 
included to control for wealth status which has been shown to be positively 
correlated with subjective well-being in transition countries (Senik 2004; 
Blanchflower and Oswald 2004). The two health measures used in the analysis as 
explanatory variables are a dummy variable for all individuals having at least one out 
of seven different chronic diseases
60
 (chronic) and a variable containing the 
individuals body mass index (bmi). As several of these controls might be endogenous 
in a life satisfaction regression, they are added in a stepwise fashion. Since the 
measure of Chernobyl affectedness is time-invariant, it is not possible to apply fixed 
effects estimation in order to control for time-invariant personality traits that are 
generally highly correlated with life satisfaction.
61
 Nevertheless, following the 
suggestion by Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) to account for this potential 
unobserved heterogeneity, the regressions will also include proxies for specific 
individual traits, in particular extroversion and neuroticism. Although the ULMS 
does not provide a full battery of questions to study psychological traits in detail, 
interviewers have to assess the respondent‘s general behaviour and attitude at the end 
of each interview. Two of these questions are used to generate these two proxy 
variables (see Table A 2-2 in the Appendix to Chapter 2 for a more detailed 
description).
62
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 Education is recoded from highest educational degree into four educational categories. 
60
The seven categories are: heart disease, illness of the lungs, liver disease, kidney disease, 
gastrointestinal disease, spinal problems, or other chronic illnesses. 
61
 Recall though that the individual level of affectedness of the nuclear accident should be orthogonal 
to the personality traits (as well as other unobserved heterogeneity) due to the randomness of the 
exogenous shock. 
62
 A simple test on the stability of externally assessed traits over time shows substantial stability for 
extroversion, but more mixed evidence for neuroticism. It should be noted, that interviewers (who 
made the assessments) might differ over time. 
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Descriptive statistics of all these variables are provided in Table 3-4. The 
mean level of life satisfaction is 2.58 (with a standard deviation of 1.16). As 
established for other transition countries, average life satisfaction in Ukraine is lower 
than in industrialised Western economies (Selezneva 2011). About 22 percent of the 
sample report to be fully dissatisfied with their lives (unhappy) and 60 percent of the 
respondents answer that they were affected by the Chernobyl catastrophe. The 
majority of the sample lives in urban areas (town or city), is female (60 percent; this 
corresponds well to the gender gap documented in official national statistics, 
especially at older ages) and married (over 70 percent). The average age of 
respondents is about 46.5 years. About half of the sample is working in the reference 
week and about 20 percent of the observations are non-working pensioners in the 
official pension age. As regards the personality traits, only two percent of the 
observations are classified as ‗neurotic‘, while 14 percent of the sample is classified 
as ‗extrovert‘.  
110 
Table 3-4: Descriptive statistics (ULMS 2003-2007) 
Variable Mean Min. Max. Number of 
observations 
Dependent variables     
Life satisfaction (Std. deviation: 1.16) 2.58 1 5 12003 
Unhappy 0.22 0 1 12003 
Radiation measures     
Self-reported affectedness 0.60 0 1 12003 
Radiation Dose (mSv)
63
 0.94 0 2.10 12003 
Demographic and health controls 
    Village (omitted category) 0.35 0 1 12003 
Town 0.26 0 1 12003 
City 0.39 0 1 12003 
Male 0.40 0 1 12003 
Age 46.56 17 75 12003 
Age squared 2379.89 289 5625 12003 
BMI 26.08 13.52 60.17 11270 
Chronic disease 0.58 0 1 11789 
Marital status and occupation 
    Single (omitted category) 0.11 0 1 12003 
Married 0.71 0 1 12003 
Widowed 0.09 0 1 12003 
Separated 0.09 0 1 12003 
Working 0.54 0 1 12003 
Unemployed 0.07 0 1 12003 
Pensioner 0.24 0 1 12003 
Inactive, working age 0.15 0 1 12003 
Other occupation (omitted category) 0.05 0 1 12003 
Household characteristics, wealth and education    
Household size 3.30 1 13 12003 
Log household income 6.49 0 9.40 12003 
Housing space per capita 23.21 0.67 152.00 12003 
Primary education (omitted category) 0.18 0 1 12003 
General secondary educ. 0.39 0 1 12003 
Professional second. educ. 0.27 0 1 12003 
Higher education 0.17 0 1 12003 
Personality traits, Soviet job info 
    Neurotic 0.02 0 1 12003 
Extrovert 0.14 0 1 12003 
Source: ULMS 2003-2007; own calculations. 
                                                          
63
 Average total (internal + external) exposure doses of caesium-137 and iodine-131, accumulated in 
1986, mSv (source: National Report by Baloga, Kholosha and Evdin (eds.) 2006). 
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3.4 Methodology 
In order to analyse the presence of long-term effects of the Chernobyl 
catastrophe on subjective well-being/mental health SWBit the following model is 
estimated: 
itioit XssAffectedneSWB   '1 .    (3.1) 
The coefficient of interest is β1 which measures the impact of being affected 
by Chernobyl (according to the self-reported or official radiation measures) on 
subjective well-being. Should long-term psychological effects exist, the estimated 
1ˆ  
is expected to have a negative sign. Without adding further controls for potential 
transmission channels to the regressions, 
1ˆ  should capture the overall or composite 
effect of the nuclear accident on today‘s life satisfaction and mental health. However, 
to shed light on possible transmission channels through which Chernobyl might have 
affected long-term well-being, different sets of control variables are included in X 
one after the other. Initially, pre-determined personal characteristics (gender and age) 
are added to the regressions to control for possible composition effects. This is 
followed by variables measuring the health status of individuals (health channel), 
marital status to capture possible effects of widowhood (widowhood), a set of 
dummy variables for current occupation (labour force participation channel), several 
education, income and wealth indicators (human capital and income channel) as well 
as proxies for extroversion and neuroticism (personality traits). If these sets of 
variables reflect different channels, their inclusion should gradually reduce to overall 
size of the 
1ˆ coefficient. All specifications control for type of settlement (village, 
town or city), region (26 oblasts) and year as well as month of interview fixed 
effects.
64
  
As regards the estimation method, at first, pooled cross sectional regressions 
controlling for intrapersonal correlation of the error terms over time are estimated by 
ordinary least squares (pooled OLS with clustered standard errors). While OLS 
estimates are more easily and directly interpretable and are consistent under classical 
assumptions, they do not account for the categorical character of the dependent 
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 Clark and Oswald (2002) suggest the inclusion of day-of-the-week effects into well-being 
regressions. The inclusion of such controls changes the size of the coefficients of interest by less than 
one percent. 
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variable (and are therefore less efficient). To test the sensitivity of the results with 
respect to this estimation method, the same set of specifications will be re-estimated 
using ordered Probit methods (as argued by Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters 2004 this 
should not change the results significantly). Furthermore, to account for the panel 
structure of the data (repeated individual observations over time) panel estimations 
will be performed as additional robustness checks. Due to the fact that having been 
affected by the catastrophe is a time invariant variable, it is not possible to perform 
fixed effects estimations (this is true for both, the self-reported and official radiation 
measures). Instead, random effects models will be estimated. 
Another econometric issue which might threaten the validity and 
informational value of the estimated effects relates to the self-reported measure of 
affectedness. As already mentioned, the estimation will be biased if claiming to be 
affected by Chernobyl is endogenous (driven by omitted factors which 
simultaneously affect life satisfaction) or if it is plagued by measurement error (as 
the ULMS question alludes to family level rather than individual affectedness). The 
last aspect might be less problematic if the actual mechanism through which 
Chernobyl impacts subjective well-being involves family member‘s health and 
(mental) well-being. Nevertheless, as regards the expected direction of these two 
potential biases, the second problem (measurement error) should lead to an 
attenuation bias, while the direction of the first potential bias is difficult to predict 
(there could be an upward bias (i.e. the effect could be overestimated) if, for 
instance, more risk averse individuals were more prone to report being affected as 
well as having lower levels of life satisfaction; another example would be, if persons 
with lower baseline levels of life satisfaction tend to claim to have been affected by 
the Chernobyl catastrophe in order to explain their lower happiness level). 
To purge the estimates from these two potential biases individual self-
reported affectedness will be instrumented using the official regional radiation doses. 
This approach is based on the implicit assumption that self-reported affectedness is 
related to radiation doses in the following way (first stage specification):  
itoit XRadiationssAffectedne   '1     (3.2) 
Radiation is the objectively measured dosage that people living in particular 
regions have received according to their place of residence in 1986. X is a set of 
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control variables. If the self-reported measures are biased, the instrumental variable 
approach should help to correct for both problems. The exclusion restriction of this 
instrumental variable approach assumes that there are no direct effects of radiation 
on life satisfaction – other than through perceived affectedness. 
Another threat to the identification strategy would be if the 1986 location 
choice of individuals and families was endogenous, i.e. if, for instance, certain types 
were more likely to live in close proximity to potential sources of danger like nuclear 
power plants (Almond, Edlund and Palme 2009). However, this aspect does not seem 
to pose a threat to the current empirical analysis for at least three reasons: first, 
during the Soviet Union the geographical mobility of workers and families was 
highly regulated and monitored by the authorities (see also Section 2.3 in Chapter 2) 
so that location choice by individuals was rather limited; second, it is likely that the 
awareness of potential hazards by nuclear power plants was much lower before the 
Chernobyl disaster than afterwards (the fact that even the first days after the nuclear 
accident the event was concealed from the public and that Soviet mass media was 
prohibited to report about the recovery work
65
 seems to support the idea that the 
public was not generally aware of potential dangers); third, the weather conditions 
caused substantial geographical variation in exposure doses so that the degree of 
radiation was not a simple monotonic function of distance to the nuclear power plant 
(Lehmann and Wadsworth 2011). 
3.5 Is there a long-term effect of the Chernobyl catastrophe on 
subjective well-being? 
3.5.1 Estimation results based on self-reported affectedness 
The OLS estimation results based on the self-reported measure of 
affectedness are reported in Table 3-5. With only basic controls, the coefficient of 
interest is negative and highly significant suggesting a long-term negative impact of 
the Chernobyl catastrophe on subjective well-being (the estimate in column 1 
corresponds to one sixth of a standard deviation).  
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 See Chapter 1 in the National Report by Baloga, Kholosha and Evdin (eds.) 2006. 
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Table 3-5: Self-reported affectedness and life satisfaction (Dependent variable: Life satisfaction; OLS estimations) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Self-reported affectedness -0.190*** -0.115*** -0.101*** -0.106*** -0.099*** -0.098*** -0.098*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Town 0.105*** 0.097*** 0.105*** 0.114*** 0.097*** 0.042 0.041 
 (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
City 0.197*** 0.178*** 0.203*** 0.221*** 0.178*** 0.072** 0.068** 
 (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) 
Male   0.082*** 0.051** 0.022 -0.006 0.027 0.036 
  (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Age   -0.118*** -0.119*** -0.162*** -0.199*** -0.188*** -0.186*** 
  (0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Age squared  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age cubic
A
  -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
BMI   0.004* 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 
   (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Chronic disease   -0.290*** -0.284*** -0.258*** -0.248*** -0.249*** 
   (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) 
Married     0.263*** 0.241*** 0.255*** 0.249*** 
    (0.045) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
Widowed     0.072 0.054 0.103* 0.100* 
    (0.059) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) 
Separated     0.003 -0.026 0.019 0.016 
    (0.056) (0.054) (0.053) (0.053) 
Working      0.491** 0.402* 0.392* 
     (0.229) (0.218) (0.220) 
Unemployed     -0.239 -0.194 -0.200 
     (0.231) (0.221) (0.222) 
Pensioner      0.182 0.201 0.192 
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     (0.231) (0.220) (0.221) 
Inactive      0.196 0.225 0.218 
     (0.230) (0.219) (0.221) 
Household size      -0.013 -0.012 
      (0.010) (0.010) 
Log household income      0.173*** 0.169*** 
      (0.016) (0.016) 
Housing space per capita      0.005*** 0.005*** 
      (0.001) (0.001) 
General secondary educ.      0.030 0.028 
      (0.031) (0.031) 
Professional second. educ.      0.147*** 0.142*** 
      (0.033) (0.033) 
Higher education      0.378*** 0.362*** 
      (0.037) (0.038) 
Neurotic        -0.210*** 
       (0.065) 
Extroverted        0.122*** 
       (0.030) 
Constant 3.099*** 5.200*** 5.122*** 5.714*** 5.921*** 4.589*** 4.552*** 
 (0.344) (0.493) (0.432) (0.491) (0.540) (0.556) (0.553) 
R-squared 0.088 0.120 0.134 0.141 0.170 0.200 0.202 
Notes: 
A
 The actual size of the estimated coefficient is -0.0000145 (column 2). All regressions control for region, year and interview month fixed effects. Number of 
observations is 12,003 (columns 1-2) and 11,065 (columns 3-7). Standard errors are clustered on the individual level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: ULMS 2003-2007, own calculations. 
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Adding basic demographic characteristics (gender and age, column 2) reduces 
the size of the estimated effect significantly (from -0.19 to -0.12). This seems to 
suggest that part of the estimated overall Chernobyl effect can be explained by 
gender and age differences (which in turn might be related to differential morbidity 
levels or psychological responses across age groups and gender). In general, men 
seem to be significantly more satisfied with their lives than women (however, this 
coefficient becomes smaller and insignificant once further controls are included in 
the estimation). Furthermore, the estimated age coefficients seem to support the 
notion that life satisfaction in Ukraine follows the U-shape pattern also found in 
other countries (Blanchflower and Oswald 2008).
66
  
The inclusion of the two proxies for health status (column 3) reduces the 
Chernobyl coefficient only slightly, but leads to a drop in the estimated male 
coefficient (suggesting gender differences in health status). Perhaps not surprisingly, 
persons suffering from chronic illnesses have a lower life satisfaction than healthy 
persons. Starting from column 3, the estimated coefficient of being affected by the 
nuclear accident remains almost unchanged throughout all specifications (about -0.10 
which corresponds to about one tenth of a standard deviation), suggesting only a 
minor direct role of these other possible channels. The separate reduced form 
estimates of having lived in regions that were affected by high radiation levels in the 
study by Lehmann and Wadsworth (2011) show that residents of these areas are 
slightly less attached to the labour market (lower probability of working and reduced 
working hours; but there seems to be no effect on monthly wages). Nevertheless, as 
regards the estimated effects of these other control variables on life satisfaction 
several important findings emerge: married persons and individuals in work are on 
average more satisfied with their lives, widowhood seems to be surprisingly 
positively related with life satisfaction. Furthermore, higher household income and 
wealth as well as higher levels of education are associated with higher levels of life 
satisfaction. The two indicators for personality traits seem to be significantly related 
to subjective well-being and show the expected sign: while neurotic persons are on 
average significantly less satisfied with their lives, extrovert individuals are more 
satisfied. 
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 Although the cubic coefficient is significantly negative, it is extremely small and excluding the 
cubic term from the regression does not affect the found U-shape in age, see Section 3.5.4.4. 
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These significantly negative findings of being affected by the Chernobyl 
catastrophe on subjective well-being based on the pooled OLS models also hold 
when estimating ordered Probit (pooled sample, clustering standard errors on the 
individual level) and random effects panel models (see Panel A in Table A 3-1 and 
Table A 3-2 in the appendix). The marginal effects for the five different satisfaction 
outcomes show that being affected by the nuclear accident significantly increases the 
probability of reporting lower levels of life satisfaction (being fully dissatisfied and 
dissatisfied) and decreases the probability of reporting higher levels of satisfaction 
with life. The size of the estimated coefficients based on the random effects panel 
models is almost identical to the pooled OLS regressions (however, the standard 
errors become slightly larger). 
3.5.2 Testing causality using official radiation measures 
To test whether the estimates based on the self-reported measure of 
affectedness suffer from endogeneity or measurement bias, the regressions are re-
estimated using the official regional radiation doses to which individuals were 
exposed to during 1986 (according to their place of residence at that time). The 
coefficients of interest from these reduced form regressions are reported in Panel A 
in Table 3-6. Even though the estimates cannot be compared directly, since the self-
reported measure is a binary variable while the radiation dose is a continuous 
variable, the qualitative findings remain the same. Throughout all specifications 
higher levels of radiation doses have a significantly negative impact on life 
satisfaction even 17 to 21 years after the nuclear accident. Having been exposed to a 
one millisievert higher radiation dose causes a drop in subjective well-being by 0.1 
points on the five-point Likert scale. In contrast to the results using the self-reported 
measure, the estimates using radiation doses are very stable across specifications 
suggesting that the effect is largely unaffected by any of the controls. Still, the results 
from these reduced form regressions provide first evidence that the estimates based 
on the self-reported measures are not completely driven by biases (spurious 
correlations). The same is true when repeating the ordered Probit regressions using 
the official radiation doses: higher doses reduce the probability to have higher levels 
of life satisfaction and increase the likelihood of being fully dissatisfied with life (see 
Panel B of Table A 3-1).  
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Table 3-6: Causal effects of the Chernobyl catastrophe on life satisfaction (OLS and 2SLS estimations) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  
A. Reduced form (pooled OLS)         
Dependent variable Life satisfaction 
Radiation dose (mSv) -0.101** -0.083* -0.085* -0.092** -0.113** -0.097** -0.097**  
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.047) (0.047) (0.046) (0.045) (0.045)  
R-squared 0.082 0.118 0.133 0.140 0.169 0.198 0.200  
B. First stage (2SLS)         
Dependent variable Self-reported affectedness 
Radiation dose (mSv) 0.084*** 0.075*** 0.081*** 0.080*** 0.081*** 0.078*** 0.078***  
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)  
R-squared 0.1237 0.1555 0.1604 0.1612 0.1616 0.1621 0.1625  
F-statistics 20.31 16.87 18.91 18.30 18.93 17.21 17.16  
C. Second stage (2SLS)         
Dependent variable Life satisfaction 
Instrumented self-reported  -1.196** -1.106* -1.041* -1.147* -1.387** -1.248** -1.248**  
affectedness (0.569) (0.627) (0.587) (0.601) (0.603) (0.615) (0.617)  
         Region & time FE         
Demographic controls -        
Health controls - -       
Marital status - - -      
Work status - - - -     
Income, wealth, HC - - - - -    
Traits - - - - - -   
Observations 12,003 12,003 11,065 11,065 11,065 11,065 11,065  
Notes: Panel A contains the estimated coefficients of interest from pooled OLS regressions; Panel B and C report those from the first and second stage of the instrumental 
variable estimation (pooled 2SLS). Standard errors are clustered on the individual level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: 
ULMS 2003-2007, own calculations. 
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However, a more powerful test of the OLS results based on the self-reported 
measures is to estimate instrumental variable regressions using the official radiation 
measures of 1986 as instruments for the self-reported affectedness. The 
corresponding first and second stage results are shown in Panel B and C (Table 3-6) 
respectively. The results of the first stage reveal that official radiation doses have a 
significantly positive effect on the likelihood of reporting to be affected by 
Chernobyl (the size of the effect is very similar across the different specifications). 
Furthermore, the instrument is powerful as suggested by the F-statistics of the 
instrument in the first stage regressions which are well above the critical value of 10 
(Staiger and Stock 1997). Turning to the results of the second stage, the negative 
effect of Chernobyl on subjective well-being remains significant and becomes now 
even larger across all specifications (the significance levels decrease slightly due to 
loss of precision of the estimates). The size of the coefficients indicates that having 
been affected by Chernobyl reduces subjective well-being by about one standard 
deviation which is a substantial effect.
67
 This finding seems to suggest that the naïve 
OLS regressions were downward biased (potentially due to an attenuation bias). 
However, in almost all specifications the IV estimates are not significantly different 
from the naïve OLS estimates and hence any interpretation in terms of an attenuation 
biases could be misleading (the standard errors of the 2SLS estimates are large). 
Overall though, these findings seem to suggest that the results based on the self-
reported measures of affectedness have indeed a causal meaning and seem to 
represent a lower bound estimate of the effect of Chernobyl on subjective well-being. 
3.5.3 Alternative dependent variable: being unhappy (binary variable) 
The same set of regressions was also estimated using a simplified version of 
the dependent variable. To this end, the categorical life satisfaction variable was 
collapsed into a binary indicator taking the value ‗1‘ for all persons reporting to be 
fully dissatisfied with their lives and ‗0‘ for all other values. The results in Table 3-7 
confirm the pattern and findings of the main specifications. Note that the sign of the 
estimated effect is reversed since the dependent variable is now ‗unhappy‘. 
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 This pattern of the results also generally hold in the instrumental variable panel data estimations 
(G2SLS-RE; see the lower panels in Table A 3-2 in the appendix). However, with increasing standard 
errors the significance levels are slightly lower and some of the coefficients in the second stage 
become only borderline significant (with a p-value of less than 0.15).  
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Table 3-7: Causal effects of the Chernobyl catastrophe on „being unhappy‟ (Probit and 2SLS regressions) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  
A. Naïve regressions (Probit)         
Dependent variable Unhappy (0/1) 
Self-reported affectedness 0.054*** 0.036*** 0.034*** 0.037*** 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.034***  
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)  
B. Reduced form (Probit)         
Dependent variable Unhappy (0/1) 
Radiation dose (mSv) 0.050*** 0.042** 0.036** 0.038** 0.048*** 0.044** 0.045**  
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)  
C. First stage (2SLS)         
Dependent variable Self-reported affectedness 
Radiation dose (mSv) 0.084*** 0.075*** 0.081*** 0.080*** 0.081*** 0.078*** 0.078***  
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)  
F-statistics 20.31 16.87 18.91 18.31 18.93 17.21 17.16  
D. Second stage (2SLS)         
Dependent variable Unhappy (0/1) 
Instrumented self-reported 
affectedness 
0.561*** 0.559** 0.486** 0.517** 0.593*** 0.570** 0.582**  
(0.211) (0.234) (0.216) (0.222) (0.223) (0.231) (0.233)  
Region & time FE         
Demographic controls -        
Health controls - -       
Marital status - - -      
Work status - - - -     
Income, wealth, HC - - - - -    
Traits - - - - - -   
Observations 12,003 12,003 11,065 11,065 11,065 11,065 11,065  
Notes: Panel A and B report marginal effect from pooled Probit regressions for the binary variable ‗unhappy‘; Panel C and D report the estimated coefficients from the 2SLS 
regressions (linear probability models). The variable ‗unhappy‘ indicates individuals answering ‗fully unsatisfied‘ on the life satisfaction question. Standard errors are 
clustered on the individual level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: ULMS 2003-2007, own calculations. 
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The marginal effects from the naïve Probit regressions using the self-reported 
affectedness measure as well as the reduced form Probit regressions imply that 
having been affected by the Chernobyl catastrophe significantly increases the 
likelihood that individuals are unhappy with their life (by about 3.5 to 5 percentage 
points). Furthermore, using the official radiation doses as instruments for the self-
reported measure of affectedness increases the estimated coefficient (and the 
standard errors) substantially. Hence, these new 2SLS results confirm the findings 
from the naïve estimates which rather tend to underestimate the full effect of the 
nuclear accident on subjective well-being (this is also true when estimating these 
specifications using random effects panel models; see Table A 3-3 in the appendix). 
3.5.4 Further sensitivity analyses and robustness checks  
Several additional analyses were performed in order to test the robustness of 
the main findings with respect to different potential threats. These tests and their 
results are summarized in the following subsections. 
3.5.4.1 Personality traits and self-reported affectedness 
Although the instrumental variable results already suggest that the estimated 
effects based on self-reported affectedness are not spuriously created through 
confounding omitted variables, it is possible to provide further support for this claim 
in the following way. In order to test whether individual personality traits influence 
the likelihood of answering being affected by the Chernobyl catastrophe (which they 
should not if the shock was truly random), simple regressions were estimated using 
the two proxies for extroversion and neuroticism as explanatory variables. The 
results of these regressions (pooled OLS) are reported in Table 3-8 (the table 
contains only the two coefficients of interest; the full set of results is provided in 
Table A 3-4 in the appendix). In contrast to the life satisfaction regressions in which 
both traits played a significant role, their effect on the propensity to report being 
affected by the nuclear accident is close to zero and insignificant (irrespective of the 
set of included control variables). It is reassuring that the results of these regressions 
reveal that the two traits do not explain any of the variation in self-reported 
affectedness. Generally, self-reported affectedness is only weakly correlated with 
demographic and household controls; the exception is the significantly negative male 
coefficient. Probably not surprisingly, health status (column 4) is positively 
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associated to the propensity to report affectedness; it seems likely that there is 
reverse causation (affectedness affecting health) so that the health coefficients effects 
should not be interpreted in a causal way. 
 
Table 3-8: Personality traits and self-reported affectedness (pooled OLS) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable Self-reported affectedness (0/1) 
Neurotic 0.018 0.026 0.026 0.033 
 (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.029) 
Extrovert  0.009 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Demographic, marital status -    
Occupation and education -    
Household income & wealth - -   
Health variables - - -  
R-squared 0.122 0.156 0.156 0.162 
Notes: The table reports selected coefficients only. The full list of results is provided in Table A 3-4 in 
the appendix. All regressions control for year, month of interview and region fixed effects. Results 
remain unaffected when controls for official radiation doses are included. Number of observations is 
12,003 (columns 1-3) and 11,065 (column 4). Standard errors are clustered on the individual level. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: ULMS 2003-2007; 
own calculations. 
 
3.5.4.2 Separate exclusion of most affected regions 
The employed radiation doses refer to regional averages and the number of 
highly affected regions is rather limited so that the estimation results using these 
official radiation measures could potentially be driven by one specific region. 
Therefore, six reduced form regressions of radiation doses on life satisfaction 
were estimated excluding each of the most affected regions one at a time (Table 3-9). 
The test confirms that the estimates are clearly robust to these omissions and not 
driven by any particular region with specific features (e.g., Kiev city being the 
capital of the country).  
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Table 3-9: Robustness check: separate omission of most affected regions 
Dependent variable   Life satisfaction   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Without 
Kiev oblast 
Without 
Zhytomyr 
oblast 
Without 
Cherkasy 
oblast 
Without 
Rivne 
oblast 
Without 
Chernihiv 
oblast 
Without 
Kiev city 
Radiation dose -0.096** -0.118** -0.137*** -0.103** -0.125*** -0.109** 
 (0.047) (0.048) (0.047) (0.046) (0.046) (0.047) 
Demographic 
controls 
      
Household controls       
Health & traits       
Observations 10751 10767 10743 10823 10870 10565 
R-squared 0.199 0.199 0.204 0.195 0.205 0.201 
Notes: Pooled OLS regressions. All regressions include full set of controls. Standard errors are 
clustered on the individual level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. Source: ULMS 2003-2007; own calculations. 
 
3.5.4.3 Falsification exercises  
In order to further assess the credibility of the self-reported affectedness 
measures, two ‗falsification exercises‘ are conducted using survey respondents who 
are less likely to have been immediately affected by the accident: the first group 
consists of young individuals who were born at least one year after the accident and 
the second group is made up of persons living in completely unaffected households 
according to the self-reported measure, i.e. households where all members answer 
that they have not been affected by the Chernobyl catastrophe.  
The first robustness check asks to what extent self-reported affectedness 
reflects ‗personal‘ affectedness of the survey respondent (instead of family 
affectedness). Those who were born after 1986 cannot have been personally affected 
by the most immediate impact of the catastrophe (especially through iodine-131 
which has a half-life of about 8 days).
68
 Interestingly, although the resulting 
coefficient has almost the same size as for those born before 1986 the coefficient is 
now insignificant (Table 3-10). This result indicates that individual subjective well-
                                                          
68
 Altruistic feelings towards affected family members could theoretically still play a role. Hence this 
test also helps to understand to what extent this family spill-over matters. Generally though, children 
who were born after the accident and grew up in contaminated areas will have accumulated some 
radiation over time. 
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being in the post-disaster generation is on average not significantly related to the 
affectedness of other family members.
69
  
The second question asks whether differences in official 1986 radiation 
measures assigned to each household member according to his/her place of residence 
in 1986, can generate significant differences in life satisfaction among households in 
which all members respond that no family member was affected by the catastrophe. 
If the self-reported measures are reliable, then the official measure should have no 
significant effect on life satisfaction in this particular subgroup. Indeed, the 
coefficient of the radiation dose is insignificant providing further credibility to the 
self-reported measure of affectedness. Overall, the results from these falsification 
exercises suggest that individuals and households respond rather accurately to the 
question on being affected by Chernobyl. 
 
Table 3-10: Robustness checks with unaffected samples  
Dependent variable Life satisfaction 
 (1) (2) 
Sample Born after 1986 Completely unaffected 
households 
Self-reported affectedness -0.109  
 (0.104)  
Radiation dose  -0.081 
  (0.075) 
Demographic controls   
Household controls   
Health & traits   
Observations 564 4,309 
R-squared 0.210 0.216 
Notes: All regressions control for full set of controls. Standard errors are clustered on the individual 
level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: ULMS 2003-
2007; own calculations. 
 
3.5.4.4 Different age specifications 
Some authors have argued that it might be preferable to control for the natural 
logarithm of age in order to account for the subjective feeling that the years pass 
faster as individuals age (van Praag and Baarsma 2005). Therefore, the regression 
specification including the full set of controls was re-estimated using various age 
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 However, since the remaining sample is very small, the estimation of the coefficients might be 
imprecise (leading to larger standard errors rendering the effects insignificant). Thus, the power of this 
test might be limited.  
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specifications, i.e. including only age (i), age and age squared (ii) and age, age 
squared and age cubic (iii) in simple as well as in logarithmic form. The reduced 
form results of the radiation dose on life satisfaction are robust to these modifications 
(the estimated radiation effect changes only marginally; see Table A 3-5 in the 
appendix).  
3.6 Long-term effects on mental health 
As suggested by several psychological studies (see Baloga, Kholosha and 
Evdin 2006) as well as by the study by Lehmann and Wadsworth (2011) for Ukraine, 
the long-lasting toll of the Chernobyl catastrophe for the Ukrainian population as a 
whole works mainly through mental distress and subjective perceptions of poor 
health rather than through measurable somatic health effects. The empirical results of 
a negative long-term effect on subjective well-being shown in the previous section 
provide further evidence for this channel.  
To shed more light on this psychological channel this section investigates the 
effect of the 1986 nuclear accident on two alternative subjective well-being measures 
which are more directly related to mental health. The UHBS questionnaires of the 
years 2004 to 2008 contained a health section, in which individuals were asked to 
provide information on their somatic and psychological diseases. From this list of 
questions, two binary indicator variables will be used as dependent variables in the 
analysis: suffering from (i) psychological trauma (diagnosed by a doctor) and/or (ii) 
depression (see detailed data description in Section 3.3.3). Given that the data is self-
reported and partly subjective information it is possible that these variables are 
plagued by measurement error (through under- or over-reporting due to stigma, for 
instance). However, as long as the measurement error does only affect the dependent 
variable and not systematically related to any of the explanatory variables this only 
leads to less precise, but not biased estimates (since it increases the variance of the 
error term, see Wooldridge (2002, chapter 4)). Generally, the fraction of individuals 
suffering from depression is much lower in the UHBS sample than in many Western 
countries. This could potentially be explained by cultural norms: mental diseases 
tend to be more strongly related to stigma and less well diagnosed in Eastern 
European countries than in Western countries. Nevertheless, given the possible role 
of stigma associated with medically assessed psychological illnesses and doctor 
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visits, it might turn out beneficial that the survey question on depression asks for 
subjective assessments of the individuals (and not about officially diagnosed 
illnesses).
70
 
In order to identify individuals who have been affected by the Chernobyl 
catastrophe, the following analysis exploits data on self-reported affectedness. A 
binary variable is coded as ‗1‘ if respondents answered that they were either 
somewhat or seriously affected and ‗0‘ otherwise. The advantage of this measure is 
that it is actually more refined than the ULMS question and more precisely targeted 
at the individual (rather than the family). One shortcoming of the UHBS dataset is, 
however, that it does not contain any information on the place of living in 1986. 
Hence, the official radiation measures cannot be linked to a respondent‘s location at 
the time of the catastrophe in order to perform similar tests on the reliability of the 
self-reported affectedness measure as was done for the ULMS data. Nevertheless, the 
preceding ULMS analysis has demonstrated that the self-reported measures of 
affectedness appear to have a causal meaning and are not simply spurious results 
based on omitted personality traits. Thus, given the findings in the previous section 
in combination with the more refined affectedness measure in the new data set, there 
seems to be substantial supportive evidence for taking the results using self-reported 
affectedness measure as lower bound estimates for the causal effect of the Chernobyl 
catastrophe on mental health.
71
 
Moreover, the analysis based on the self-reported affectedness will be 
complemented by an amended test making use of the official radiation measures. 
Instead of assigning the radiation doses to the respondent‘s place of living in 1986, 
the 1986 radiation doses are assigned according to the current residence (oblast). 
Since people in Post-Soviet Ukraine are in principle free to move to their preferred 
location and this location choice is likely to be endogenous, this test is likely to be 
less powerful.
72
 However, the level of mobility from 1986 to 2003 was very low in 
Ukraine (especially among the older population). Lack of housing, liquidity 
constraints and other administrative barriers kept mobility very low even after the 
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 The ideal dataset would consist of a compulsory medical assessment of the entire population to 
circumvent the problem of self-selection into seeking medical examinations and treatment.  
71
 Unfortunately, there are no variables on life satisfaction in the UHBS data to test whether the results 
based on the ULMS data can be replicated with this second dataset. 
72
 The analysis by Lehmann and Wadsworth (2011) seems to suggest that mobility is slightly lower 
among Ukrainians living in contaminated areas rather than in other regions of the country.  
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collapse of the Soviet Union (as shown for Russia by Andrienko and Guriev 2004). 
In fact, the ULMS data reveal that only 7.4 percent of the sample in 2003 lived in a 
different region as compared to 1986.
73
 Furthermore, less than one percent of those 
who moved to another region related the motivation behind their change of residence 
to the Chernobyl catastrophe (the ULMS questionnaire asks respondents to give the 
reasons for their moves).
74
 Given this background information on comparatively 
limited mobility, the empirical problem due to potentially endogenous location 
choice should be less severe.   
Table 3-11 presents the results from the mental health regressions based on 
five cross-sections of the UHBS. The first three columns refer to the regressions on 
trauma, while the other three columns denote the results related to depression – in 
each case controlling for the full set of covariates. The three reported estimates stem 
from (i) the naïve OLS regressions using the self-reported affectedness measure, (ii) 
the reduced form OLS regressions based on the regional radiation doses and (iii) the 
2SLS estimations in which the self-reported affectedness is instrumented by the 
official radiation measures. The lower panel reports the first stage results from the 
2SLS regressions. 
The regression results based on the naïve OLS regression reveal that being 
affected by Chernobyl significantly increases the likelihood of suffering from 
psychological trauma or depression (see columns 1 and 4 respectively). This 
significantly negative long-term effect on mental health is also found when using the 
official radiation doses as a measure of affectedness (reduced form regressions, 
columns 2 and 4). The 2SLS estimates (with a highly significant first stage) provide 
further evidence that this long-term effect on mental health is indeed causally related 
to the nuclear accident from 1986. Hence, these results based on a second data set 
and using alternative measures of subjective well-being once more seem to confirm 
the long-lasting burden of large parts of the Ukrainian society due to the Chernobyl 
catastrophe which is manifested in lower subjective well-being and mental health. 
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 This refers to the estimation sample and includes persons who used to live outside the territory of 
Ukraine in 1986. 
74
 Individuals were asked for their reasons of changing residence. The list of answers included 21 
items. Most often, individuals changed residence because they moved out of their parents‘ home, 
married, purchased an apartment, were released from military service or started studying. 
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Table 3-11: The Chernobyl effect on mental health (UHBS 2004-2008) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 
OLS 
(naïve) 
OLS 
(reduced 
form) 
2SLS 
(2
nd
 stage)  
OLS 
(naïve) 
OLS 
(reduced 
form) 
2SLS 
(2
nd
 stage) 
Dependent variable Trauma  Depression 
Self-reported affectedness 0.003***  0.007***  0.003***  0.003* 
 (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Radiation dose (Reduced   0.002***    0.001*  
form)  (0.001)    (0.001)  
        
First stage        
Dependent variable: Self-reported affectedness     
Radiation dose   0.338***    0.338*** 
   (0.003)    (0.003) 
F-statistic   12,507    12,507 
        
Age, age squared        
Gender        
Education        
Employment status        
Settlement FE        
Time FE         
        
Observations 95,452 95,452 95,452  95,452 95,452 95,452 
R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.001  0.003 0.003 0.003 
Notes: Sample for the years 2004-2008. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1.  Source: UHBS 2004-2008; own calculations.  
 
3.7 Compensation and state transfers 
This section evaluates the aggregate toll of the Chernobyl disaster on 
subjective well-being in terms of required monetary compensating differentials 
(using the ULMS data). Additionally, it sheds more light on the relationship between 
affectedness and the existing state transfer system.  
3.7.1 Estimation of the monetary value of the aggregate utility loss  
As implied by the previous results on subjective well-being the disaster at the 
Chernobyl nuclear power plant exerted a large negative externality on the population. 
In most countries there are no comprehensive insurance schemes for nuclear plants 
and possible nuclear accidents. Furthermore, there are generally no available 
mechanisms through which individuals can insure themselves against such nuclear 
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accidents. In other words, in case of emergency, it is most likely the state which has 
to bear the costs of the accident and to compensate individuals for the suffered 
damage. The nuclear accident of Fukushima (Japan 2011) showed that the state 
might have to bear a substantial part of the costs even when nuclear power plants are 
privately owned. 
Using the estimates from the life satisfaction regressions in Section 3.5 the 
following calculations will provide an estimate of the monetary equivalent of the 
suffered loss in subjective well-being. In particular, it is possible to compute the 
amount of monetary compensation required to equalise the well-being of affected 
and non-affected groups of individuals (Clark and Oswald 2002; van Praag and 
Baarsma 2005; Winkelmann and Winkelmann 1998). This approach interprets 
equation (3.1) as a utility function where life satisfaction is assumed to proxy for 
direct experienced utility. Using the relative size of the affectedness coefficient to the 
income coefficient, it is possible to compute the compensating differential in 
monetary terms for the average individual. In other words, this method helps to 
assess the monetary equivalent required to raise the lower subjective well-being of 
affected individuals up to the level of unaffected persons.  
Since the income measure enters the regression equation in log-form the 
statistical relationship between these two measures corresponds to a semi-log 
functional form in which the estimated income coefficient incˆ  
gives the change in 
the dependent variable ( SWB ) due to a change in the log of income. In the 
meantime, the loss in subjective well-being due to being affected by the Chernobyl 
disaster is simply given by 
affectˆ  .  
iiinciaffectoi XincomessAffectedneSWB   ')log(       (3.3)
 
The relative income change required for these two opposing effects to 
neutralize each other can be expressed by the following equation: 







 

inc
affect
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

ˆ
ˆ
exp   (3.4) 
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where the compensating income differential represents the ratio of the 
compensated income level over the uncompensated income level  
( teduncompensadcompensate incomeincome ). 
In order to express the monetary value of this required income change one has 
to multiply the compensating income differential with the uncompensated income 
level and calculate the difference between the compensated and uncompensated 
income levels. The results of these calculations are presented in Table 3-12.  
 
Table 3-12: Compensating differentials and share of total compensation in GDP 
 
Set of 
controls affect
ˆ  
incˆ  






 
inc
affect


ˆ
ˆ
exp  
Compensating 
differential  
(in Hryvnia) 
Share 
of GDP 
I. 
excluding 
health 
proxies 
-0.114 0.178 1.90 833.4 10.8% 
II. 
including 
health 
proxies 
-0.098 0.169 1.79 729.9 9.5% 
Notes: Based on self-reported affectedness measure. Unless otherwise noted, the estimates stem from 
regressions including the full set of controls as in Table 3-5, column 7. All reported coefficients are 
significantly different from zero.  
 
The income measure used in the regressions and the compensation 
calculations is total monthly household income (all values expressed in June 2004 
values).
75
 The estimates of 
affectˆ  and incˆ are taken from the main specification using 
the self-reported affectedness measure (i.e. using the lower bound estimate of 
affectˆ ). 
With an average uncompensated real income of 928.8 UAH, the compensation 
amounts to substantial 833.4 UAH per affected household and month. This equals 
around 90 percent of average monthly household income. A back-of-the-envelope 
calculation of the fiscal costs of such a compensatory policy shows that the 
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 The household income measure includes all kinds of payments (including payments in the form of 
goods and services) and transfers that the household received in the last month (after tax). There are 
several advantages of using household instead of individual income: households tend to pool of 
resources and also have joint expenditures, the measure of household income provides a more 
complete assessment of non-wage income sources (some transfers are paid to households/families and 
not to individuals) and it is less dependent on an individual‘s labour market decision (which can be 
endogenous to health or Chernobyl affectedness). 
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Ukrainian government would have to additionally spend between 9.5 and 10.8 
percent of annual GDP in order to pay for full compensation.
76
 Given that the 
government already spends five to seven percent of annual GDP on Chernobyl 
related social programs, the overall long-term costs of the catastrophe including the 
loss in subjective well-being are enormous (Oughton, Bay-Larsen and Voigt 2009). 
3.7.2 Assessment of the role of current Chernobyl assistance payments  
The Ukrainian government runs a costly Chernobyl assistance program which 
offers an extremely complex mix of 50 different privileges and social benefits 
ranging from direct monetary compensation to subsidized health care, tax exemption, 
as well as travel and university grants (Oughton, Bay-Larsen and Voigt, 2009).
77
 To 
what extent do these Chernobyl assistance payments help to mitigate the well-being 
loss of Chernobyl victims? To answer this question, the following analysis makes use 
of the ULMS data which contains information on whether individuals received 
Chernobyl assistance payments in the last 30 days (binary variable).
78
 Furthermore, 
the previous model (3.1) is amended by introducing interaction terms between 1986 
radiation doses (three categories: close to zero, medium and high levels) with the 
binary indicator variable for Chernobyl assistance payments: 
'.*.
3
1
,32
3
1
,1  XAssistRadnceAssistaRadiationW
k
k
k
koit  

     (3.5) 
The estimated coefficients help to disentangle the effect of radiation exposure 
and state assistance of victims and to what extent these assistance payments help to 
mitigate the radiation effect. In particular, based on the estimated 321
ˆˆ,ˆ  and  
coefficients, it is possible to express the relative subjective well-being loss/gain of a 
person having been exposed to medium/high radiation doses and having/having not 
received Chernobyl assistance payments to the ‗baseline‘ comparison group of 
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 A similar conclusion is reached when exploiting the reduced form coefficients of objective radiation 
doses with individual income data. Similar costs apply when compensating individuals for 2 mSv of 
additional radiation. 
77
 The Ukrainian law «On the status and social protection of citizens who suffered from the ChNPP 
catastrophe» from February 29, 1991 – which was amended in the following years – is the legal basis 
for the social protection of the Chernobyl victims (see also Chapters 4 and 12 in the National Report 
from Baloga, Kholosha and Evdin (2006)). 
78
 The corresponding question in the ULMS 2007 questionnaire asks respondents about whether they 
personally received any Chernobyl assistance in the last 30 days prior to the interview (monetary 
payments or payments in the form of goods or services). About 1.4 percent of the sample answer that 
they received such payments. 
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unaffected persons (zero radiation dose). For instance, in comparison to an 
unaffected person, the well-being loss/gain of someone with medium levels of 
radiation, but no assistance amounts to
2,1ˆ , while the loss/gain of a person having 
been exposed to the same radiation dose, but receiving compensatory assistance 
payments at the same time corresponds to the sum of the three coefficients
2,322,1
ˆˆˆ   . These estimated well-being losses/gains have been calculated for the 
four different categories of persons and are represented graphically in Figure 3-5.  
 
Figure 3-5: The effect of radiation levels and Chernobyl assistance on subjective 
well-being 
 
Notes: Figure shows effects of radiation dose on subjective well-being (bar) with 90% confidence 
interval. Baseline category is ‗no additional radiation‘. Effects based on regressions with full set of 
controls and individually clustered standard errors. 
 
Several interesting findings emerge. Positive (non-zero) radiation levels have 
a significant negative impact on subjective well-being among those who do not 
receive any accident-related benefits (see the two left bars in Figure 3-5). The size of 
the coefficient is around -0.2 irrespectively of whether individuals received a 
medium or high dosage. Turning to the respondents receiving Chernobyl assistance 
payments, individuals with medium dosage still suffer from a well-being discount of 
more than -0.2, however, the increased standard errors render the effect insignificant. 
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In other words, medium affected individuals receiving assistance payments have no 
significantly lower well-being than non-affected individuals. In contrast are the 
results for those who suffered from high radiation doses and receive Chernobyl 
assistance. Their well-being toll amounts to almost -0.8 points despite the 
compensatory assistance payments. This surprising finding could be related to the 
fact that the official 1986 radiation measures used in the regressions refer to the 
regional level and represent average values and not personal radiation dosimetry 
measures (even in small areas there was non-negligible variation in radiation 
exposure across space). However, if benefits are targeted to the most affected 
individuals within regions this significantly negative effect could identify those 
individuals who were more severely exposed to the radiation so that the assistance 
payments are not sufficient to fully compensate them (in contrast to individuals with 
medium radiation exposure).
79
  
3.7.3 Social state transfer dependency of Chernobyl victims  
Psychologists have argued that traumatised individuals might suffer from 
psychological illnesses, depression, anxiety and lethargy leading to increased levels 
of state aid dependency (Osiatynski 2004; Udovyk 2007). To analyse whether this 
behavioural effect can be also found in the data used in this study the following 
analysis will take advantage of the fact that the UBHS data consistently collected 
relevant information on individual social state transfer receipt across years.
80
 The 
dependent variable is the transfer share in total income which is constructed using the 
single income components reported by the individuals. A higher state aid 
dependency (higher transfer share) could indicate that affected persons indeed suffer 
from stronger feelings of powerlessness and are less able to help themselves.  
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 On the other hand, the payment of compensation might work as a signal for the own (partially 
unobservable) radiation status and lead to lower well-being levels. The latter explanation, however, 
stands in contrast to the compensation effect found among those with medium radiation levels. There 
are more indications in favour of the first explanation: individuals in the group of high radiation levels 
receiving assistance are on average 60 percent more likely to suffer from one out of seven chronic 
diseases than those with similar radiation levels but no compensation. This higher incidence of poor 
health conditions also translates into substantially larger medical out-of-pocket expenditures (183 
UAH per month compared to 65 UAH) and—conditional on working—more days of sickness absence 
during a period of the past three months (14.8 days compared to 6.7 days). These numbers indicate 
that compensated individuals in the high radiation group suffer indeed from a worse health status. 
80
 Unfortunately, structural inconsistencies in the income sections of the ULMS over time prevent an 
analysis of the extent of transfer dependency using the panel data set. 
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Table 3-13 provides OLS and 2SLS results from this empirical assessment. 
Columns (1) to (4) exploit a wider definition of state transfers (including Chernobyl 
benefits) while columns (5) to (8) exclude all benefits related to the catastrophe. 
Results are provided for two levels of self-reported affectedness: The first dummy 
variable (somewhat affected) includes all individuals who report to be personally at 
least somewhat affected, while the second variable (seriously affected) identifies only 
those whose health was strongly affected.  
The results in Table 3-13 reveal that there is a significant positive association 
between Chernobyl affectedness and transfer dependency: persons affected by the 
nuclear accident have a significantly higher transfer share in their total income – 
irrespective of whether explicit Chernobyl payments are included in the measure of 
state transfers or not (the coefficients decrease only marginally when Chernobyl 
payments are not accounted for). Furthermore, while the somewhat affected 
individuals have on average a two percentage point higher state transfer ratio, the 
effect rises to between four and nine percent for the seriously affected. The table also 
demonstrates that the average state dependency decreased over time as indicated by 
the time trend against the base year 2001. Moreover, women and older persons are 
on average more dependent upon state transfers (which probably relates retirement 
and old-age pensions; also note that the legal retirement age is five years lower for 
women (age 55) than for men (age 60)). 
 1
3
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Table 3-13: The Chernobyl effect on the transfer share in total income 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS  OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
Dependent variable  Transfer share in total income  Transfer share in total income  
(excluding all Chernobyl related benefits) 
At least somewhat affected 0.017*** 0.020***    0.016*** 0.017***   
 (0.001) (0.004)    (0.001) (0.004)   
Seriously affected   0.042*** 0.087***    0.038*** 0.075*** 
   (0.003) (0.019)    (0.003) (0.019) 
Age 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005***  0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age squared 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Female 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.029***  0.029*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Year 2002 -0.012*** -0.014*** -0.004 -0.007**  -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.004 -0.006** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Year 2003 -0.030*** -0.032*** -0.022*** -0.024***  -0.030*** -0.031*** -0.023*** -0.024*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Year 2004 -0.024*** -0.026*** -0.016*** -0.018***  -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.017*** -0.018*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Year 2005 -0.024*** -0.026*** -0.016*** -0.018***  -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.017*** -0.018*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Year 2006 -0.031*** -0.033*** -0.023*** -0.025***  -0.031*** -0.032*** -0.023*** -0.025*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Year 2007 -0.033*** -0.034*** -0.024*** -0.025***  -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.025*** -0.025*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Year 2008 -0.035*** -0.037*** -0.027*** -0.028***  -0.035*** -0.036*** -0.027*** -0.028*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant -0.206*** -0.205*** -0.207*** -0.205***  -0.204*** -0.204*** -0.205*** -0.204*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
R-squared 0.794 0.794 0.794 0.794  0.794 0.794 0.794 0.794 
Notes: All regressions include controls for educational attainment, economic status as well as regions. The number of observations is 140,869 in all columns. The first stage F-
statistics is 1937.4. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Source: UHBS 2001-2008; own calculations. 
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3.8 Extension: Separate results by subgroups 
Recent research investigates the effect of gender on risk perception and crisis 
management. The literature review by Croson and Gneezy (2009) gives an overview of 
this huge strand of research which finds that women have on average stronger emotional 
experiences and are more fearful than men. For instance, while the prime emotional 
reaction following the September 11 attacks in the United States among men was anger, 
women became more fearful and pessimistic (Lerner, Gonzalez, Small and Fischhoff  
2003). Furthermore, women are more risk averse than men (Borghans, Golsteyn, 
Heckman and Meijers 2009). To investigate whether men and women responded 
differently to the Chernobyl catastrophe the life satisfaction regressions are estimated 
separately by gender (Table 3-14): while both men and women show a similarly sized 
negative effect of self-reported affectedness on life satisfaction this is not true for the 
results using the official radiation measures (reduced form as well as 2SLS estimates). 
While the results for women reveal large and significantly negative effects of radiation 
doses on subjective well-being, the results for men – although having the expected sign 
– are close to zero and not significant.81  
 
Table 3-14: Gender differences in subjective well-being (ULMS) 
Dependent variable                                       Life satisfaction   
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 Naïve OLS  Reduced form OLS  2SLS (2
nd
 stage) 
 Men Women  Men Women  Men Women 
Subjective  -0.089*** -0.111***     -0.013 -2.413** 
affectedness (0.033) (0.029)     (0.933) (1.024) 
Radiation dose    -0.001 -0.184***    
    (0.069) (0.060)    
Demographic 
controls 
        
Household controls         
Health & traits         
Observations 4,491 6,574  4,491 6,574  4,491 6,574 
R-squared 0.201 0.211  0.200 0.211  0.200 -0.556 
Notes: All regression with full set of controls. Standard errors are clustered on the individual level. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: ULMS 2003-2007; own 
calculations. 
                                                          
81
 The regressions from Table 3-14 allow all coefficients to vary by gender. When alternatively estimating 
a pooled model with a gender-Chernobyl interaction effect, the interaction term is only significant when 
only the basic controls are included in the regression. This would imply that there are no significant 
gender differences in responses to the Chernobyl catastrophe as suggested by the results using the self-
reported affectedness measure in Table 3-14. 
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These potential gender differences in long-term subjective well-being would be 
in line with the above cited literature, where men are found to acquire a more positive 
attitude towards negative events. Actual radiation does not seem to negatively impact 
men‘s life satisfaction in the long run. The significant effect for males when using the 
self-reported affectedness measure (column 1) might reflect a compassion affect with 
affected female family members. 
While there is generally mixed and inconclusive evidence regarding the effect of 
higher radiation exposure on the prevalence of leukaemia and most other somatic 
illnesses, there is consensus regarding the effect on increased incidence of thyroid 
cancer among children and adolescents (United Nations 2002; UNSCEAR 2008). 
Children and young individuals born prior to the accident appear to have been 
especially vulnerable to internal exposure of radioactive iodine (especially the isotope 
iodine-131) and have subsequently suffered more often from thyroid cancer. To test 
whether this is also related to subjective well-being among young individuals, separate 
reduced form regressions are estimated for the sample of children who were zero to 18 
years old at the time of the catastrophe (Table 3-15). Since there exist gender specific 
information on absorbed doses of thyroid, these regressions are also repeated for girls 
and boys separately.  
 
Table 3-15: Robustness check: Effect of absorbed thyroid doses on 1986-children 
and adolescents 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Children aged  
0-18 in 1986 
Children aged  
0-18 in 1986 
Girls aged  
0-18 in 1986 
Boys aged  
0-18 in 1986 
Dependent variable  Life satisfaction  
Log thyroid dose -0.013*  -0.020**  
females aged 1-18 (0.007)  (0.009)  
Log thyroid dose   -0.013*  0.003 
dose males aged 1-18  (0.007)  (0.013) 
Demographic controls     
Household controls     
Health & traits     
Observations 3,532 3,532 2,052 1,480 
R-squared 0.195 0.195 0.186 0.240 
Notes: Samples comprise only children who were aged zero to 18 in the year 1986 (born before January 
1987). Absorbed thyroid doses are log transformed. Standard errors are clustered on the individual level. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: ULMS 2003-2007; own 
calculations. 
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The results in the first two columns of Table 3-15 reveal that exposure to higher 
iodine doses has a significantly negative effect on long-run life satisfaction. When 
splitting the sample by gender the picture is similar to the findings on the whole 
population: the reduced form estimates indicate a significant negative long-run effect 
for girls, while boys‘ life satisfaction seems to be unaffected. 
3.9 Extension: Possible behavioural implications – fatalism and 
precaution 
Fatalism is generally defined as an attitude or belief of having little power in 
determining one‘s life and being exposed to an inevitable fate. As presumably received 
radiation doses cannot be removed from human bodies, people might develop a 
fatalistic attitude towards their situation. It is possible to test whether people believe that 
their exposure to the Chernobyl disaster significantly reduces their remaining lifetime 
using the ULMS data. In the 2007 wave, individuals aged 45 and above were asked to 
name the probability that they would survive until a certain ‗target age‘ in the future 
(typically around 10 years in the future).
82
 This ‗target age‘ was specified according to 
the current age of the respondent: For instance, all respondents aged 45 to 55 (56 to 60) 
were asked to assess their survival probability until age 65 (70) and so on (see notes 
below Table 3-16). 
Table 3-16 shows the effects of self-reported and objective affectedness on these 
subjective survival probabilities (as well as the 2SLS results). If respondents identify 
themselves as being affected by the Chernobyl catastrophe (self-reported measure), the 
individual survival expectancy falls by 4.2 to 3.5 percentage points. The fact that there 
are significant effects in response to self-reported affectedness suggests that people 
think mostly about their personal affectedness (unless people believe that radiation in 
other household members can reduce their own life span
83
) when responding to the 
Chernobyl question. Using the official radiation doses the reduced form effects become 
even larger: A one mSv higher exposure dose reduces the expected survival probability 
by between 7.4 to 8.1 percentage points (a bit less than 30 percent of a standard 
deviation). These negative effects of the Chernobyl catastrophe on subjective survival 
                                                          
82
 The corresponding survey question reads: ―What are the chances that you will live to be age [X] and 
older?‖. There are about 1,980 observations in the estimation sample for whom this variable is non-
missing (the smaller sample size is due to the fact that the question was only asked in the 2007 wave). 
The mean of this variable is 53.9 percent (standard deviation of 27.0). 
83
 This might be relevant if people perform stressful home care, for instance. 
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probabilities is also confirmed when using the instrumental variable approach (the 
estimated effects become extremely large – about minus 73.6 to 87.0 percentage points). 
 
Table 3-16: Impact of affectedness on subjective survival probability 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable Subjective probability of survival to target age (0% to 100%) 
A. Naïve regressions (OLS)    
Self-reported affectedness -4.178*** -3.935*** -3.640*** 
 (1.287) (1.291) (1.289) 
B. Reduced form (OLS)    
Radiation dose (mSv) -7.444*** -8.049*** -7.892*** 
 (1.644) (1.585) (1.573) 
C. First stage (2SLS) 
Dependent variable Self-reported affectedness 
Radiation dose (mSv) 0.101*** 0.097*** 0.091*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
F-statistic 15.53 13.98 12.27 
D. Second stage (2SLS)    
Dependent variable Subjective survival probability 
Instrumented self-reported  -73.628*** -83.313*** -86.962*** 
affectedness (23.612) (26.191) (28.844) 
Basic controls    
Individual and health controls -   
Traits and household controls - -  
Observations 1,981 1,881 1,881 
Notes: The target age is 65 for those aged 45 to 55, 70 for those aged 56 to 60, 75 for those aged 61 to 65 
and 80 for those aged 66 to 75. All regressions control for full set of age dummies. The questions on the 
survival probabilities were asked only in ULMS 2007 to individuals aged 45 and above—hence the 
limited sample sizes. In order to increase the degrees of freedom, regressions control for macro regions 
instead of single oblasts. Standard errors are clustered on the individual level. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Source: ULMS 2007. 
  
Once people become wary of their potential long-run effects suffered from the 
Chernobyl catastrophe or anticipate potentially shorter lifetimes, they might choose to 
do whatever is in their power to reduce the risk of falling ill, i.e. they might engage in 
precautionary behaviour. It is beyond the scope of this study to conduct a 
comprehensive analysis about potential behavioural implications of the Chernobyl 
catastrophe. Nevertheless, Table 3-17 provides suggestive evidence on potential 
behavioural effects in terms of smoking. Smoking is an immediate and individual-level 
indicator for risky behaviour (Cawley and Ruhm 2011).
84
 Despite the fact that the 
awareness of specific health risks from smoking might be lower in middle- and low-
                                                          
84
 Cawley and Ruhm (2011) provide a recent review article on the economics on risky behaviour. 
 140 
 
income countries compared to industrialized nations (Steptoe, Wardle, Cui, Baban, 
Glass, Pelzer, Tsuda and Vinck, 2002) smoking is generally considered to be harmful. 
The binary smoking variable indicates persons who report to be currently smoking.  
 
Table 3-17: Effect of Chernobyl affectedness on the propensity to smoke  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variables Smoking (0/1) 
A. Naïve regression (Probit)    
Self-reported affectedness -0.109*** -0.032** -0.032** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.028 0.306 0.316 
B. Reduced form (Probit)    
Radiation level -0.079*** -0.048* -0.060** 
 (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.019 0.306 0.316 
C. First stage (2SLS)    
Radiation level  0.084*** 0.081*** 0.078*** 
 (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) 
F-statistics 7.82 7.65 6.94 
D. Second stage (2SLS)    
Instrumented self-reported  -0.955** -0.544
†
 -0.679* 
affectedness (0.470) (0.360) (0.404) 
Basic controls    
Individual and health controls -   
Traits and household controls - -  
Observations 12,003 11,065 11,065 
Notes: Panel A and B report marginal effects. Standard errors are clustered on the individual level. 
Standard errors are clustered on the individual level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1, 
† 
p<0.15. Source: ULMS 2003-2007; own calculations. 
 
As Panel A in Table 3-17 reveals, self-reported Chernobyl victims are almost 11 
percentage points less like to smoke – an effect that falls to 3 percentage points but 
remains significant once individual and household controls (and health status as well as 
traits in specification (3)) are accounted for. A similar significant negative effect on 
smoking is found in the reduced form regressions using the official radiation doses 
(Panel B). Each additional millisievert of effective exposure dose reduces the 
probability to smoke by five to almost eight percentage points. As previously the 2SLS 
estimates are even larger than the simple Probit effects (marginal effects). However, due 
to the inflated standard errors, the effects become only marginally significant (the 
significance level varies across specifications).  
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Hence, these results seem to suggest that affected persons are – on average – less 
likely to smoke. This could be interpreted as a first indication for possible precautionary 
health behaviour induced by the Chernobyl catastrophe. However, surprisingly, these 
results are not in line with those by Lehmann and Wadsworth (2011) who do not find a 
significant effect of having lived in regions exposed to higher radiation levels in 1986 
on contemporary smoking habits (reduced form regressions). Although their 
coefficients have the same negative sign like in the results presented in Table 3-17, they 
are marginally insignificant. These differences could be related to the different measures 
of affectedness and radiation exposure used in their study vis-à-vis those used in the 
present study (e.g., in their regression on smoking, the Chernobyl indicator is a dummy 
variable for having lived in the designated monitoring zone in 1986). 
3.10 Conclusions 
This chapter analysed long-term effects of the Chernobyl catastrophe on life 
satisfaction and mental health in Ukraine more than 17 years after the nuclear accident. 
To identify persons who were exposed to radiation the study uses self-reported 
affectedness measures as well as objective 1986 radiation doses which can be assigned 
to individuals according to their place of living in 1986. Since the Chernobyl disaster 
was unexpected and randomly affected certain parts of the Ukrainian population more 
than others (geographic variation in radiation doses) the empirical analysis can generate 
estimates of the causal effect of the nuclear accident on various outcomes. The results 
suggest that individuals who were affected by the catastrophe exhibit significantly lower 
levels of life satisfaction as well as higher probabilities of suffering from depression or 
psychological traumas (posttraumatic stress disorders). These results hold irrespective 
of the measure of affectedness used (self-reported or official measures), although the 
instrumental variable estimations which aim at correcting potential measurement as well 
as endogeneity problems of the self-reported measure seem to imply that the results 
based on the latter can be interpreted as lower bound estimates.  
In order to evaluate the monetary costs of these subjective well-being losses 
(utility losses) and to assess the negative externality of the catastrophe on the general 
population and the economy as a whole, the chapter also provides estimates of the 
monetary value needed to compensate victims for their burden. The estimated 
compensating income differentials suggest a total annual cost around ten percent of 
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Ukrainian GDP. This is a remarkable sum considering the fact that the Chernobyl 
disaster took place such a long time ago. 
In further extensions to the main analysis, the study also finds evidence on 
effects on subjective life expectancy (subjective survival probabilities during the next 
ten years) as well as precautionary health behaviour: individuals affected by the 1986 
nuclear accident expect to have a lower life expectancy on average and are significantly 
less likely to smoke. However, it is beyond the scope of this study to draw any final 
conclusions about possible fatalistic or precautionary behavioural responses or attitudes 
due to the increased (health) uncertainty caused by the Chernobyl catastrophe. The task 
to explore and analyse these possible long-term effects in more depth is left for future 
research.   
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3.11 Appendix to Chapter 3 
Table A 3-1: Ordered Probit regressions (marginal effects) using self-reported and 
official measures of affectedness 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable  Life satisfaction  
A. Self-reported affectedness    
Self-reported affectedness (β) -0.182*** -0.099*** -0.100*** 
 (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0304 0.0619 0.0751 
    
Marginal effects    
Fully unsatisfied (outcome 1) 0.051*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Unsatisfied (outcome 2) 0.021*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Neither/nor (outcome 3) -0.014*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Satisfied (outcome 4) -0.045*** -0.025*** -0.025*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
Fully satisfied (outcome 5) -0.013*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
    
B. Official radiation measures    
Radiation dose (β) -0.098* -0.116** -0.104** 
 (0.052) (0.052) (0.051) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0284 0.0615 0.0747 
    
Marginal effects    
Fully unsatisfied (outcome 1) 0.028* 0.031** 0.028** 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) 
Unsatisfied (outcome 2) 0.011* 0.015** 0.014** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Neither, nor (outcome 3) -0.008* -0.010** -0.010** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Satisfied (outcome 4) -0.024* -0.029** -0.026** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Fully satisfied (outcome 5) -0.007* -0.007** -0.006** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Region & time FE    
Demographics, health, work -   
Income, wealth, traits - -  
Observations 12,003 11,065 11,065 
Notes: The included controls in columns (1), (2) and (3) correspond to columns (1), (5) and (7) in Table 
3-5. Standard errors are clustered on the individual level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, 
† 
p<0.15. Source: ULMS 2003-2007; own calculations. 
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Table A 3-2: Alternative estimation method: Generalized Least Squares Random 
Effects and Generalized Two-Stage Least Squares Random Effects (GLS-RE and 
G2SLS-RE) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
A. Naive GLS-RE  
Dependent variable  Life satisfaction  
Self-reported affectedness -0.190*** -0.096*** -0.096*** 
 (0.027) (0.026) (0.025) 
R-squared overall 0.0873 0.1691 0.2008 
B. Reduced form GLS-RE    
Dependent variable Life satisfaction 
Radiation dose -0.088
†
 -0.102** -0.088* 
 (0.056) (0.052) (0.050) 
R-squared overall 0.0819 0.1681 0.1997 
C. First stage G2SLS-RE    
Dependent variable Self-reported affectedness 
Radiation dose 0.083*** 0.079*** 0.077*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
z-value of instrument 4.40 4.11 3.99 
D. Second stage G2SLS-RE    
Dependent variable Life satisfaction 
Instrumented self-reported -1.045
†
 -1.254* -1.112
†
 
affectedness (0.713) (0.768) (0.737) 
R-squared overall 0.0507 0.0845 0.1182 
 
Region & time FE    
Demographics, health, work -   
Income, wealth, traits - -  
Observations 12,003 11,065 11,065 
Notes: The included controls in columns (1), (2) and (3) correspond to columns (1), (5) and (7) in Table 
3-5. Standard errors are clustered on the individual level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, 
† 
p<0.15. Source: ULMS; own calculations. 
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Table A 3-3: Causal effects on the likelihood of being unhappy – alternative estimation method (GLS-RE and G2SLS-RE) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  
Naive GLS-RE         
Dependent variable Unhappy (0/1) 
Self-reported affectedness 0.055*** 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.037*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.034***  
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)  
Reduced form GLS-RE          
Dependent variable Unhappy (0/1) 
Radiation dose 0.045** 0.040** 0.038** 0.040** 0.047*** 0.043** 0.044**  
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017)  
GLS-RE First stage         
Dependent variable Self-reported affectedness 
Radiation dose 0.083*** 0.073*** 0.080*** 0.078*** 0.079*** 0.077*** 0.076***  
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)  
Z-value of instrument 4.40 3.93 4.16 4.09 4.11 3.99 3.98  
G2SLS-RE Second stage         
Dependent variable Unhappy (0/1) 
Instrumented self-reported 
affectedness 
0.519* 0.529* 0.468* 0.499* 0.579** 0.546* 0.558*  
(0.271) (0.304) (0.268) (0.280) (0.294) (0.289) (0.293)  
Region & time FE         
Demographic controls -        
Health controls - -       
Marital status - - -      
Work status - - - -     
Income, wealth, HC - - - - -    
Traits - - - - - -   
Observations 12,003 12,003 11,065 11,065 11,065 11,065 11,065  
Notes: Panel A and B report marginal effect from pooled Probit regressions for the binary variable ‗unhappy‘; Panel C and D report the estimated coefficients from the 2SLS 
regressions (linear probability models). The variable ‗unhappy‘ indicates individuals answering ‗fully unsatisfied‘ on the life satisfaction question. Standard errors are clustered 
on the individual level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: ULMS 2003-2007, own calculations. 
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Table A 3-4: Personality traits and self-reported affectedness (pooled OLS) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable Self-reported affectedness 
Neurotic 0.018 0.026 0.026 0.033 
 (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.029) 
Extrovert  0.009 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Male   -0.115*** -0.115*** -0.083*** 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) 
Married   0.015 0.015 0.029 
  (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) 
Widowed   0.013 0.016 0.028 
  (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) 
Separated   -0.031 -0.030 -0.017 
  (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) 
Age   0.007 0.008 0.009 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Age squared  0.000 0.000 -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age cubic  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
General secondary educ.  0.005 0.004 -0.002 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Professional second. educ.  -0.018 -0.019 -0.026* 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) 
Higher education   -0.006 -0.007 -0.018 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Working   -0.077 -0.079 -0.110 
  (0.125) (0.126) (0.137) 
Unemployed   -0.061 -0.059 -0.081 
  (0.126) (0.127) (0.138) 
Pensioner   -0.052 -0.052 -0.081 
  (0.126) (0.127) (0.138) 
Inactive   -0.067 -0.066 -0.102 
  (0.126) (0.126) (0.137) 
Household size   -0.006 -0.007** 
   (0.003) (0.004) 
Log of household income   0.006 0.005 
   (0.005) (0.006) 
Living space per capita   -0.000*** -0.000*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
BMI    0.002 
    (0.001) 
Chronic disease    0.077*** 
    (0.010) 
Constant 0.225 0.051 0.053 0.068 
 (0.226) (0.274) (0.261) (0.260) 
R-squared 0.122 0.156 0.156 0.162 
Notes: Results remain unaffected when control for objective radiation doses are added. Regressions 
control for year, month of interview and region fixed effects. Number of observations is 12,003 (columns 
1-3) and 11,065 (column 4). Standard errors are clustered on the individual level. Robust standard errors 
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: ULMS 2003-2007, own calculations. 
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Table A 3-5: OLS regressions of subjective well-being (reduced form), various age 
controls 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable  Subjective well-being   
       
Radiation dosage -0.080* -0.097** -0.102** -0.085* -0.101** -0.099** 
 (0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) 
Age  -0.013*** -0.065*** -0.188***    
 (0.001) (0.006) (0.024)    
Age squared  0.001*** 0.004***    
  (0.000) (0.001)    
Age cubic   -0.000***    
   (0.000)    
Log(Age)    -0.595*** -7.157*** -34.845*** 
    (0.046) (0.807) (9.405) 
Log(Age) squared     0.908*** 8.658*** 
     (0.111) (2.618) 
Log(Age) cubic       -0.719*** 
      (0.242) 
Full controls       
Observations 11,065 11,065 11,065 11,065 11,065 11,065 
R-squared 0.192 0.197 0.200 0.195 0.200 0.201 
Notes: Full controls see Table 3-5. Standard errors are clustered on the individual level. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: ULMS 2003-2007; own calculations. 
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4 Labour Market Participation of New Mothers and Medium-Run 
Cognitive Child Outcomes 
4.1 Introduction, Motivation and Research Question 
This chapter investigates the question whether prolonged paid and job protected 
parental leave and thus reduced maternal employment in the first years of a child‘s life 
has effects on the offspring‘s cognitive development through the increase in the 
maternal time that can be devoted to child-rearing. In many industrialized countries, the 
provision of parental leave is one of the main policy instruments aimed at helping 
young families reconcile working life with family life.
85
 This topic has become 
increasingly important and prominent in the public debate as female labour force 
participation rates have been growing over the past decades in many industrialized 
countries.
86
 However, the advantages and disadvantages of this policy instrument have 
been critically discussed: while proponents of (more generous) parental leave 
entitlements assert positive consequences for the health and well-being of children and 
their mothers as well as for the general situation of women in the workplace (e.g., 
through lower unemployment rates related to childbirth and stronger incentives to return 
to the previous employer), opponents fear that parental leave mandates diminish market 
flexibility, thereby leading to inefficiencies and lower rates of employment growth 
(Ruhm 1998, 2000). The lack of an academic and societal consensus about the potential 
effects of parental leave on maternal labour market performance and on the 
development of new-borns is also partly reflected in the large cross-country variation in 
the generosity of parental leave entitlements in terms of duration of job protection and 
income replacement level. For instance, one of the shortest and less generous parental 
leave regulations can be found in the USA. The maternity and parental leave 
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 The Preamble of the European Community Council Directive 96/34/EC of 3 June 1996 on the 
framework agreement on parental leave states this very clearly: ―The enclosed framework agreement 
represents an undertaking by Unicef, CEEP and the ETUC to set out minimum requirements on parental 
leave and time off from work on grounds of force majeure, as an important means of reconciling work 
and family life and promoting equal opportunities and treatment between men and women.‖ (European 
Community 1996, Preamble). 
86
 This increasing trend has been particularly strong in countries with comparatively low female labour 
force participation rates in the early 1980s, for instance, Austria, Germany, Italy, Spain (see also Table A 
4-1 in the appendix). In the Scandinavian countries Denmark, Norway and Sweden, female labour force 
participation rates have increased between the year 1980 and 2009, but the development over time was 
not monotonic and seems to have flattened or even slightly decreased in the last decade. 
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entitlements according to the US federal Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) from 
1993 grants a maximum duration of unpaid, job protected leave of 12 weeks which is 
low in comparison to other countries (Berger, Hill and Waldfogel 2005). Furthermore, 
the regulations in the FMLA apply to only about half of the female workforce; parental 
leave allowances for the other half are determined in individual employer regulations.
87
 
In contrast, most European countries grant much longer durations of job protected leave 
(some of which is even compulsory) and mothers or fathers on leave receive partial or 
full income compensation (for an overview, see Neyer 2003). Since the length of the 
granted parental leave is relevant for the return-to-work decision, these cross-country 
differences in legislation help to explain why new mothers in some countries return to 
work much sooner and spend less time at home with their child compared to mothers in 
other countries (e.g. Ruhm 2000 for a study on 16 European countries; Tanaka 2005 for 
an analysis of 18 OECD countries). 
Overall, previous empirical studies in psychology and economics have produced 
mixed evidence regarding the impact of early maternal employment on child outcomes. 
If anything, the majority of studies seem to support the hypothesis that the labour force 
participation of mothers during their children‘s first year of life has potentially adverse 
effects on their subsequent development (see Ruhm 2008 and studies cited therein). In 
addition, there is some indication for heterogeneous effects across subgroups: children 
with a higher socio-economic background are potentially more likely to be negatively 
affected by maternal employment, while children from low income families might 
benefit if maternal employment improves the income situation of the household (Currie 
2003). Hence, depending on the specific design of the laws regarding the length of 
granted leave, the income replacement level during the leave period as well as the 
medium- to long-term labour market consequences for the mother, parental leave 
mandates might affect child outcomes through time effects (more maternal time 
investments) and potentially through income effects (if household income is reduced 
due to foregone wage earnings of the mother in the short-run and potentially in the long-
run).   
The fundamental challenge of these empirical assessments is the non-trivial 
identification of the causal effect of early maternal employment on child development. 
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 A more detailed description and analysis of the US Parental Leave regulations and differences across 
single states is given by Han, Ruhm, Waldfogel (2009). 
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Maternal employment, fertility behaviour and the timing the labour market re-entry after 
childbirth are choice variables and might be driven by unobserved mother or child 
characteristics (e.g. ability, fertility and work preferences, role models, regional 
differences in availability and costs of alternative child care). If particular types of 
women (e.g., higher ability women) return to work sooner than others, differences in 
child outcomes between these groups of mothers might reflect differences in maternal 
characteristics and intergenerational transmission of ability rather than the causal effect 
of maternal employment. Reverse causality might be an additional challenge, since 
certain health conditions of a child are likely to impede its mother‘s return to work. As 
long as it is not clear which factors lead some women to return to work sooner than 
others, empirical analyses will only provide statistical associations and one must be 
careful not to draw conclusions about causality. 
Until recently, the majority of studies on this topic tried to tackle the 
endogeneity problem of the maternal return-to-work decision (omitted variable bias) by 
including as many potentially relevant control variables as possible (e.g., pre-birth 
characteristics, the omission of which could confound the analysis), by estimating 
family fixed effects models and comparing sibling differences, by implementing 
propensity score matching or by employing instrumental variable techniques (among 
the first to follow this approach were Blau and Grossberg (1992); for an overview of 
previous studies and methods, see Currie 2003; Almond and Currie 2010; Hill, 
Waldfogel, Brooks-Gunn and Han 2005). However, as Currie (2003) notes, each of 
these empirical approaches has severe limitations and any inference and conclusions 
drawn from single studies have to be put in specific context and compared to results 
using other methods. None of these methods (except for the instrumental variable 
techniques if strong and compelling instruments are available), can convincingly solve 
the self-selection into maternal employment problem or the potential reverse causality 
from children‘s needs.  
A very recent strand of the literature has tried to address the identification 
problem by employing quasi-experimental methods. These exploit exogenous changes 
in maternal employment caused by reforms in parental leave provisions in several 
countries with different institutional settings (Baker and Milligan (2010a, 2010b) focus 
on Canada, Carneiro, Løken and Salvanes (2010) on Norway, Dustmann and Schönberg 
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(2010) on Germany, Liu and Nordstrom Skans (2010) on Sweden, Würtz Rasmussen 
(2010) on Denmark).  
This study complements this new development by analysing the effects of a 
substantial exogenous change in the duration of maternal time at home on medium-term 
cognitive child outcomes in Austria. The exogenous variation was induced by an 
unexpected and unanticipated policy reform that extended the maximum duration of job 
protected and paid parental leave by twelve months for all eligible mothers giving birth 
on July 1, 1990 or afterwards. Employed women having a child before this cut-off date 
were only eligible for job protected and paid parental leave until the child‘s first 
birthday. The reform had a strong impact on the time new mothers stayed at home with 
their children before returning to work since (a) female labour force participation in 
Austria in 1990 was already comparatively high
88
, (b) most employed women generally 
satisfied the eligibility criteria, (c) take-up rates were extremely high and (d) most 
mothers exhausted the full duration of their leave entitlements (about 80 percent of 
mothers) (Lalive and Zweimüller 2009; Lalive, Schlosser, Steinhauer and Zweimüller 
2010). However, although the reform caused mothers to substantially delay their return 
to work in the short-run, it did not adversely affect medium- or long-run employment 
and earnings of mothers (Lalive and Zweimüller 2009; Lalive, Schlosser, Steinhauer 
and Zweimüller 2010). 
The aim of this chapter is to assess the reduced form or intention-to-treat effect 
of this twelve-months expansion of paid and job-protected parental leave for mothers on 
the cognitive skills of their children at age 15, measured by test scores from 
standardized assessments in mathematics, reading and scientific literacy from the 
international PISA study (Programme for International Student Assessment). The main 
empirical strategy is based on a Difference-in-Differences (DID) design which exploits 
the variation in the duration of parental leave created by the specific cut-off date of the 
reform. Specifically, differences in average test scores of children born shortly before 
and shortly after the reform (born in May/June 1990 versus July/August 1990 
respectively) are compared with the test score differences in a control year in which 
there was no reform (children born in May/June 1987 versus July/August 1987). The 
inclusion of an additional pre-reform control year is motivated by the fact that outcome 
                                                          
88
 More than 70 percent among 20 to 40 year old women on average and even more than 80 percent for 
women with post-secondary education (see also Section 4.4.2). 
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comparisons across birth months within a given year could be confounded by season of 
birth or simple age effects (older children being more potentially advantaged at any 
given test date; see, for instance, Bedard and Dhuey 2006). However, as long as these 
underlying seasonality or age effects are constant over time, the DID approach will 
difference these out and estimate the true effect of the reform.  
This study contributes to the existing literature in several ways: First, it adds to 
the few pieces of evidence on the causal relationship between maternal employment in 
the first years of the child‘s life and the child‘s cognitive development identified 
through exogenous reductions in maternal employment. Second, the analysis sheds light 
on this cognitive effect in a country where most non-parental child care of under three-
year-olds is provided informally by grandparents or other relatives instead of formal day 
care centres (in contrast to countries like Sweden and Denmark where children 
participate in formal care-centres already at very young ages). Against this background, 
the reform most likely caused a replacement of informal care through maternal care, 
which might have different implications than switching from formal to maternal care 
(the possible role of different types of child care is discussed in more detail in Section 
4.2.2). Third, the length of the paid extension, i.e. 12 months, is much larger than in the 
above mentioned comparable studies using quasi-experimental designs and might thus 
have a stronger impact on child outcomes. Moreover, only a few papers have assessed 
the effect of maternal care during the child‘s second year of life. Fourth, in contrast to 
the study for Germany by Dustmann and Schönberg (2010) which comes closest to the 
Austrian case in terms of cultural and institutional background, this analysis contains 
information on parental background and can thus distinguish between heterogeneous 
effects across subgroups. Fifth, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first empirical 
evaluation of the causal link between parental leave and child outcomes in Austria. 
The empirical analysis produces several results: The overall effect of prolonged 
parental leave on test scores for the pooled sample of all children is close to zero and 
statistically insignificant. The subgroup analyses by maternal education and child 
gender yield inconclusive results. Although the main DID estimations indicate a strong 
and positive effect for children (especially for boys) of highly educated mothers a 
critical sensitivity analysis casts doubts on the robustness of these findings. 
Unfortunately, data limitations prevent a final assessment of whether these ambiguous 
results are caused by a violation of the common trend assumption.  
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The chapter is organized as follows: the next section introduces the underlying 
theoretical framework and reviews findings from previous empirical studies aiming at 
identifying the causal effect of early maternal employment on child outcomes in quasi-
experimental approaches. This is followed by an overview of the institutional 
background in Section 4.3. The section includes details of the Austrian reform as well 
as a summary of findings from previous studies which evaluated this reform with 
respect to labour market and fertility outcomes. Section 4.4 explains the identification 
strategy and discusses critical assumptions and empirical challenges. Section 4.5 
introduces the data set and describes the included outcome and control variables. The 
results of the main specification are presented and discussed in Section 0, while Section 
4.7 contains several robustness checks and sensitivity analyses. Section 4.8 concludes 
with a critical and comparative summary of the empirical findings. 
4.2 Parental Leave, Maternal Employment and Child Development  
4.2.1 The role of maternal employment in the cognitive ability production 
function  
Since the formation of human capital during childhood is a very complex 
process it is helpful to structure the discussion and analysis of potential effects of 
maternal employment on child outcomes along the lines of an underlying cognitive 
ability production function of the following type, where Yit denotes a measure of 
cognitive ability of child i at age t (a similar formulation has been used, for instance, by 
Bernal 2008, Bernal and Keane 2011, and Dustmann and Schönberg 2010). 
                                                                         (4.1) 
According to this framework the cognitive ability of child i at age t is 
determined by several input factors, namely (T) maternal (parental) time investment up 
through age t, (G) inputs in the form of market-purchased goods and services other than 
non-parental child care (depending on income of parents; examples are quality of 
housing, additional educational material, nutrition, health expenditure), (C) time 
investment through non-parental caregivers (i.e. time in non-parental child care), (F) 
any direct effect of family composition, e.g. number of siblings (interaction between 
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siblings; quantity-quality trade-off), birth order
89
, time intervals between siblings
90
, (P) 
public investments in children and child development (e.g., early child development 
programmes, public child care facilities and schools, state child health programmes and 
health insurance) and (  ) an idiosyncratic ability endowment, e.g., through 
intergenerational transmission of genes. As the function differentiates between different 
child ages it allows for varying effects of certain inputs at particular stages of child 
development. 
Obviously, families cannot increase all input factors at the same time due to 
monetary and time budget constraints. In particular, when analysing the role of maternal 
employment within this framework, there is a clear trade-off between maternal time 
investment and maternal earned income which could be used to buy market-based 
inputs. Furthermore, it is possible that the reduction in maternal time inputs of working 
mothers can be at least partly compensated by the input of other goods (e.g., health 
investments, better nutrition) or by higher quality time investments of other caregivers 
(high income parents might be able to afford better quality child care). However, it 
should be noted that the time-income trade-off can be mitigated to the extent that 
mothers receive compensating maternal leave payments while being on parental leave.  
The general provision or existence as well as the amount of such payments vary 
substantially across countries. In Austria at the beginning of the 1990s, mothers on 
parental leave received a monthly flat payment of approximately one third of the 
median female earnings (see Section 4.3.1). When assessing the importance of potential 
income losses related to leave periods after childbirth, it is crucial to consider not only 
short-term income losses due to absence from work during parental leave, but also 
potential long-term reductions in earnings which could result from human capital 
depreciation and/or increased difficulties in finding an employment after a prolonged 
leave period that exceeded the period of legal job protection.  
                                                          
89
 Using a rich data set from Norway, Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2005) find that an increasing 
number of siblings leads to a reduction of average ‗child quality‘ (i.e. educational attainment). However, 
the within-household analysis reveals that the negative ‗family size effect‘ is distributed unevenly across 
siblings and that children of higher birth order are more adversely affected. 
90
 A recent study from Sweden uses exogenously determined changes in spacing between births and finds 
that shorter spacing (within 24 months) has a detrimental effect on child outcomes (Pettersson-Lidbom 
and Skogman Thoursie 2009). Buckles and Munnich (2011) use instrumental variables to correct for the 
endogeneity of the time interval between births and find that test scores of older siblings are lower when 
spacing between siblings is smaller (preliminary findings based on US data from the NLSY79 Children 
and Young Adults Survey). In contrast to these results, an earlier study from the Netherlands finds no 
effect of the length of the time interval between births on cognitive child outcomes (Belmont, Stein and 
Zybert 1978). 
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Further refinements of the categories of input factors in the cognitive ability 
production function allow a more differentiated discussion help to explain potential 
heterogeneity across subgroups. For instance, Blau and Grossberg (1992) disaggregate 
parental time into ‗quantity of maternal time‘ and ‗quality of parental time‘ where 
higher quality of time also leads to better child outcomes. Interestingly, in their analysis 
‗quality of parental time‘ is proxied by a measure of verbal ability and mother‘s and 
father‘s education. A direct effect of higher education on quality of time and child care 
could be explained through better access to knowledge and application of methods to 
foster child development, for instance. In their analysis, Blau and Grossberg (1992) take 
quality of parental time as given; however, it is possible that working parents 
endogenously adjust the quality of time with their children in response to their working 
hours to compensate for foregone time with children. On the other hand, if parents are 
stressed and exhausted after work, they may have only limited capacities to spend as 
much ‗quality time‘ with and pay as much attention to their children as they would like 
to or as might be beneficial for the children (Baum II 2003). This aspect of endogenous 
quality of parental time cannot be properly addressed in most empirical analyses due to 
the lack of measures of actual quality of parental time. Analogously, the unobservable 
quality of non-parental child care, i.e. the relative quality of time investment from 
alternative caregivers in comparison with maternal care, is also likely to affect child 
development (Bernal 2008; Bernal and Keane 2011). There is likely to be substantial 
variation in the quality of child care not only through differences across formal 
childcare centres, but also through quality differences across alternative forms of child 
care: formal (accredited) versus informal child care, informal child care by relatives 
versus non-relatives. It seems reasonable to believe that the availability and quality of 
certain types of child care is likely to play an important role as an intermediating factor 
for the effect of maternal employment on child outcomes as these determine the relative 
quality of maternal and non-maternal child care. If quality of non-parental child care is 
positively correlated with child care costs, then access to high quality day care centres is 
likely to be unequally distributed across families with different levels of income. 
Certainly, a reduction in early maternal employment after childbirth through 
extended parental leave entitlements allows mothers to spend more time with their 
children than otherwise. Several potential mechanisms through which increased 
maternal time might positively affect child development have been put forward in the 
existing literature. One major channel put forward in most studies is prolonged 
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breastfeeding, particularly during the child‘s first year of life, which is claimed to lead 
to better health outcomes of children (see critical discussion in Baker and Milligan 
2008). 91  Increased maternal care time might furthermore positively influence health 
outcomes of children and thus their cognitive development through better monitoring 
ability of their health status and more timely doctor visits (see Berger, Hill and 
Waldfogel 2005 and studies cited therein), through more time for healthier meal 
preparation and house cleaning or lower risk of injuries and infectious disease (Morrill 
2011). Early maternal employment, especially when exceeding 10 hours per week, 
might also negatively influence the attachment of mother and child and might lead to 
behavioural problems of the child (Brooks-Gunn, Han and Waldfogel 2002). Moreover, 
it is possible that exhausting market-based work leaves mothers not only with less time, 
but also with less energy for stimulating and nurturing child care to foster cognitive 
child development (lower quality home environment for cognitive development) (Ruhm 
2004; Waldfogel, Han and Brooks-Gunn 2002). Conversely, a prolonged absence from 
work might raise the risk of social detachment and of depressions by mothers who stay 
at home, which in turn lowers the quality of maternal time and might have adverse 
effects for the children (Baum II 2003). 
It should be noted that the above arguments and derived hypotheses from this 
simplified framework are implicitly holding the partner‘s labour supply and child care 
input constant. This assumption is less restrictive in countries where the bulk of parental 
child care is traditionally supplied by the mother and family life follows the ‗male 
bread-winner model‘. However, a more sophisticated analysis could furthermore take 
into account the joint labour force decision of the couple as well as the role of 
potentially endogenous paternal time investments.   
4.2.2 Empirical evidence on the causal effect of maternal employment and 
cognitive child outcomes based on changes in parental leave legislations 
While the relationship between maternal employment and cognitive child 
development has received a lot of attention in the literature, in recent years the research 
question has been revisited with the objective to identify the causal effect of maternal 
employment by exploiting exogenous variations in maternal employment generated by 
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 However, although Baker and Milligan (2008) find a significant impact of prolonged parental leave 
entitlements on breastfeeding duration in Canada, most of their results do not reveal any positive health 
effects for children. 
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changes in statutory parental leave entitlements. Table 4-1 provides a summary of these 
papers focusing on the main features of the respective reforms and those empirical 
results which are most relevant for the present study. All these studies have as a 
common starting point an unexpected extension of the granted parental leave duration 
which significantly increased the time mothers stayed at home before returning to work 
after childbirth. Furthermore, almost all studies are able to implement either a 
Difference-in-Difference or a Regression Discontinuity estimation strategy as most of 
the reforms were implemented with a sharp cut-off date that strictly determined 
mothers‘ eligibility to extended leave periods (only in Sweden the 90-days extension 
was gradually phased in over a period of three months). Against the background of the 
theoretical considerations regarding the potentially adverse effects of early maternal 
employment on child development (as well as on maternal health), it seems surprising 
that most of these studies find either no or only negligible effects of prolonged parental 
leave on cognitive child outcomes. The only exception is the analysis by Carneiro, 
Løken and Salvanes (2010) for Norway: based on a sample of mothers who were 
eligible for parental leave, the authors find significant positive effects of prolonged 
maternal time at home during the child‘s first year on medium-run schooling 
achievement, IQ measures and height. The effects seem to be even stronger for children 
of mothers with low educational attainment. Interestingly, the Norwegian study is 
unique in that it can distinguish between children of eligible and ineligible mothers. The 
authors demonstrate that results become insignificant as in the other studies when 
children of all mothers irrespective of their eligibility and affectedness are included in 
the estimation sample.
92
 
The findings by Liu and Nordstrom Skans (2010) for Sweden stand in contrast 
to the empirical results for Norway: although the average effect for the pooled sample is 
statistically not significantly different from zero, it appears that children of better-
educated mothers having at least some tertiary education have benefited from the reform 
and perform better in nationally administered tests. Hence, while in Norway the effect 
of maternal leave on child outcomes is positive for children from lower-educated 
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 When running estimations on the whole population of eligible and ineligible mothers, it will be the 
more difficult to detect the actual effect of the reform on child outcomes the larger the group of non-
eligible mothers who do not change their return-to-work behaviour in response to the policy change. This 
is related to the fact that the effect will be averaged over the entire population and not over the actually 
affected subgroup. 
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mothers, results for Sweden imply that especially children from better-educated mothers 
have benefited from the reform.  
In order to reconcile the seemingly contradictory evidence of zero effects and 
positive effects for separate subgroups it is important to pay attention to the essential 
differences between these studies which complicate straightforward comparisons. The 
analyses vary predominantly with respect to:  
(1) The affected age group of children: Does the particular extension of 
parental leave allow women to stay at home longer during the first year of 
life (e.g., an extension from 8 to 12 months) or does it affect the period 
when the child is more than two years old? This point is highly relevant if 
the importance of maternal care varies over the different development 
stages of the child. 
(2) The length of the extension: The analysed parental leave extensions vary 
between six weeks and 18 months. The granted length of the extension is 
likely to influence the additional time that mothers stay home. If there is a 
positive effect of maternal time on child outcomes and this effect is 
increasing with time input, then one would expect differential effects 
depending on leave duration.   
(3) The measure of cognitive development and age at its measurement: While 
some studies focus on short-run effects measured before the first birthday 
(parent-reported assessments or psychological tests), others compare 
medium- or long-term outcomes up to age 29 (e.g., using completed 
educational attainment). On the one hand, it is possible that initial 
differences in early cognitive development might be mitigated, for 
instance, through special education or development programmes over the 
life course. On the other hand, it could be that particular inequalities in the 
very early stages of life persist over time or are even aggravated 
(cumulative effect of an early negative ‗shock‘). Furthermore, different 
types of measures of cognitive development might generate different 
results if they a) capture different aspects or types of cognitive skills 
(verbal versus mathematical skills), b) are designed for a particular age 
(e.g., ‗Number Knowledge Test‘ for four year-olds versus high school 
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grade point average), or c) differ in their precision or level of aggregation 
(e.g., educational attainment categories versus standardized test scores). 
(4) Different institutional environments: There are strong differences across 
countries (and over time) in terms of prevailing non-parental child care 
arrangements (formal centre-based or informal care by relatives) which 
determines the type of care likely to be substituted by prolonged maternal 
care. In fact, there might be in addition an interaction effect of the 
institutional environment and of the initial parental leave length (i.e., if the 
pre-reform leave lasted only 3 months mothers might have used different 
types of child care than if the initial leave lasted already 18 months, which 
could be related to minimum age requirements in formal day-care 
facilities).   
(5) The type of the reforms and their indirect effects on other supposedly 
relevant determinants of child outcomes like income and fertility: e.g., 
does the reform expand the duration of fully, partly and/or unpaid leave? 
These indirect effects could alter the (opportunity) costs of children and 
also enhance or change the ‗quantity-quality‘ trade-off. 
(6) The precision of the data and the estimations: Can eligible mothers be 
identified (only possible in the Norwegian study) or can children be linked 
to parents? Are the studies based on representative surveys or huge 
administrative datasets? 
(7) The estimation strategies: the exact implementation of the DID and RD 
estimations differs across studies as do the control groups. 
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Table 4-1: Studies using changes in parental leave legislations to identify causal effects of maternal employment on child outcomes 
Publication 
(Authors 
and Year) 
Country and 
Data Source 
Year & Substance of PL reform  Assessed child 
outcome(s) 
(Short/Medium/Long 
run effects) 
Main 
empirical 
method 
Results on 
effect of 
reform on 
child 
outcomes 
Heterogenous 
effects 
Institutional 
background: 
provision of 
child care 
Baker and 
Milligan 
(2010a) 
Canada: 
National 
Longitudinal 
Study 
of Children and 
Youth 
(NLSCY); about 
2,000 children 
per cohort 
 December 31, 2000 
 Maximum duration of maternity 
leave benefits raised from 25 to 
50 weeks (out of which 10 and 
respectively 35 weeks can be 
claimed by either mother or 
father) 
 Pre-reform job protected 
maternity leave varied between 
18 and 70 weeks across regions. 
Post-reform maternity leave 
duration increased to at least 52 
weeks in all regions. 
SR effects: 
 Children between 7 
and 24 months 
 Parent-reported 
measures of 
temperament, motor 
and social 
development 
Test of 
differences 
between 
average 
outcomes 
of birth 
cohorts 
born before 
and after 
the reform; 
(regressions 
based on 
six yearly 
values) 
 Overall small 
and mostly 
insignificant 
effects on the 
development 
variables 
 Not tested  Centre-
based care 
for children 
under 12 
(24) months 
very low (4 
% and 6 %) 
 Mainly 
informal 
care (about 
39% and 
41%) 
 
Baker and 
Milligan 
(2010b) 
Canada: 
National 
Longitudinal 
Study 
of Children and 
Youth 
(NLSCY); about 
2,000 children 
per cohort 
 See Baker and Milligan (2010a) SR effects: 
 At ages 4 or 5 
 Cognitive 
development (e.g., 
Peabody Picture 
Vocabulary or 
Number Knowledge 
Test) 
 Parent-reported 
behavioural 
development (e.g., 
hyperactivity) 
See Baker 
and 
Milligan 
(2010a) 
 No 
significant 
positive 
effects  
 None 
(No 
differences 
by child 
gender or 
parental 
education) 
See Baker and 
Milligan 
(2010a) 
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Carneiro, 
Løken and 
Salvanes 
(2010) 
Norway: 
Administrative 
register data on 
schooling and 
family events 
and military 
records (linked 
child-parent  
data)  
 July 1, 1977 
 Introduction of paid PL for 18 
weeks (4.5 months) with 100% 
income replacement as well as 
extension of unpaid PL from 3 to 
12 months (on top of paid PL) 
[de facto increase in PL take-up 
from 8 to 12 months] 
MR & LR effects: 
 Dropout rates from 
high school 
(measured at age 29) 
 College attendance 
(measured at age 29) 
 IQ (males aged 18-
19) 
 Teenage pregnancy 
(females with birth 
before age 20) 
 Height (males aged 
18-19) 
Non-
parametric 
RD (1977 
cohort; 
local linear 
regression) 
and non-
parametric 
RD-DID 
(cohorts 
1977 and 
1975) 
 Significant, 
positive 
effect on 
high school 
graduation, 
college 
attendance 
and IQ (for 
males) for 
sample of 
eligible 
mothers 
 Insignificant 
effects when 
including 
ineligible 
mothers 
 Yes, stronger 
positive 
effects for 
children 
from  
households 
with lower 
maternal 
education 
(less than 10 
years of 
schooling) 
 No 
differences 
by child 
gender or 
pre-birth 
household 
income 
 Extremely 
low 
enrolment 
rates of 
zero- to 
two-year-
olds in 
public child 
care in 
1977; 
mainly 
informal 
child care 
through 
relatives  
Dustmann 
and 
Schönberg 
(2010) 
Germany:  
Administrative 
data on public 
schools in three 
federal states 
(information on 
type of school/ 
track and 
graduation); 
social security 
data on 
educational 
attainment  
 Three reforms: 1979, 1986, 1992 
 May 1, 1979:  
Extension of paid+job protected 
PL (flat rate) from 2 to 6 months 
 January 1, 1986:  
Extension of paid+job protected 
PL (flat rate up to month 6; 
means-tested from month 7 to 
10) from 6 to 10 months  
 January 1, 1992: 
Extension of unpaid job 
protected PL from 18 to 36 
months (maternity leave 
payments up to month 18) 
MR & LR effects: 
 1979 reform: wages 
and educational 
attainment at age 28 
or 29 
 1986 reform: 
Graduation from 
academic track 
(before age 20) 
 1992 reform: Choice 
of school track at 
age 14 (8th grade) 
(most/medium/least 
academic track) 
DID and 
TS-2SLS  
(RD and 
RD-DID as 
robustness 
check) 
 No 
significant 
effects or 
only 
extremely 
small 
positive 
effects 
 Effect of 
expansion of 
18 to 36 
months even 
slightly 
negative  
 Not tested Enrolment in 
formal day 
care centres 
low (5% for 
under 18-
months-olds); 
Child care 
mainly 
informal 
through 
grandparents 
or other 
relatives  
(29 %) 
  
1
6
2
 
Liu and 
Nordstrom 
Skans 
(2010) 
Sweden: 
Administrative 
register data  
 August–October  1988 
 Extension of paid PL benefits 
from 12 to 15 months 
 Gradual extension by 30 days in 
each of three consecutive months 
in 1988: 1st of 
August/September/October  
MR effects: 
 Test scores from 
national tests during 
last year of 
compulsory school 
 Compulsory school 
grades (GPA scores) 
scores at age 16 
OLS 
regression 
of child 
outcomes 
on legal 
number of 
PL months 
(according 
to birth 
month of 
child)  
 Average 
effect on 
child 
outcomes is 
insignificant 
 Positive 
effect for 
well-
educated 
mothers 
(some 
tertiary 
education) 
 No 
differences 
between 
boys and 
girls  
Established 
public child 
care system: 
40-50% of 
children aged 
1-2 in formal 
day care or 
family centres; 
only few 
children in 
informal care 
Würtz 
Rasmussen 
(2010) 
Denmark: 
Administrative 
register data 
(linked child-
parent data);  
PISA 2000 
 March 26, 1984 
 Extension of paid PL from 14 to 
20 weeks 
 
MR effects: 
 High school 
enrolment 
 High school GPA 
 Reading test scores of 
15-years old children 
(PISA test in 2000) 
RD  
(DID as 
robustness 
check) 
 No 
significant 
effects 
 None 
(No 
differences 
by child 
gender or 
parental 
education) 
Publicly 
subsidized 
day care 
system even 
for very 
young 
children 
available 
Notes: PL – Parental leave; RD – Regression Discontinuity; DID – Difference-in-Difference; TS-2SLS – Two-Sample Two-Stage-Least-Squares; IV – Instrumental Variables; 
GPA – Grade Point Average; SR/MR/LR – short-run/medium-run/long-run effects 
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For instance, consider the seemingly contradictory findings for Norway and 
Sweden: one has to keep in mind that the Norwegian study focuses on a reform 
affecting leave taking between month 8 and 12 after childbirth and considers long-term 
schooling outcomes at ages 18 to 29 (e.g. high school drop-out rates). Furthermore, the 
predominant type of child care for children of the relevant age group was mainly 
informal (through relatives), suggesting a substitution effect of the reform from care by 
relatives to maternal care (at least relatively more maternal care compared to the 
situation before the reform in families combining both types of care). The Swedish 
reform affected children at a later stage of development, aged 12 to 15 months and the 
later observed child outcomes are test scores of national tests and grades in certain 
subjects during the last year of compulsory school (age 16). In contrast to the 
Norwegian scenario, almost half of Swedish children aged 1 to 2 during the time of the 
reform were in public day-care and informal child care arrangements were very 
uncommon. Hence, the positive effect for children of well-educated mothers in Sweden 
might be related to a substitution of public day care with maternal care and the 
possibility that well-educated mothers provide comparatively better quality care for 
their children than public institutions, which might not be the case for less educated 
mothers (Liu and Nordstrom Skans 2010).
93
  
On the other hand, the authors of the study for Norway conjecture that the 
reform resulted in a replacement of informal care through maternal care with positive 
effects on all children, but seemingly more pronounced effects for children of lower 
educated mothers (Carneiro, Løken and Salvanes 2010). Moreover, their findings are in 
line with results from Bernal and Keane (2011) who show that only increased informal 
child care (i.e., non-centre based child care by grandparents or other relatives) has 
adverse effects on the cognitive development of children of single mothers in the USA, 
while an additional year of centre-based child care has no negative effects. Bernal and 
Keane (2011) relate their results to other empirical studies
94
 providing evidence for 
negative effects of informal child care by grandparents on cognitive child development 
and summarize the two possible main channels for this adverse effect: (a) trained, well-
                                                          
93
 Generally, parents can combine different types of child care and it is also possible that the reform 
helped parents to combine different types of child care more efficiently.  
94
 Bernal and Keane (2011) refer to two studies from the UK from Hansen and Hawkes (2009) and Gregg, 
Washbrook, Propper and Burgess (2005). However, the evidence from Hansen and Hawkes (2009) 
regarding the effects of child care by grandparents is mixed and depends on the outcome (the study finds 
negative behavioural effects, especially for boys). 
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educated personnel in day centres could generate better cognitive stimulation for 
children and (b) there might be positive effects through interactions between children as 
well as increased educational activities fostering cognitive development. Similar results 
are found by Datta Gupta and Simonsen (2010) for Denmark who exploit regional 
differences in excess demand and waiting lists for child care: while participation in 
centre-based care with highly qualified personnel does not have detrimental effects on 
non-cognitive child outcomes in comparison with home-based care, family day care (in 
private homes by one child minder) has negative effects on non-cognitive outcomes, 
especially for boys from less educated mothers. 
To sum up, the institutional background and the details of the reforms vary 
widely across countries and seem to play an important role for the effect of parental 
leave on child outcomes. In terms of institutional and cultural set-up, Austria comes 
closest to Germany, while the type of reform (paid leave extension between the child‘s 
first and second birthday) is more similar to the evaluated reform in Sweden where, 
however, participation rates of one- to two-year-olds in formal child care are very high. 
Nevertheless, the reform in Sweden led only to a three months extension of parental 
leave, while in Austria the extension comprised 12 months. This way the analysis in this 
chapter helps to shed more light on the influence of maternal employment beyond the 
child‘s first birthday when formal day care for this age group is generally not available. 
Furthermore, the Austrian reform is unique in that it involves an exceptionally long 
extension of paid parental leave. 
4.2.3 Heterogenous effects 
Some of the quasi-experimental studies mentioned in the previous section have 
also investigated in more detail whether maternal employment has differential impacts 
across population subgroups, focusing in particular on the level of the mother‘s 
educational attainment and child gender. As Table 4-1 indicates, there are no universally 
consistent patterns across these studies with respect to maternal education. While most 
papers do not find any differences in the impact between children of more versus less 
educated mothers, the Norwegian study finds more pronounced effects for children of 
lower educated mothers and the Swedish results indicate positive results for better 
educated mothers (as has been discussed in the previous section).  
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In terms of child gender, none of the four papers who run separate regressions 
for girls and boys detect any significant differences regarding the effect of prolonged 
maternal leave. In contrast, several previous studies from other strands of literature 
suggest that maternal employment has a stronger detrimental effect on boys as 
compared to girls, which is partly explained by the fact that boys seem to be more 
‗vulnerable to early stressors‘ and to react more adversely to non-maternal child care 
(Brooks-Gunn, Han and Waldfogel 2002).
95
 These negative effects are also supported 
by papers assessing the effect on health outcomes (see next paragraph).
96
 
4.2.4 Maternal employment and health outcomes of children 
As mentioned before in Section 4.2.1, maternal employment might affect 
cognitive development of children also through its effect on health outcomes. There is a 
complementary literature on the relationship between early maternal employment and 
health outcomes of children. These studies face the same identification problem since a 
mother‘s return-to-work decision might be driven by unobserved factors like poor 
health of their children. Three recent studies specifically accounting for the non-random 
selection of mothers into employment by using quasi-experimental and instrumental 
variables approaches are Baker and Milligan (2008) for Canada as well as Gennetian, 
Hill, London and Lopoo (2010) and Morrill (2011) for the USA. While the Canadian 
study finds strong effects of prolonged parental leave on breastfeeding duration, there 
are generally no positive health effects on self-reported maternal or child health. In 
contrast to these findings are the two studies from the US: using age-based kindergarten 
eligibility for the youngest child as instrumental variable for maternal employment, 
Morrill (2011) finds that children of working mothers have a greater risk of suffering 
from adverse health events (overnight hospitalization, asthma episodes, injury and 
poisoning) and that the negative effect is twice as large for boys than for girls (the effect 
for the subsample of girls is even insignificant). Gennetian et al. (2010) correct for the 
endogenous work decision of the mother by using the experimental design of a welfare-
                                                          
95
 In addition, there is evidence from Denmark that informal or less qualitative day care has particularly 
detrimental effects on boys (Datta Gupta and Simonsen 2010). 
96
 General gender differences in schooling or particular types of cognitive skills (e.g., language versus 
mathematical skills) might be related to underlying genetic or cultural differences (Guiso, Monte, 
Sapienza, and Zingales 2008; Machin and Pekkarinen 2008). Furthermore, there is evidence for ‗son 
preferences‘ leading to unequal treatment of sons and daughters with potentially long-term adverse effects 
for girls (although this phenomenon is generally associated with developing countries, Mammen (2011) 
shows that fathers in the USA spend more time with sons than with daughters).   
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to-work programme which increased the share of mothers working without affecting 
household income resources (income from the welfare programme was replaced by 
earned income from market based work). The results imply a negative effect of maternal 
employment on child health outcomes in low-income families measured at age five to 
nine; again, this adverse effect seems stronger for boys than for girls. 
4.3 Institutional setting and background 
This section describes in detail the content and timeline of the reform of the 
parental leave legislation in 1990 and gives an overview of the institutional background 
regarding the development of maternal employment as well as child care in Austria over 
time. 
4.3.1 Parental Leave in Austria and the Reform in 1990  
 
4.3.1.1 The development of parental leave in Austria 
The history of parental leave in Austria dates back to 1957 when working 
women became entitled to an unpaid, but job protected leave of up to six months on top 
of the paid mandatory maternity leave of 12 weeks, making Austria the first country in 
Europe to introduce parental leave (Neyer 2003). Since that time childbirth related leave 
from work in Austria comprises two parts: a mandatory maternity leave and an optional 
parental leave. 
4.3.1.2 Mandatory Maternity Leave 
The length of the mandatory maternity leave was raised from 12 to 16 weeks in 
1974 (Hoem, Prskawetz and Neyer 2001b). More specifically, according to the 
Maternity Protection Act (Mutterschutzgesetz) employed women are not allowed to 
work during the last 8 weeks before the expected birth date and 8 weeks after delivery 
(this period extends up to 12 weeks for multiple or premature births or Caesarean 
sections).
97
 While being on leave women receive a ‗maternity pay‘ (Wochengeld) which 
equals 100 percent of the average net earnings of the preceding 13 weeks. Furthermore, 
during pregnancy and until 4 months after delivery, women are subject to a special 
employment protection and cannot be dismissed by their employer. This period of 
                                                          
97
  Before 1974 the length of the mandatory maternity leave was only 12 weeks. 
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employment protection is further extended, if the mother takes parental leave 
immediately after the mandatory maternity leave (job protection until 4 weeks after 
returning to work).
98
 
4.3.1.3 Parental leave before the reform in 1990 
After the introduction of optional unpaid parental leave in 1957 – this was in 
fact maternal leave, since fathers were not entitled to take leave – important 
amendments to the law followed in the years 1961, 1974 and 1990. In 1961 the maximal 
duration of job protected parental leave was extended up to the child‘s first birthday and 
mothers on leave became entitled to a cash benefit as long as their household income 
was below a certain threshold. The level of benefits equalled the level of unemployment 
benefits for single mothers and half the level of unemployment benefits for married 
mothers.
99
 To become eligible for parental leave payments women needed to be in 
employment subject to compulsory social insurance contributions for at least 52 weeks 
during the two years preceding the first birth (20 weeks during the most recent year for 
higher order births).
100
 Furthermore, special regulations on work requirements applied 
for mothers becoming pregnant while being on parental leave: if their expected birth 
date lay within 14 weeks (3.5 months) after the expiry of the previous parental leave 
period then their parental leave entitlement was renewed (automatic renewal; see 
discussion in Hoem, Prskawetz and Neyer (2001a) and Lalive and Zweimüller (2009). 
However, this required women to become pregnant six and a half months after their last 
birth and which was even biologically difficult to realize and hence uncommon.  
The work eligibility requirement for young mothers was subsequently reduced 
to 20 weeks during the last 12 months (the age criteria for ‗young mothers‘ was at 20 in 
1974 and was raised to 25 in 1989). 1974 saw important amendments to the law 
regarding cash benefits: the amount of cash benefits was uncoupled from household 
income by granting a flat rate benefit to all mothers on parental leave (single mothers 
and wives of no or low income earners received a 50 percent higher assistance). A 
subgroup of particularly disadvantaged mothers became entitled to special maternity 
                                                          
98
  See Law on Maternity Protection (Mutterschutzgesetz) as of March 2011, 
http://www.jusline.at/Mutterschutzgesetz_%28MSchG%29.html 
99
 The information on the parental leave in this section draws mainly on the timeline of changes in 
parental leave legislation provided in Austrian Family Report 1999, Volume I., chapter 12.2.3, and 
Volume II., chapter 3.3.2 (BMUJF 1999a, 1999b), and in Hoem et al. (2001b, Appendix C). 
100
 Periods during which women received unemployment benefits are counted towards these minimum 
work requirements. 
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leave payments (Sondernotstandshilfe) up to the child‘s third birthday (at first only 
single mothers, in 1990 married women in households with low or no income were 
added to this group). In 1982 farmers and self-employed mothers became eligible for up 
to 16 weeks of maternity flat rate transfer payments.  
4.3.1.4 Parental leave taking of fathers 
Fathers became eligible for the parental leave only as of January 1, 1990. 
However, their entitlement to parental leave was conditional on the mother meeting all 
eligibility criteria. The take-up rate of parental leave of fathers remained close to zero 
during the 1990s (from 0.2 percent in 1990 to 1 percent in 1997, see Table 4-2). These 
numbers demonstrate that parental leave taking was and is still almost exclusively 
relevant to working mothers.  
4.3.1.5 The parental leave reform in 1990 
The following empirical analysis will exploit a quasi-experiment that was 
created by the amendment to the parental leave legislation that came in effect on July 1, 
1990 (Karenzurlaubserweiterungsgesetz, June 27, 1990, BGBl. Nr. 408/1990). The 
main aspect of this reform was the extension of the maximal duration of the optional 
paid and job protected leave from the child‘s first up to the child‘s second birthday (see 
scheme in Figure 4-1). According to the law, this extension was only granted to mothers 
of children who were born on or after the cut-off date of July 1, 1990. There were no 
‗transition rules‘ allowing mothers who gave birth before July 1, 1990 to benefit from 
the new regulations. This increase of 12 months of paid and job protected parental leave 
is much larger than any of the comparable reforms that took place in other countries and 
that have been evaluated in terms of child outcomes (see Table 4-1). An important side 
effect of this extension by 12 months was that it became easier for families to get 
automatic renewal of parental leave: the maximum period between previous birth and 
conception of a future child that would grant automatic renewal was extended by one 
year (from 6.5 to 18.5 months). As described in more detail further below (see Section 
4.4.1), the reform was announced and implemented only shortly before it came into 
effect. This is why it was not possible for parents to adjust their fertility timing in order 
to take advantage of the more generous parental leave regime (i.e. there were no 
anticipatory fertility effects).  
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Figure 4-1: Parental leave entitlements before and after the reform on July 1, 1990  
 
Other changes that came into effect with this reform were the option of part-time 
leave between the child‘s first and second birthday if both parents took their leave 
simultaneously or up the third birthday if only one parent went on leave or the parents 
took the leave in turns. However, only a tiny fraction of mothers made use of this new 
possibility (less than 2 percent of all women on parental leave were on part-time leave 
in the years 1992-1994, see BMUJF 1999b, Vol. 2, Table 3.46c on page 157). 
Furthermore, the parental leave subsidy (Teilzeitbeihilfe) for farmers and self-employed 
amounting to half the regular flat-rate parental-leave payment was extended to the 
child‘s second birthday. This reduced parental leave subsidy became also available to 
employed mothers who did not meet the minimal work requirements.  
In 1990, the amount of the regular flat-rate parental leave payment was about 
340 Euros per month, which corresponded to 31 (40) percent of gross (net) median 
female earnings (Lalive and Zweimüller 2009).
101
 In 1996 the flat-rate benefits equalled 
about 35 percent of the average monthly net female earnings (BMUJF 1999b). Since 
the level of parental leave benefit was independent of previous earnings, the earnings 
replacement rate was much lower for mothers with high pre-birth earnings than for 
mothers with low pre-birth earnings. In other words, the associated income loss and 
opportunity costs of parental leave were higher for the former than for the latter group 
of mothers.  
                                                          
101
 According to a study by Fuchshuber (2006), which was conducted by order of the Austrian Federal 
Ministry for Health and Women to investigate potential career barriers and problems for female 
employees, some firms (in particular larger companies) tend to offer additional benefits for families 
(financial benefits or fringe benefits like child care facilities) or even special parental leave or job 
protection arrangements beyond the legally required minimum. Unfortunately, the report does not provide 
information on whether these benefits were already common in 1990. 
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Table 4-2: Statistics on the development of maternity and parental leave take-up between 1985 and 1997 
Year Number of 
women 
receiving 
mandatory 
maternity 
pay 
Parental 
leave, 1
st
 
year 
Parental 
leave, 2
nd
 
year 
Parental 
leave 
(yearly 
average) 
Parental 
leave 
(Dec 31) 
Parental 
leave, 
Men 
Parental 
leave, 
Women 
Share of 
fathers 
on 
parental 
leave 
(%) 
Number 
of births 
Children 
aged 0-1 
Children 
aged 1-2 
Share of 
women on 
mand. 
maternity 
leave in 
comparison 
to all births 
(%) 
Share of 
mothers 
on 1st 
year 
parental 
leave 
(%) 
 I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII*) XIII **) 
1985 60,505   37,601 38,440  37,601   82,970 87,906 89,176 72.9 51.3 
1986 60,412 
  
38,132 39,031 
 
38,132   83,176 87,004 88,158 72.6 52.6 
1987 60,500 
  
38,354 39,493 
 
38,354   81,996 86,625 87,357 73.8 53.1 
1988 61,688 
  
43,722 44,959 
 
43,722   83,326 87,298 87,099 74.0 60.1 
1989 62,477     44,357 45,876   44,357   84,095 88,534 88,063 74.3 60.1 
1990 65,223     46,328 48,897 83 46,244 0.2 85,110 89,932 89,412 76.6 61.8 
1991 71,637     59,868 83,039 328 59,540 0.5 90,499 92,573 90,971 79.2   
1992 73,256 n.a. n.a. 106,195 115,680 781 105,414 0.7 91,123 94,803 93,881 80.4   
1993 75,913 58,660 59,044 117,703 120,514 920 116,783 0.8 91,684 94,797 95,610 82.8 74.3 
1994 74,602 60,258 61,010 121,268 122,411 1,014 120,254 0.8 89,509 93,542 95,710 83.3 77.3 
1995 73,045 57,210 63,510 120,271 120,611 1,044 119,227 0.9 86,441 89,554 94,118 84.5 76.7 
1996 71,258 55,260 62,553 118,252 117,832 1,071 117,181 0.9 84,847 87,641 90,792 84.0 75.7 
1997   59,455 50,949 112,239 115,110 1,067 111,170 1.0           
Source: Austrian Family Report 1999 Vol. 2 (BMUJF 1999b), p. 152-157; Notes: *) own calculations based on (I) and (IX); **) numbers adjusted in the Austrian Family Report 
for the fact that official parental leave lasts only for 10 months during the child‘s first year of life as it only starts after two months of mandatory maternity leave. 
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4.3.1.6 Share of eligible mothers among all mothers 
Due to the steadily increasing age at first birth (from 25 years in 1990 to 29 
years in 2005; see Human Fertility Database) and high economic activity rates (73 and 
70 percent for 20-24 and respectively 25-29 year old women in 1991) the share of 
mothers meeting the eligibility criteria and being entitled to parental leave payments 
was already relatively high in 1990. A rough upper bound estimate of the share of 
mothers who were eligible for parental leave in 1990 is given by the share of mothers 
on mandatory maternity leave among all mothers (see column XII in Table 4-2). 
According to this calculation at most 76.6 percent of all mothers were eligible for 
parental leave in 1990 (the corresponding figure in 1987 is 73.8 percent).
 102
  
4.3.1.7 Take-up rates before and after the reform in 1990 
Already during the 1990s the take-up rates of eligible mothers were extremely 
high. Estimates range between 93 and 96 percent (Kreimer 2002). These numbers are 
also in line with the Austrian Family Report 1999, according to which the share of 
mothers returning to work immediately after the mandatory maternity leave and hence 
foregoing the option of parental leave was only about 5 percent (BMUJF 1999a). As 
regards the duration of take-up, only an extremely small fraction of eligible mothers 
returned to work before the end of their entitlement (Kreimer 2002). These high take-up 
rates as well as the fact that women made use of the full period can also be seen in 
Figure 4-2 that plots a time series of the monthly numbers of persons on parental leave 
and receiving parental leave pay between January 1991 and December 1993 
(unfortunately, this data is not available for earlier years).  
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 This calculation is in line with the indicator used in the Family Report of 1999 (BMUJF 1999b). 
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Figure 4-2: Numbers on take-up of parental leave as well as number of children 
over time showing the effect of the reform of July 1, 1990.  
 
Source: Persons on Parental Leave based on statistics from AMS (AMS, Public Employment Service 
Austria); Number of children: own calculations based on monthly birth records (Human Fertility 
Database). The number of children 0-1 (0-2) corresponds to the total of children born in the previous 10 
(22) months. 
 
 
Up to June 1991 the percentage of women on parental leave among all women 
who had given birth within the last year was about 65 percent (this number accounts for 
the fact that women appear in the statistics on parental leave for only 10 months). The 
first cohort of women who could remain on parental leave after the child‘s first birthday 
started their second leave year on July 1991 (12 months after the cut-off date). The 
figure demonstrates a steady inflow of mothers into the second leave year up to June 
1992, which was the final, 24th month of leave for the first cohort of women who were 
eligible for 24 month of parental leave. Starting from July 1992 the strong inflow into 
the stock of persons on parental leave stopped and the share of mothers on parental 
leave among all mothers with up to two-year-old children stabilized again at around 65 
percent (calculated using the adjusted numbers of birth in the preceding 2 years). After 
July 1992 the amount of women on parental leave continued to grow slightly due to the 
steadily rising number of eligible women (steady growth of female labour force 
participation and increasing age at first birth). Overall, the rise in the number of women 
on parental leave is approximately in line with the claim of high take-up rates of the 
extended leave duration: between June 1991 and June 1992 the monthly average 
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number of women on parental leave doubles from about 52.000 to 111.000 (the latter is 
the sum of mothers on ‗first year leave‘ and on ‗second year leave‘; the fact that the 
number more than doubles is related to the fact that there is a slight increase in number 
of children aged zero to two between these two points of time). 
4.3.2 Effects on subsequent maternal labour market success and fertility 
Previous studies investigating the effects of the 1990 parental leave extension 
have focused on outcomes and behavioural changes of new mothers, in particular their 
short- and medium-term labour market outcomes as well as their fertility behaviour.  
4.3.2.1 Short-term and medium-term effects on maternal employment 
The fact that the duration of the leave entitlement before and after the reform in 
Austria was actually binding and thereby exogenously determining the minimum length 
of leave take-up has been demonstrated by Lalive and Zweimüller (2009) and Lalive, 
Schlosser, Steinhauer and Zweimüller (2010). This result can be illustrated with Figure 
4-3 from Lalive and Zweimüller (2009): it depicts the proportion of pre- versus post-
reform mothers having returned to work at any time after giving birth to their first child. 
There are about ten percent of mothers who return to work immediately after the end of 
the mandatory maternity leave, i.e. two months after childbirth, and this pattern holds 
generally true before and after the reform. Both the dotted line for pre-reform mothers 
(June births) and the solid line for post-reform mothers (July births) reveal a jump of 
roughly 20 percentage points at the time when the legal leave entitlement expires (after 
12 months and 24 months respectively). This reaction at the end of the parental leave 
shows that the duration of job-protected and paid leave is binding and determining the 
work decisions of a large group of mothers. Nevertheless, the majority of mothers stay 
out of the labour force and do not return to work immediately after the parental leave 
has elapsed. The effect of the reform becomes visible when considering the share of 
women having returned to work after 23 months: while only about 20 percent of the 
post-reform mothers have returned to work after 23 months, the majority (around 55 
percent) of women having given birth under the old legislation have returned to work 
after 23 months; hence, the reduction in short-term re-entry (within 23 months) equals 
approximately 35 percentage points. After 24 months, i.e. after the end of the two year 
parental leave, post-reform mothers are still over 10 percent less likely than pre-reform 
mothers to have returned to work. After three years 62 out of 100 pre-reform mothers 
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have returned to work, whereas the same is only true for 52 out of 100 post-reform 
mothers. Although this gap in return-to-work rates between the two groups narrows 
slowly over time, post-reform mothers remain slightly less likely to have ever returned 
to work even after ten years (the difference amounts to three percentage points). 
Irrespective of the duration of the parental leave a substantial fraction of mothers do not 
return to work within ten years after giving birth (around 18 percent of post-reform 
mothers; the number for pre-reform mothers is only slightly lower).  
 
 Figure 4-3: Share of mothers returning to work after birth 
 
Source: Figure 5.B. taken from Lalive and Zweimüller (2009, p. 1387) 
 
Despite the substantial changes in return-to-work behaviour, there are no 
medium-term effects on alternative labour market outcomes like average number of 
months in employment or earnings per month (Lalive and Zweimüller 2009). Even 
though in the short-run post-reform mothers work significantly fewer months on 
average and have lower earnings than pre-reform mothers, there are no significant 
differences in these outcomes after ten years.    
Overall, the reform has had a significant impact on the time mothers take 
parental leave after birth. The average duration of parental leave take-up and receiving 
benefits (after mandatory maternity leave) increased from 10 to 20 months (Lalive, 
Schlosser, Steinhauer and Zweimüller 2010). Lalive and Zweimüller (2009, p. 1399-
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1340) conclude furthermore that ―most mothers exhaust the full duration of their leaves  
(sic); that return to work is substantially delayed even after PL [parental leave] has been 
exhausted‖. 
While Lalive and Zweimüller‘s (2009) analysis is limited to first births, results 
generally hold for higher order births as well. As Lalive et al. (2010) demonstrate, the 
parental leave extension had no significant medium-term effects (after five years) on 
employment probability, months worked per year, daily earnings or annual incomes of 
mothers with first or higher order births.  
Last but not least, it should be noted that mothers who gave birth after the 
extension of the parental leave experienced an income loss of about 3,200 Euros which,  
is caused almost exclusively by foregone earnings during the prolonged leave period 
and not by differential earnings developments after the expiration of the parental leave 
entitlements (Lalive et al. 2010). 
4.3.2.2 Effects on fertility behaviour (timing and completed fertility) 
Theoretical considerations as well as empirical evidence on the fertility effects 
of the reform are presented in the paper by Lalive and Zweimüller (2009). In their 
terminology, the overall impact of the reform on fertility was a combination of current-
child effect and future-child effect. The current-child effect relates to changes in fertility 
behaviour which, in combination with the 12 months leave extension, made it 
biologically more feasible for couples to take advantage of the prolonged automatic 
renewal period in case of a new pregnancy (the automatic renewal period increased 
from 15.5 to 27.5 months). The authors use the term future-child effect to refer to 
changes in fertility due to the reduced costs associated with giving birth under the new 
legislation with extended job protection and benefits (the more generous parental leave 
regulations affect the costs-and-benefits of future births as such). Their empirical 
analysis of the current-child effect is based on a comparison of short- and medium-term 
outcomes of treated and control mothers (giving birth to their first child in July 1990 or 
June 1990 respectively), who do not differ in pre-birth characteristics and who face 
similar labour market conditions but are subject to more or less generous parental leave 
regulations. The empirical approach basically resembles a fuzzy Regression 
Discontinuity Design, since eligibility to the extended leave period is based on a random 
assignment according to the cut-off date of childbirth, July 1, 1990 (the authors perform 
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several sensitivity checks and provide supporting material and facts for this and other 
underlying identifying assumptions). The estimation of the future child effect (the role 
of extended parental leave on future births) is based on a comparison of short-term 
outcomes from women giving birth in June 1990 versus June 1987 (both groups are 
subject to the same parental leave regulations of one year for the current child, but differ 
with respect to the length of parental leave granted for higher order births within the 
next three years).  
According to the analysis of Lalive and Zweimüller (2009), the reform had a 
strong and significant impact on fertility outcomes in the short (within three years after 
the previous birth) and medium-run (after ten years). The extended parental leave 
caused an increase in the probability of having a second child within three years after 
the previous birth by five percentage points (15 percent) due the current child effect and 
by seven percentage points (21 percent) due to the future child effect. These short run 
effects also translate into medium-run effects: after ten years post-reform mothers are 
three percent more likely to have given birth to another child than pre-reform mothers. 
A more detailed analysis of the timing effects reveals further interesting changes: the 
probability of giving birth within the first 16 months actually decreased. The overall 
positive effect in the three-year period is hence driven by the strong increase of the birth 
probability between month 17 and 28. In sum, while there is a significant decrease in 
the share of siblings born within a very short time interval (less than 16 months apart 
from each), the increase of the share of siblings whose age gap is between 17 to 28 
months is even larger leading to an overall reduction in spacing between births. Lalive 
and Zweimüller (2009) conclude from their findings that the 1990 reform not only 
affected the spacing between subsequent births (tempo or timing effect), but is likely to 
have actually increased completed fertility (quantum effect). Their results are robust to 
sensitivity and placebo checks (controlling for pre-birth characteristics; excluding births 
one week before and after the reform; running a placebo experiment using June 1987 
and July 1987).  
However, another study by Št‘astná and Sobotka (2009) who use data on 
individual, parity specific birth records and who also investigate the effect of the 1990 
parental leave extension on subsequent fertility behaviour, do not find any medium-term 
effects on total number of children within ten years after the reform. Nevertheless, this 
latter study confirms the findings by Lalive and Zweimüller (2009) on changes in 
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spacing between first and second births. It furthermore demonstrates that these changes 
apply to birth intervals between second and third births as well. More specifically, 
Št‘astná and Sobotka (2009) show that the extended leave period reduces the occurrence 
of very short birth intervals of 15 to 20 months and increases the share of births 
occurring after 21 to 26 months following the last birth. The difference between the two 
studies lies mainly in the different types of data and samples: while Lalive and 
Zweimüller (2009) extract the relevant fertility information from administrative Social 
Security records and is thus limited to a certain subpopulation of women (who ever 
were employed in jobs subject to social insurance contributions; public sector workers 
as well as self-employed and farmers are not included), the analysis by Št‘astná and 
Sobotka (2009) involves information on all live births by women residing in Austria and 
is thus comprehensive. However, since the reform in 1990 could by definition only 
affect working women, it is likely that the latter analysis provides less precise estimates 
(since it is based on working (=eligible) and non-working (=non-eligible) women). On 
the other hand, information on birth events constructed from the Social Security 
database could be also imperfect, since births occurring before the first job are not 
captured. 
One of the first studies to analyse the effect of the reform in 1990 on subsequent 
fertility was conducted by Hoem, Prskawetz and Neyer (2001a, 2001b). Using the 
Austrian Family and Fertility Survey from 1995/1996 to analyse trends and changes in 
third births in Austria from 1960 to 1996, they find that the July 1990 reform had a 
tempo effect on third births (at least in the short run), in the sense that the general trend 
towards postponement of third births was temporarily reversed. Since their analysis 
does not go beyond the year 1996 it is impossible to draw any conclusions regarding the 
persistence of this effect over time. Hoem, Prskawetz and Neyer (2001a, 2001b) 
attribute this narrowed spacing between second and third births to the implicit ‗speed 
premium‘ (automatic renewal period; waiver of employment requirements) of the new 
parental leave legislation. 
4.3.2.3 Heterogeneity of effects across population subgroups 
To test for differential reactions to the reform across subgroups, Lalive and 
Zweimüller (2009) run separate analyses for high and low wage earners (women 
earning above or below the median daily income one year before the birth) on the one 
hand and for white- and blue-collar occupations on the other hand. Both groups, high- 
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and low-wage mothers react to the extended leave period with higher fertility rates in 
the short term (within three years). However, mothers with low pre-birth wages react 
almost twice as strongly as mothers with high pre-birth wages: the probability of having 
an additional child within three years after giving birth increases by seven versus four 
percent respectively. Interestingly, a more detailed timing analysis reveals that high-
wage mothers respond by significantly reducing their very short-term fertility (within 16 
months after the previous birth), whereas this short-term postponement effect is much 
smaller for low-wage mothers. These group differences become even more pronounced 
when looking at the long-term fertility effect: while low-wage mothers have an excess 
fertility of five percent after ten years, there is no significant change in long-term 
fertility for high-wage mothers. Hence, high-wage mothers seem to have reacted to the 
extended leave period mainly by changing the spacing between births, while low-wage 
mothers have also increased the total number of births in the next ten years. Lalive and 
Zweimüller (2009) hypothesise that financial support during the parental leave period is 
supposedly more relevant to low income families by mitigating potential financial 
distress, whereas the job protection guarantee might be more relevant for career-
oriented women with higher wages and more specialized skills and higher costs of job 
lost. In contrast to these stark differences in fertility behaviour, there seem to be no 
differential effects on short- and medium-term labour market outcomes apart from a 
slightly stronger short-run earnings reduction for low-wage women. 
A different picture emerges when assessing differences between white- and 
blue-collar workers: both groups react quite similarly to the more generous leave 
regulations in terms of their short- and long-term fertility outcomes, even though white-
collar mothers tend to adjust their timing more than blue-collar mothers. Under the 
more generous parental leave regime a larger fraction of white-collar women has their 
second child already within 28 months after the last birth (within the prolonged 
automatic renewal period of now 28 months). However, white-collar workers tend to 
react more strongly to the reform than blue-collar workers in terms of labour market 
outcomes. Especially in the short-run, treated white-collar workers have lower earnings 
and are less likely to return to work than white-collar control mothers. And although in 
the long-run there are generally no effects for either of the occupation groups, white-
collar mothers have a slightly lower probability of having returned to work within ten 
years after giving birth (there are no differences in terms of long-term employment or 
earnings outcomes).  
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4.3.3 The availability and usage of formal and informal child care facilities 
4.3.3.1 Child care for children from 0-2 and 3-6 years of age 
The potential effect of maternal employment on child development depends 
crucially on the type and quality of care children are exposed to during the working 
hours of their mothers. Furthermore, the availability of centre-based or other forms of 
non-parental care (including care by relatives) for pre-school children generally 
facilitates the reconciliation of work and family life of parents and especially mothers 
and might therefore affect female labour force participation. This is why it is important 
to understand the extent of the availability and usage of child care in Austria around the 
time of the reform. Unfortunately, comprehensive child care information and in 
particular separate information by different types of child care – formal and informal – 
in Austria for the year 1990 or before is extremely scarce.  
 
Figure 4-4: Gross enrolment rates of zero- to two-year-olds in formal child care (% 
of children in respective age group) 
 
Notes: Gross enrolment rates of zero- to two-year-olds based on own calculations, dividing absolute 
numbers on children enrolled in formal child care by the sum of all births from the previous two years. 
Data sources: Statistik Austria (2010) and Human Fertility Database. 
 
Figure 4-4 depicts the development of the enrolment rate of children younger 
than three years of age using an indicator that was calculated based on information on 
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the number of births in the previous two years and enrolment numbers of zero- to two-
year-olds in kindergarten (children enter formal care and school typically in September). 
According to this measure only about 2.5 percent of this age group participated in 
formal child care.
103
 
Furthermore, there are official statistics on the provision of and participation in 
formal pre-school child care starting from 1995. While the numbers for zero- to two-
year-olds are low, enrolment rates of children aged three to six in formal childcare 
(Kindergarten) are much higher and rose over time (from around 70 percent in 1995 up 
to 85 percent in 2007, see Figure 4-5).
104
  
 
Figure 4-5: Share of children in institutional day care over time (average for 
Austria) 
 
Source: Data from Statistik Austria (2010). 
 
  
                                                          
103
 These numbers tend to be biased slightly downwards, since the denominator does not take into account 
infant mortality. However, the positive trend in the figure is not driven by changes in infant mortality.  
104
 Unfortunately these official statistics on enrolment in pre-school day care centers are only available 
starting from 1995. 
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Nevertheless, these rates are still below the 90 percent target rate set by the 
European Union for 2010 (Stanzel-Tischler and Breit 2009). The supply and usage of 
institutional child care for children under three years is even lower, but has traditionally 
been extremely low in Austria: in 1995 only 4.6 percent of children in this age group 
were registered in day care centres. Given the high Austrian female labour force 
participation rate it is not surprising that a survey in 1995 revealed excess demand for 
institutional day care for under three-year-olds (Dörfler 2004). Alternative enrolment 
figures of child care ratios stem from the micro census 1995 which collected 
information on overall external child care (institutional facilities as well as child 
minders or independent child groups). According to the micro census data, six percent 
of children under the age of three were in non-family day care, out of which about one 
third (36 percent) was provided through non-institutional child care arrangements 
(BSMUJ 1999a, p. 534). An OECD report (OECD 1989) provides numbers on 
enrolment rates in formal pre-primary education at age two in 1986/1987, i.e. before the 
parental leave reform: in Austria only 1.2 percent of the two-year-olds were enrolled in 
institutional care-centres, while in Norway and Finland the corresponding rates were 
20.8 and 21.1 percent respectively (however, these numbers do not include other, less 
education oriented institutions like day mothers, crèches, day-care centres as well as 
informal care).  
Apart from differences across age groups there is also a substantial variation in 
the proportion of children in institutional day care across regions in 1995 (see Figure 
4-6). The region with the highest share of under three-year-olds in day care centres, 
namely 16.9 percent, is Vienna, the Austrian capital and the only city in the country 
with more than one million inhabitants (about 1.5 million according to the 1991 
Census). The corresponding numbers of other regions of the country are much smaller 
and the day care shares ranged between 0.3 and 6.0 percent. Even though the overall 
ratio of children in formal care has increased over time this regional pattern has 
remained unchanged. 
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Figure 4-6: Share of children in institutional formal day care across regions in the 
year 1995 
 
 
Source: Data from Statistik Austria (2010). 
 
A special section on child care in the micro census from 2002 furthermore 
reveals that 9.8 percent of children under the age of three were enrolled in formal child 
care facilities (BSMG 2003). Within this group the highest fraction (40.4 percent) of 
children attended public pre-kindergarten child care (Kindergarten/Krippen), 21.9 
percent attended private kindergarten, 23.7 percent were looked after by day mothers 
and 8.3 percent attended play or child groups. 70.6 percent of these children attended 
the child care facilities on five days a week, 29.3 percent on four days. 
Unfortunately, information and data on use of informal (unregulated and not 
registered) child care provided by relatives, friends, neighbours, babysitters in Austria is 
very sparse. Nevertheless, this form of child care seems to play a non-negligible role in 
Austria, as 20 percent of children under the age of three are cared for by unpaid child-
minders in a typical week in 2008 (OECD Family database 2010 (OECD 2010, Table 
PF3.3.A)).  
Against this background of limited availability and low enrolment rates of zero- 
to two-year-olds in formal non-family day care in Austria even in the years 2002 to 
2008, it seems unlikely that the reform in 1990 and the prolonged duration of the 
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parental leave implied a substitution from formal to maternal child care. Instead, the 
numbers tend to support the idea that the reform generated a substitution from 
individual informal day care arrangements (by relatives, friends, neighbours, etc.) to 
maternal care among those mothers who extended their leave period from one to two 
years as a reaction to the reform. 
4.3.3.2 Time use of parents 
An analysis of the interrelationship of own and partner‘s labour force 
participation and child care activities on the Austrian Time Use Survey from 1992 
produces three interesting and relevant findings (Neuwirth 2004). First of all, and not 
surprisingly, increased market working time is associated with less time spent on child 
care activities. However, there is only an imperfect substitution between working and 
child care time: one additional hour of own labour market activity reduces maternal 
child care by only about 10 to 20 minutes. Furthermore, daily time devoted to child care 
rises with educational level ceteris paribus, i.e. holding market working time constant: 
mothers with university degrees spend on average 50 minutes per day more on child 
care activities than mothers with compulsory education. Time spent on child care is also 
higher for under three-year-olds than children aged four to six. 
4.3.4 Possible effects of the Austrian reform on child outcomes (possible 
mechanisms) 
Combining these identified reform effects with the theoretical considerations 
outlined in Section 2.1 there seem to be two potential channels through which the 
parental leave extension in Austria could have affected child development: first, a 
‗quality channel‘ which works through the potentially superior quality of maternal care 
as opposed to alternative forms of child care, and second, the ‗fertility channel‘, which 
works through changes in the fertility behaviour, i.e. the number of children and the 
spacing between births. 
To summarize, the parental leave reform in 1990 significantly raised the time 
new mothers stayed at home after childbirth between the child‘s first and second 
birthday, but it did not affect medium- to long-run income and labour market outcomes 
of the average mother (thus, it is unlikely that the reform exerted a negative income 
effect on child outcomes driven by medium- to long-term income losses; if anything, 
the leave extension generated a relatively small and only short-term income loss caused 
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by foregone earnings during the additional leave months).
105
 At the time of the reform 
the prevailing form of child care for children under two years of age was almost 
exclusively informal care provided by grandparents or other persons. Under the 
hypothesis that maternal care is superior to informal care for very young children, one 
would expect that the prolonged parental leave period had a positive impact on child 
outcomes. This could be especially true for better educated mothers if they are able to 
provide higher quality and more ‗productive‘ maternal care, for instance, through better 
access to knowledge on how to foster cognitive development of children (Grossman 
(2006) provides an overview and a critical discussion of the theoretical models as well 
as the empirical evidence regarding the effect of education on nonmarket outcomes, in 
which he distinguishes between productive and allocative efficiency, both of which are 
increasing in human capital and education).  
However, the reform also altered the fertility behaviour of parents, most 
unambiguously the time interval between adjacent births: although the incidence of 
extremely short birth intervals declined, the average birth interval between first and 
second as well as second and third child decreased due to the incentives generated by 
the automatic renewal period. If shorter spacing between births reduces the time and 
material resources that are allocated to each child, this effect could have negative 
implications for child development and cognitive outcomes. On the contrary, if the 
relation between spacing and child outcomes is non-linear, a positive effect of the 
reduction in extremely short birth intervals could outweigh a negative effect from the 
average reduction in spacing. There is also some empirical evidence that the reform 
might have increased the total number of births per woman. If this is the case, this effect 
could work in the opposite direction and diminish or reverse a potentially positive time 
effect.
106
 
                                                          
105
 However, for those women who would not have returned to work after the child‘s first birthday under 
the old regime anyways, the prolonged parental leave payments might have implied a gain in short term 
income as these mothers would not have earned any income during the second year. Furthermore, it is 
difficult to assess to what extent this short-term income loss from working mothers translates into a 
potentially negative income shock for the child: if non-parental child care is costly, a fraction of the 
mother‘s earned income will be spent on child care and it is not clear whether the remaining amount of 
maternal income is actually larger or smaller than the parental leave payments. Only if the reform leads to 
a significant short-term income loss, there might be negative effects on child outcomes which could work 
against any positive time effect.  
106
 The same could be true, if the reform exerts a significant negative income shock for families (see 
discussion in footnote 105). 
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Moreover, the reactions to the reform differed across population subgroups: 
high-wage mothers reacted less strongly to the extended leave period in terms of 
fertility behaviour than low-wage mothers (see Section 4.3.2.3). For the group of high-
wage mothers there is no significant rise in overall fertility (no potentially negative 
quantity-quality trade-off), there is a much more pronounced decrease in extremely 
short birth intervals of 16 months (which should have a positive impact on child 
outcomes) and a weaker increase in short term fertility (within three years). In contrast, 
low-wage mothers have an excess fertility in the short and in the long-run by about 
seven and five percent respectively and there is no reduction in the incidence of 
extremely short birth intervals. These fertility effects are more likely to offset any 
positive time effect of the prolonged leave duration on child outcomes of low-wage 
mothers. 
Overall, it seems that any positive effect from increased maternal time should be 
more easily detectable among children of high-wage mothers who altered their fertility 
behaviour only very modestly. For the children of low-wage mothers the effect of the 
parental leave reform is a mixture of counteracting changes of maternal care, increased 
family size and changed spacing between births. 
4.4 Empirical approach  
This section describes the empirical method used to investigate the link between 
the extended parental leave and cognitive child outcomes. It discusses the corresponding 
identifying assumptions as well as several refinements and potential problems with the 
approach. 
4.4.1 Difference-in-Difference estimator and identifying assumptions 
Given the unexpected and strict implementation of the prolonged parental leave 
period for all children born on July 1, 1990 or later, it is possible to use a Difference-in-
Differences (DID) analysis to identify the effect of extended maternal care on child 
outcomes (like in the analysis of Germany by Dustmann and Schönberg 2010). The 
DID regression specifications are the following: 
                                                                      (4.2) 
                                                               (4.3) 
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   is the measure for cognitive child outcome (i.e. test scores from standardized 
tests from the two years 2006 and 2003 covering the cohorts of children born in 1990 
and 1987, respectively, see Section 4.5 for data description), Post June is a dummy 
variable taking on the value 1 for all children whose birthday is on or after July 1 (July 
– December) and the coefficient    captures all possible permanent and general 
differences between children born in the first and  the second half of a given year; y2006 
is a dummy variable for the year 2006 that controls for the common trend between the 
two test years 2006 and 2003; the interaction effect between Post June and y2006 
identifies all children whose mothers were affected by the reform and eligible to a 
longer parental leave –    is the coefficient of interest and measures the treatment 
effect; to account for possible season of birth effects as well as age effects the 
regressions include a set of birth month dummy variables.
107
 To control for possible 
differences in sample composition over time the more refined specification (4.3) 
contains additionally a set of parental and other background characteristics (X). 
If the assignment into treated (=post reform; 24 months PL) and control group 
(=pre reform; 12 months PL) is ‗as good as random‘, a simple representation of the 
estimated treatment effect      (estimated by OLS) is 
                                                  .                            (4.4) 
This is the difference in average cognitive outcomes (test scores) of children 
born after versus before the reform (whose mothers were eligible to 24 versus 12 
months of paid parental leave respectively) less the difference in outcomes of children 
born before and after July 1, 2003 who were not subject to the reform. 
The advantage of this DID approach is that potentially confounding systematic 
differences between children born before and after July 1 which could otherwise exert a 
bias are differenced out: First, the test scores used in the analysis stem from tests that 
took place within a certain month (e.g. April) and children born in January 1990 will be 
about 12 months older at the time of the test than children born in December 1990. If 
age in itself has a positive effect on outcomes, any potentially positive effects of the 
reform will be downward biased, since post-reform children are always younger than 
pre-reform children. Second, there might be systematic season of birth effects affecting 
                                                          
107
 Figure A 4-1 in the appendix reveals a seasonal pattern in the number of births (on average there are 
more births per day in July, August and September than in the rest of the year). However, these seasonal 
trends are constant over the years and should thus be accounted for in the DID approach. 
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the composition of children and their parents over the year. If certain types of couples 
are more likely to have babies in particular months of the year this might also impact 
upon the distribution of test scores across birth months.  
One of the most crucial identifying assumptions for this approach is that 
assignment into treatment was indeed ‗as good as random‘, i.e. that mothers could not 
self-select into treatment or control group. This basically requires that mother could not 
manipulate the date of childbirth around the cut-off date of July 1, 1990. Lalive and 
Zweimüller (1999) provide several arguments and evidence in support of the 
assumption of random assignment: first, an assessment of newspaper reports about a 
potential reform of parental leave duration revealed that the public discussion did not 
start before November 11, 1989 and that it was not clear until April 5 whether and when 
such a reform would be implemented. This timing of policy decision and 
implementation makes anticipatory adjustments to fertility plans highly unlikely, 
especially when taking into account that successful conception and date of childbirths 
cannot be perfectly controlled and planned by parents. Furthermore, as also argued by 
Würtz Rasmussen (2010), it is biologically infeasible to postpone the date of delivery (it 
is easier to give birth at an earlier date). The exceptions are births by Caesarean 
sections. However, an analysis of number of births during the days shortly before and 
after the reform did not indicate a higher density of births on July 1 or the days after 
(Lalive and Zweimüller 2009). Another assumption is the common trend assumption 
which requires that seasonal patterns or age effects are constant across years.  
However, the common trend assumption might be problematic if there are 
changes over time. Certainly, this assumption becomes less restrictive if one limits the 
sample to children born extremely close to the cut-off date as these children are very 
similar in age as well as in season of birth (like in a Regression Discontinuity 
analysis).
108
 Another advantage of narrowing the window of birth months before and 
after the reform would be that these children are more likely to face identical 
kindergarten and schooling regulations and rules, e.g., the Austrian school year typically 
runs from September to August (see also Section 4.4.3). Furthermore, their mothers 
were exposed to similar macroeconomic conditions and labour market developments 
(this argument in favour for a narrow sample around the cut-off date is given by Lalive 
                                                          
108
 This relates to the general idea behind a Regression Discontinuity Approach which relies on the 
similarity of composition of treatment and control group in terms of observed and unobserved 
characteristics who only differ with respect to the assignment into treatment. 
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et al. 2010). However, this strategy would require a very large data set. Unfortunately, 
the available test scores data base does not satisfy this condition. 
Hence, given the data at hand, there is a trade-off between limiting the analysis 
on children who are as similar as possible (which would also reduce the likelihood of 
violating the common trend assumption) and having a sufficiently large sample size. 
Therefore, each specification will be estimated several times while successively 
narrowing down the window of birth months (starting from the birth months March to 
October and narrowing it down to May to August).  
Since the data neither allow identifying children whose mothers were actually 
eligible for the more generous parental leave entitlements nor contain information on 
actual duration of leave taking of mothers, the estimated effect will represent the 
intention-to-treat effect of the reform (i.e. the reduced form effect of being eligible to 24 
instead of 12 months of parental leave; see explanation and discussion by Baker and 
Milligan (2008, 2010) and Dustmann and Schönberg (2010)). More specifically, the 
estimated intention-to-treat effect is the average causal effect of the assignment of 
treatment on the outcome. The estimation procedure will simply compare outcomes of 
students that were randomly assigned to the treatment group or the control group (i.e., 
24 or 12 months of parental leave), without accounting for the fact that neither all 
children in the treatment group actually received the treatment nor all children in the 
control group did not receive the treatment of prolonged parental leave. This intention-
to-treat effect will be a lower bound estimate of the effect of prolonged parental leave 
and maternal care on child outcomes (compliers: mothers who adjust the length of the 
parental leave in response to the extended entitlements), since it is estimated on the full 
sample including children of mothers who did not change their behaviour because of the 
reform (non-complying mothers; see Angrist, Imbens and Rubin 1996). This latter 
group consists of always-takers (mothers always staying at home irrespective of the 
parental leave regime), i.e. non-working mothers as well as working mothers, who stop 
working post-birth for much longer than the granted parental leave period irrespective 
of the actual legislation, and of never-takers (mothers who return to work very early 
irrespective of the generosity of the system), i.e. non-eligible working mothers, e.g. self-
employed, or working mothers who would return to work immediately after the 
compulsory maternity leave period independent of the actual leave provision. 
Furthermore, the intention-to-treat estimate could be a combination of different 
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channels through which the reform might have affected child outcomes (see discussion 
of channels in Section 4.3.4). If information on actual maternal leave taking duration 
had been available in the data, the reform cut-off date could have been used as an 
instrumental variable in order to estimate the local average treatment effect of the 
reform. 
4.4.2 Refinement and subgroup analysis 
One way to get closer to the actual effect of the reform would be to restrict the 
sample to children whose mothers were actually eligible for parental leave and hence 
affected by the reform. Although direct information on the working status of the mother 
is not available in the data, it is possible to infer average labour force participation rates 
from educational attainments of mothers by splitting the sample into sub-groups of 
mothers with comparatively high or low labour force participation rates and hence a 
higher and a lower likelihood of parental leave eligibility (a similar approach is adopted 
in Baker and Milligan 2008). 
Table 4-3 provides information on employment rates of mothers aged 18 to 39 
with a baby younger than one year. The ratios were calculated using data from the 
Austrian Census 1991 (May 15, 1991). The employment measure includes women who 
are currently absent from work due to maternity or parental leave in the numerator (ratio 
of employed women to all women in the respective age group). Note that the Census 
1991 was conducted before the first cohort of post-reform mothers started their second 
year of parental leave (by July 1991).  
According to these figures women having completed post-secondary or tertiary 
education (having employment ratios of above 80 percent) will be categorized as ‗High 
labour force participation group (High LFP)‘, and those with lower ratios will be 
subsumed as ‗Low labour force participation group (Low FLP)‘. The latter group 
comprises women whose highest educational degree is higher secondary school or less. 
On average, these groups have an employment ratio of about 84 percent (High LFP 
group) and 70 percent (Low LFP group).
109
 When including women born abroad in the 
calculations the numbers become slightly lower, but the overall ranking remains the 
same (on average 81 (67) percent for the High (Low) LFP group; this might be related 
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 When including the ‗unemployed‘ in the measure, the average ratios of ‗economically active‘ become 
89 and 78 percent, respectively. 
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to lower labour force participation rates or higher unemployment rates among foreign-
born individuals). Unfortunately the census data does not allow a distinction between 
employed and self-employed or unpaid workers, and thus these numbers probably 
slightly exaggerate the share of mothers with employment contracts granting parental 
leave eligibility (possibly especially so for the less educated). 
 
Table 4-3: Female employment ratio by highest education completed, Census 1991 
  
Born in Austria 
 
Born anywhere 
ISCED Highest education completed 
Employment 
ratio N   
Employment 
ratio N 
1.  Group of mothers with lower labour force participation 
   
2 Compulsory secondary school 60.8% 2,020  57.2% 2,528 
3C Intermediate technical & 
vocational secondary school 
(short form) 
67.7% 136 
 
67.2% 137 
3B Upper secondary 75.3% 3,828  74.6% 3,970 
3A Higher general secondary 
school 
65.9% 437  60.8% 523 
 Total 70.0% 6,421  67.3% 7,158 
2.  Group of mothers with higher labour force participation 
   
4 Post-secondary (not tertiary) 
(Intermediate or higher 
technical & vocational 
secondary school) 
81.7% 699  79.7% 744 
5B Post-secondary college 
(tertiary) 
90.7% 333  90.0% 341 
5A/6 University, Polytechnic 
(tertiary) 
81.6% 305  76.8% 358 
 Total 83.9% 1,337  81.4% 1,443 
Notes: Subsample of all mothers aged 18 to 39 years with a child younger than one year (Austria, Census 
date May 15, 1991). The ‗employment ratio‘ is calculated as the ratio of persons working for an employer, 
self-employed persons, unpaid workers engaged in the production of economic goods, and persons who 
have a job but were temporarily absent for some reason (e.g. maternity or parental leave) divided by the 
total number of people in this age group. Employment measure does not include unemployed individuals, 
since the focus of the following analysis is on working mothers. Including unemployed women in the 
employment measure changes the ratios only slightly (they become larger). The educational classification 
is according to ISCED 1997. Source: Census Austria 1991 downloaded from the Integrated Public Use 
Microdata Series International (Minnesota Population Center 2011); own calculations. 
 
A division between these two groups of mothers according to educational 
attainment will not only differentiate between supposable eligibility statuses (women 
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with higher education being more likely to be affected by the reform because of higher 
employment rates). In addition, if more educated mothers are more career-oriented and 
have stronger incentives to return to work immediately after the end of the granted 
period of job protection their ‗return-to-work‘ decisions might follow the official rules 
more strictly (the period of parental leave entitlements might be more binding for 
women with a stronger attachment to the labour force). If this is the case, an estimation 
based on children from this subgroup of mothers will reflect the extension of the 
specific effect more clearly (mothers with lower attachment to the labour force might 
stay away from work for a longer period irrespective of the granted parental leave 
period). Moreover, a higher level of education might have a stronger and positive 
impact on child development in itself, if mothers with higher education are able to 
provide better quality time and care at home than less educated mothers (or informal 
child care). 
4.4.3 Potentially confounding effects: School-entry cut-off age 
One additional challenge for the empirical analysis is the proximity of the 
reform cut-off date July 1, 1990 to the Austrian school entry cut-off date which is the 1
st
 
of September of each year. More specifically, all children having their sixth birthday 
before September 1 of each year are obliged to start school in the same year (school 
starts typically at the beginning of September) unless they are officially considered as 
not yet ready for school given their cognitive skills (level of maturity according to 
professional opinion). However, until 1999, enforcement of this school entry cut-off 
date was not strict, conceding some discretionary power to parents regarding the 
decision whether their child was ‗ready‘ for school or whether it should start one year 
later. Overall, the fraction of children enrolling late tends to be particularly high in the 
birth months immediately preceding the cut-off date. Furthermore, children born in July 
and August who enter school at the regular age will always be the youngest in their 
class. Simple age effects (biological, cognitive development) as well as more complex 
psychological peer effects might increase the likelihood that these children perform 
relatively worse than others and might thus be at higher risk of repeating a grade (recent 
empirical accounts of such relative age effects within classrooms are given by the 
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following studies: Bedard and Dhuey (2006), Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2011), 
Mühlenweg (2010), Schneeweis and Zweimüller (2009) and Sprietsma (2010)).
110
 
These two effects – late enrolment and grade repetition – lead to a very unequal 
distribution of the share of children enrolled in their regular grade level given their birth 
date across all birth months. Figure 4-7 plots the fractions of 15 year old children in 
Austria (for the reform cohort 1990) who were enrolled in a regular, advanced or lower 
grade level by month of birth. The categorization into regular, advanced and lower level 
is based on a comparison of their actual grade level with the grade level they should be 
in according to their birth date (based on the PISA 2006 data; for data description see 
Section 4.5.1). More specifically, in this particular case all children born before 
September should be enrolled in grade 10, while all children born between September 
and December should be enrolled in grade 9.  
 
Figure 4-7: Grade progression by birth month  
 
Source: PISA 2006; own calculations based on full sample included in the analysis and using student 
weights calculated by the data providers (N= 4,372; see sample description in Section 4.5.2). 
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 The cited literature also discusses other potential relative age effect channels. On the one hand, 
relatively younger children might benefit from the fact that they cover certain material at a younger age 
than their older classmates. On the other hand, there could be a negative effect if younger children imitate 
risky behaviour from their older peers. 
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The figure reveals that the fraction of children in lower than regular grade levels 
exceeds 30 percent in the months July and August (33 and 36 percent respectively), 
whereas in June and May the fraction drops to 24 and 19 percent. Under the plausible 
assumption that children in lower grade levels will perform comparatively worse in the 
PISA tests than children in higher grade levels – since they have completed fewer years 
of formal education and covered less material – the average test scores of children born 
in August and July will be lower than for children born earlier in the year. The same is 
especially true for children born between September and December 1990: among these 
children about 80 percent are in grade level 9 and hence their average test scores will be 
lower than those in the preceding birth months.  
The comparison of the distribution of children in lower than regular grades 
across birth months for the cohorts 1990 and 1987 (PISA data 2006 and 2003) in Figure 
4-8 reveals that this phenomenon is relatively consistent over time. This is an important 
prerequisite for the DID estimation strategy.  
 
Figure 4-8: Distribution of students in lower than regular grade level (cohorts 1990 
and 1987) 
 
Source: PISA 2006 and 2003; own calculations based on full sample included in the analysis and using 
student weights calculated by the data providers. 
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The compositional changes in grade level attendance across birth months and 
especially to the right of the reform cut-off date seems to call for a limitation of the 
analysis to the birth months June and July only. Unfortunately though, as already 
mentioned earlier, this strategy is not possible due to the small sample size. To test to 
what extent the empirical results are sensitive to this school entry cut-off date, as a 
further robustness check the following analysis is also run only including children born 
before September (but still gradually extending the sample to the left of the cut-off ).
111
 
An alternative sensitivity test will restrict the sample to children who are in the 
regular grade only. However, since current grade level of a student might be 
endogenous to his cognitive skills, these results can only provide suggestive evidence 
and have to interpreted with caution. 
4.5 Data on cognitive outcomes of the 1990 birth cohort in Austria 
An analysis of the effects of the 1990 parental leave extension on medium-term 
cognitive child outcomes requires micro data on scholastic achievements from students 
born shortly before and after the reform in 1990. However, nationally representative 
data on standardized cognitive child outcomes for single birth cohorts which also 
contains information on socio-demographic characteristics of the child as well as its 
parents are generally not available in Austria. The only exception are data from 
international skill assessment studies, in particular, the Programme for International 
Student Assessment (PISA), Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study 
(TIMSS) or the Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS). 
4.5.1 The PISA data  
Among these international studies there is fortunately one which captures 
exactly the relevant birth cohort: the PISA study 2006 was based on students born 
between January and December 1990. The following analysis will use data from the 
Austrian subsample of the PISA studies in 2006 and 2003, covering the birth cohorts 
                                                          
111
  In Austria, the compulsory schooling law requires children to complete at least nine years of formal 
education (school). Hence, some students who should have been observed in grade 10 (born before 
September), might have already dropped out of school. According to the Austrian survey conductors 
about 5 percent of the relevant cohort have already left school and are not included in the test (Schreiner, 
Breit, Schwantner and Grafendorfer 2007). This is another reason why the sample of children born before 
September (might have already dropped out of school) and after September 1 (still in compulsory 
schooling) differ and why one needs to account for these differences in the analysis.   
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1990 and 1987 respectively (see motivation for and advantages of the DID approach in 
Section 4.4.1). 
There are several important features of the PISA data which make it especially 
suitable for the analysis: first of all, the PISA data provides results from standardized 
tests of cognitive skills in terms of reading, mathematical and scientific literacy. The 
focus of PISA is less a pure assessment of curriculum based knowledge, but more an 
evaluation of general skills needed for adult life and of the ability to apply knowledge to 
real-life problems. Second, the tests are administered to a nationally representative 
sample of 15-year old students independent of their current grade level in school. In 
contrast, other international studies like TIMSS and PIRLS assess students in particular 
grade levels, e.g. 4
th
 and 8
th
 grade, and are thus not representative for a particular birth 
cohort. Comparisons of outcomes across birth months would be biased if, for example, 
the propensity of grade retention or early or late school entry differs between children 
born closer or further away from the school entry cut-off date (see discussion in Section 
4.4.3). Third, the PISA data files contain important student-reported background 
information on the student (e.g., gender, birth year and month, nationality, attitudes), the 
student‘s parents (educational achievement, nationality, occupational information) and 
the school (e.g., school programme, location, school size, resources). 
However, it should be mentioned that the Austrian PISA data has also several 
disadvantages: although the overall sample size in 2006 includes about 4,927 students, 
the relevant sample when comparing children born in particular months of the year 
becomes quite small (there are only about 350 children per birth month). Furthermore, 
there is no retrospective information on maternal labour market participation at the time 
of birth which prevents a clear identification of mothers who were truly eligible for 
parental leave. Moreover, information on exact birth dates is not available in the data 
due to strict data security and protection rules. The lack of information on exact birth 
dates in conjunction with the rather small sample size prevents any refinement of the 
analysis beyond the month level (e.g. children born shortly before or after the cut-off 
date cannot be excluded to test for robustness to potential sorting across the cut-off 
date). 
The Programme for International Student Assessment was initiated and is 
coordinated by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
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(OECD)
112
. The international micro data files are publicly available free of charge from 
the OECD web-site which also offers detailed information on the data, variables and 
survey methodology (see http://www.pisa.oecd.org/). In Austria, the PISA 2003 and 
2006 tests were managed and carried out by the Federal Institute for Education 
Research and Innovation & Development of the Austrian School System (Bifie – 
Bundestinstitut für Bildungsforschung, Innovation & Entwicklung des österreichischen 
Schulwesens).
113
  
The students participating in the Austrian PISA test were sampled according to a  
two-stage stratified sampling design: the first stage involved a random selection of 
schools from the universe of all schools having 15 year old students (probability-
proportional-to-size sampling, where size referred to number of 15-year-olds within 
school; the stratification also accounted for different school types and programmes); in 
the second stage a maximum of 35 15-year-olds were selected within each school to 
participate in the test (Breit and Schreiner 2007). The test itself was designed as a two 
hours paper-and-pencil assessment including multiple-choice and open answer 
questions plus a 30 minutes background questionnaire (OECD 2009a).  
4.5.2 Sample selection and variables 
Several observations were dropped from the original data in order to increase the 
cohesiveness of the data for the analysis. A detailed overview of how many 
observations were lost due to these sample restrictions is presented in Table A 4-2 in the 
appendix to this chapter. Overall, the sample of children born between May and August 
1990 (1987) in the PISA data 2006 (2003) was reduced from 1,640 (1,574) to 1,480 
(1,379) observations. The final sample used in the regressions thus represents about 90 
percent (86 percent) of the original sample. First, students whose mothers are highly 
unlikely to have been eligible for parental leave or affected by the reform are excluded: 
this relates to children who were not born in Austria and whose mother was thus 
unlikely to work in Austria at the time of the reform in 1990. However, all those 
children who were born in Austria even though their mother and/or father were born 
abroad are kept in the sample. Furthermore, a few observations had missing information 
on maternal education (parental education is reported by the student). These 
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 Up to date, PISA tests were carried out in the years 2000, 2003, 2006 and 2009 and the number of 
countries participating in the test has increased from 43 countries (OECD and non-OECD) in 2000 to 65 
countries in 2009.  
113
 Further details on the implementation of PISA in Austria are available at http://www.bifie.at/pisa. 
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observations were dropped for two reasons: first, missing answers on maternal 
education could indicate absence of mothers due to death, separation, etc. which is 
problematic given the aim to evaluate the importance of maternal employment or care 
on child outcomes. Second, the level of maternal education is a crucial variable 
according to which the sample will be divided into two groups in the subsequent 
analysis and missing information on maternal educational attainment prohibits the 
allocation of the student to a particular group. A few students in schools for children 
with special needs were also excluded from the sample to increase consistency across 
students and across years, since these children have a completely different curriculum 
and these children were administered special test items (Schreiner, Breit, Schwantner 
and Grafendorfer 2007). 
The variables that are used in the analysis are described in Table 4-4. The main 
outcome variables measuring cognitive skills are test scores in mathematics, reading 
and science.
114
 The test scores in each subject are rescaled by the OECD so that the 
mean across all participating countries is 500 points and the standard deviation is 100 
points.
115
 
Two other potential outcome variables are indicator variables on whether a 
student is in a lower than the regular grade level given their birth month and whether the 
student is enrolled in a school track which gives access to university or college 
education (academic track). In Austria, students are allocated to different educational 
tracks after the fourth grade (i.e. at age 10 or 11), which is relatively early compared to 
other European countries (Schneeweis and Zweimüller 2009). Starting with grade level 
nine, a further differentiation into specific tracks takes place; the PISA sample thus 
covers several different school types representing high and low track schools, which are 
also associated with different levels of PISA test outcomes. A list of these national 
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 Strictly speaking, the PISA data does not contain standard test scores, but so-called ‗plausible values‘ 
(five plausible values per subject) which are estimates of the overall proficiency of a student given his/her 
particular objective test outcomes, drawn from an underlying latent ability distribution of the student. As 
recommended in the PISA Data Analysis Manual (OECD 2009b), the following analysis is based on one 
of these plausible values (plausible value 1) for each subject (as has been done in another study by 
Schneeweis and Winter-Ebmer 2007). Also in line with the OECD recommendations all presented results 
are weighted using the provided student level weights. Standard errors are clustered by school 
programme, school location and gender to account for within group correlation of outcomes. 
115
 More specifically, to ease comparison of results across survey years, the test results were rescaled such 
that the reading and mathematics reporting scales of 2006 are equal to those in 2003. The test results in 
science are rescaled such that the mean is 500 and the standard deviation is 100 for the 30 OECD 
countries that participated in PISA 2006 (see OECD 2009a, PISA 2006 Technical Report, pp. 157-158). 
However, any general differences in test scores across years and subjects will be accounted for in the 
analysis by including controls for years and by running separate regressions for each subject. 
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school programmes and how these are categorized into ‗academic track‘ schools can be 
found at the bottom of Table 4-4. Again, since these different school programmes are 
associated with different achievement levels and since they have different orientations 
(vocational training versus academic education) enrolment into a particular school type 
is an endogenous outcome. 
 
Table 4-4: Description of variables 
Variable Name Variable Description 
School outcomes  
Mathematics score Mathematics test score (plausible value 1) 
Reading score Reading test score (plausible value 1) 
Science score Science test score (plausible value 1) 
Retained = 1, if observed grade level is below grade level student should 
be according to this birth month (regular grade level is 10 for 
children born before September, and 9 for children born in 
September or later) (= 0, otherwise) 
Academic track = 1, if enrolled in school which enables student to attend 
university after graduation (= 0, otherwise) 
Male = 1, if gender is male; = 0, if gender is female 
Age in years Age in years at the time of the test 
School location (dummy variables) 
City = 1, if school is located in ‗city‘, i.e. ‗100,000 to 1,000,000 
inhabitants‘ (= 0, otherwise) 
Metropolitan area = 1, if school is located in ‗metropolitan area‘, ‗more than 
1,000,000 inhabitants‘ (= 0, otherwise) 
Mother’s and father’s educational attainment (dummy variables):   
Lower secondary Lower secondary or less      [ ‗low LFP‘ group] 
Upper secondary Upper secondary                  [ ‗low LFP‘ group] 
Tertiary Tertiary or Post-Secondary  [ ‗high LFP‘ group] 
Educ. father: miss. Educational attainment of father is unknown or missing 
Migration background of family (dummy variables) 
Family type 2 = 1, if family speaks German at home, but at least one of the 
parents was born abroad (= 0, otherwise) 
Family type 3 = 1, if both parents were born in Austria and home language is 
German (= 0, otherwise) 
National school programme (Austria) (dummy variables): 
Vocational (low track) Vocational (low track) (Hauptschule, Polytechnische Schule) 
Apprenticeship Apprenticeship training (Berufsschule) 
BMS Medium vocational school  (Berufsbildende Mittlere Schule) 
BHS Higher vocational school (Berufsbildende Höhere Schule)    
[ ‗academic track‘] 
AHS Gymnasium, Higher general school (Allgemeinbildende Höhere 
Schule) [ ‗academic track‘] 
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Further variables of interest are the student‘s gender and age (age will be 
implicitly accounted for by controlling for birth month), dummy variables indicating 
whether the school is located in an urban area (i.e. metropolitan area or large city; the 
base category are smaller towns with less than 100,000 inhabitants and villages), 
information on mother‘s and father‘s highest completed level of education, and control 
variables for migration status of the family (whether the family speaks German at home 
and whether mother and father were born in Austria; the base category are non-German 
speaking families). All these variables have been selected to be included in the analysis 
since they are comparatively unlikely to be endogenous to child characteristics (i.e., 
these variables were chosen as to present pre-birth characteristics of the family). This 
endogeneity problem is the reason why no information on current employment or 
current occupation of the mother is incorporated in the analysis (current refers to date of 
the respective PISA test).  
4.5.3 Descriptive statistics and first raw comparisons 
The mean values of the outcome variables and control variables of the PISA 
2006 and 2003 data are presented in Table 4-5, separately for children born in May and 
June (before the reform in 1990) and for children born in July and August (after the 
reform in 1990). 
As regards the other demographic characteristics, school location, mother‘s and 
father‘s education as well as migration background there are no significant systematic 
differences between pre and post reform children in 2006, which supports the important 
assumption that the reform was unexpected and that there was not systematic self-
selection of particular types of parents or families around the cut-off date. In 2003 there 
seems to be a higher density of mothers with tertiary education among children born in 
July or August than born in May or June. 
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Table 4-5: Mean comparisons of outcomes and characteristics of students born in 
May/June versus July/August in the reform year 1990 and the control year 1987 
 
PISA 2006 (birth cohort 1990)  PISA 2003 (birth cohort 1987) 
 
Pre 
reform 
Post 
reform   
 Pre 
reform 
Pre 
reform   
Birth months May- 
June 
July- 
Aug. 
  
 May- 
June 
July- 
Aug. 
  
 
Mean 
(1) 
Mean 
(2) 
Diff.  
(2)-(1) 
Std.  
error 
 Mean 
(1) 
Mean 
(2) 
Diff.  
(2)-(1) 
Std.  
error 
Mathematics score 
(Std. deviation: 92.8)  
521.20 519.80 -1.45 5.23  515.90 515.10 -0.74 5.92 
Reading score  
(Std. deviation: 101.1) 
507.20 500.70 -6.46 5.74  501.10 501.70 0.62 5.73 
Science score  
(Std. deviation: 90.6) 
526.90 523.70 -3.18 5.09  504.40 502.50 -1.87 5.65 
Retained  0.21 0.34 0.13** 0.03  0.25 0.33 0.08** 0.03 
Academic track 0.54 0.52 -0.02 0.03  0.46 0.51 0.04 0.03 
Male 0.52 0.50 -0.02 0.03  0.50 0.49 -0.01 0.03 
Age in years 15.92 15.75 -0.17** 0.00  15.93 15.76 -0.17** 0.00 
City 0.41 0.41 -0.01 0.03  0.34 0.35 0.01 0.03 
Metropolitan area 0.14 0.13 -0.01 0.02  0.16 0.14 -0.02 0.02 
Mother‘s education:            
Lower secondary  0.09 0.09 0.00 0.02  0.13 0.09 -0.04** 0.02 
Upper secondary 0.54 0.56 0.02 0.03  0.59 0.56 -0.03 0.03 
Tertiary 0.37 0.35 -0.02 0.03  0.28 0.34 0.07** 0.03 
Father‘s education          
Lower secondary  0.06 0.06 0.00 0.01  0.09 0.07 -0.02 0.02 
Upper secondary 0.47 0.46 -0.01 0.03  0.51 0.48 -0.03 0.03 
Tertiary 0.45 0.46 0.02 0.03  0.37 0.41 0.05 0.03 
Educ. father: miss. 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01  0.03 0.04 0.01 0.01 
Family type 2 0.09 0.07 -0.02 0.02  0.06 0.06 0.00 0.01 
Family type 3 0.85 0.86 0.01 0.02  0.90 0.91 0.01 0.02 
School programme:          
Vocational (low track) 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.02  0.05 0.07 0.02 0.02 
Apprenticeship 0.26 0.23 -0.04 0.02  0.26 0.24 -0.02 0.03 
BMS 0.13 0.16 0.03* 0.02  0.20 0.17 -0.03 0.02 
BHS 0.33 0.30 -0.03 0.03  0.31 0.32 0.01 0.03 
AHS 0.23 0.24 0.01 0.02  0.18 0.21 0.03 0.02 
Number of observations 716 764    680 680   
Notes: Estimations weighted by individual inverse probability weights provided in the PISA data set. The 
standard deviations refer to the 2006 data using the pooled sample from May to August. Significance 
levels are denoted by: ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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4.6 Empirical results of the effect of the reform on cognitive skills 
After showing some simple graphs on the distribution of the average test scores 
across birth months, this section presents and discusses the results from the Difference-
in-Differences estimations.   
4.6.1 Graphical Results 
Figure 4-9 helps to get a first impression and better understanding of the 
distribution of test scores across birth months. The graphical analysis is a simple tool to 
check whether there is a jump in test scores for children born after the parental leave 
extension (using reading test scores for this example). It seems that there is a general 
negative trend in average reading test scores across birth months that would be in line 
with possible age effects as discussed earlier. However, comparing the test outcomes 
immediately before and after the reform (i.e., June and July children) the absence of any 
marked differences suggests no positive reform effect. Nevertheless, this flat passage 
could imply a positive effect if it is the result of a positive reform effect neutralizing a 
negative age effect. Furthermore, the graph illustrates that children born between 
September and December 1990 perform on average worse in the tests. This is related to 
the fact that these children are in lower grade levels due to the school-entry cut-off 
regulations (children born in September or later enter school one year later). 
In contrast, the picture looks different when the sample is limited to those 
children whose mothers were more likely to be affected by the reform due to a higher 
labour force participation rate (Figure 4-9, lower graph). Although the overall negative 
age effect remains, test scores of July children are much higher than for June or even 
May children and it seems as if the distribution was slightly upward shifted for post-
reform children. Average test results of August children are lower than those for July 
children which would be in line with a negative age and school-entry effect (the share of 
August children who are in grade level nine instead of ten is higher than in July).  
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Figure 4-9: Average reading test scores across birth months (full and subsample)  
 
 
 
 
Notes: The graphs plot the estimated birth month coefficients of a regression of test scores on a set 
of birth month dummy variables without additional controls (weighted using the individual students 
weights provided in the PISA data; the base month excluded from the regression is ‗June‘) based on 
the full sample (upper graph) and on the subsample of children with mothers with higher labour 
force participation likelihood (lower graph). The 90 percent-confidence interval is based on 
estimated standard errors that were clustered by school programme, school location, and gender.  
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To test whether the test score gap between June and July children is significantly 
different from zero, a simple estimation was carried out based on the PISA 2006 before 
proceeding to the DID estimations. Test scores from the three different subjects were 
regressed on a set of birth months with June as the excluded base category, and other 
control variables on parental background. The estimated ‗born in July‘ coefficients are 
reported in Table 4-6 for separate regressions by subject, maternal labour force 
participation and child gender.  The first two columns in Table 4-6 show the results 
from the full sample of mothers. As the previous graphs suggested the average test 
scores do not differ significantly between pre- and post-reform children in the full 
sample and this applies for all three tested subjects. Furthermore, the estimated 
coefficients change only marginally after controls for parental background are included 
in the regression (although standard errors become slightly smaller). Comparing the 
results by gender (columns 1 and 2, middle and bottom panel) reveals that there might 
be gender differences as the estimated coefficients for boys tend to be positive (but 
insignificant), while the estimated coefficients for girls tend to be negative. Restricting 
the sample to the subsample of mothers who were more likely affected by the reform 
(columns 3 and 4), confirms the graphical impression of a positive effect: the estimated 
effects become much larger and are significantly different from zero (at the five percent 
level) for reading and science. Again, the effects for boys seem to be larger than for 
girls. The separate analyses show that the differences remain significantly different from 
zero only for the male subsample. For completeness, the two columns on the right show 
the respective results for children from mothers with lower labour force participation 
rates. Most of the coefficients have a negative sign implying a decline in test scores 
after the reform; however, none of these effects is significantly different from zero. 
Given the previous discussion of the potentially confounding age and school-
entry effects, it is important to refine the analysis and to perform sensitivity checks in 
order to be able to draw more well-grounded and meaningful conclusions. This will be 
done in the next sections. 
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Table 4-6: Simple OLS regressions on the differences between June and July 
children using only data from the PISA test 2006 (including birth months May-
August) 
 (1) (2) (4) (5) (7) (8) 
 Full 
sample 
Full 
sample 
High LFP 
mother 
High LFP 
mother 
Low LFP 
mother 
Low LFP 
mother 
  MALES + FEMALES  
Mathematics 3.043 3.289 15.687 15.276 -3.377 -2.920 
 (7.002) (6.208) (11.040) (11.074) (8.358) (7.519) 
       
Reading 3.308 3.987 28.946** 28.559** -10.111 -8.923 
 (6.936) (6.022) (13.485) (13.730) (8.677) (7.396) 
       
Science 3.850 3.832 23.700** 22.113** -6.424 -5.802 
 (6.315) (5.428) (10.398) (10.223) (8.082) (6.894) 
       
Observations 1,480 1,480 523 523 957 957 
   MALES 
  
Mathematics 11.734 8.615 27.893 21.853 2.882 1.934 
 (8.957) (8.014) (17.287) (14.846) (8.820) (9.099) 
       
Reading 12.491 10.470 50.349** 44.261* -7.795 -5.048 
 (9.167) (7.871) (22.448) (21.999) (10.809) (9.806) 
       
Science 7.720 4.677 40.772** 34.568** -9.886 -10.464 
 (8.559) (7.312) (15.513) (14.392) (8.722) (7.863) 
       
Observations 752 752 265 265 487 487 
   FEMALES   
Mathematics -5.771 -2.289 3.492 5.848 -9.627 -4.493 
 (10.041) (9.823) (14.652) (15.520) (14.027) (13.150) 
       
Reading -6.051 -2.955 8.174 11.779 -12.219 -8.156 
 (9.755) (8.702) (15.309) (15.431) (13.713) (11.104) 
       
Science -0.118 2.751 7.136 7.288 -2.750 2.238 
 (9.269) (8.554) (14.316) (14.530) (14.140) (12.586) 
       
Observations 728 728 258 258 470 470 
       
Controls for 
parental 
background  
-  -  -  
Notes: The presented numbers are the estimated effects of ‗being born in July‘ as opposed to ‗being 
born in May‘ using the 2006 PISA sample. The results in the top panel stem from the pooled sample 
of males and females, the middle panel from the male and the bottom panel from the female sample. 
All regressions include children born between May 1 and August 31 and control for birth months 
(dummy variables) and gender (top panel). The control variables on parental background include 
dummy variables for mother‘s and father‘s educational attainment, school location, and migration 
background. Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by school programme, school location, 
and gender). Estimations weighted by individual inverse probability weights provided in the PISA 
data set. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: PISA data set (OECD), own calculations. 
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4.6.2 Difference-in-Differences estimates of the effect of the parental leave reform 
on test scores 
The results of the main DID estimates of the effect of the parental leave 
extension on PISA test scores are presented in Table 4-7 for the full sample (all 
mothers) and separately for mothers with higher and lower labour force participation 
rates. The estimation window includes children born two months before and after the 
reform (born between May and August). For each of these samples the first column 
shows the results without any control variables (columns 1, 3 and 5), while the second 
column contains results after controlling for background variables to account for 
potential changes in sample composition across years (and possibly across months). 
Even this more refined estimation approach seems to confirm the findings from the 
simple graphs shown earlier: the treatment effects of the reform (being born post June in 
the year 1990) are close to zero in the full sample (columns 1 and 2). Adding controls 
changes the coefficient slightly, but given the size of the standard errors these 
differences are not significant.
116
 The average effect on reading test scores is a little bit 
larger and negative, but still not significantly different from zero. 
In contrast to these neutral findings are the results from the regressions based on 
the subsample of high LFP mothers. The average effect on all three test subjects is 
significantly positive and of remarkable size; according to these results the extended 
parental leave period raised test scores by about 22 percent of a standard deviation (a 
little bit less in mathematics).
117
 It is likely that these differences in results between the 
full sample and the sample of high LFP mothers can be related to the different levels of 
eligibility of the reform in conjunction with possibly higher quality care of better 
educated mothers (relative to informal care arrangements). Furthermore, the results for 
the subgroup of high LFP mothers are more likely to show the pure time and care effect 
of the parental leave extension, since the reform did not affect overall fertility or labour 
market success of mothers with higher earnings (which is proxied here by higher levels 
of education and higher labour force participation rates).   
                                                          
116
 Standard errors were clustered by school programme, school location and gender to account for the 
fact that test scores of students in the same programme, location and gender are likely to be correlated and 
not independent of each other. 
117 As a further refinement, a set of dummy variables for the different school programs (which are highly 
correlated with different average test scores) was added to the regressions. As expected, this inclusion 
helped to increase the precision of the estimates as the standard errors became smaller. The treatment 
effects became larger and more significant. However, due to the endogeneity of these variables these 
results are only reported in the appendix, Table A 4-3, column set (A). 
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In comparison, the effects for the low LFP group are generally negative and 
even statistically significant for the reading test scores. Although the fraction of affected 
mothers in this group is smaller, it seems that these children have not benefited from the 
reform. This could be potentially attributed to the increased levels of fertility and less 
available resources (time and market goods) per child (i.e. a possible ‗quantity-quality‘ 
trade-off), to shorten time intervals between births or maybe to a lower quality of 
maternal time in the sense of ability to foster cognitive child development. 
To shed more light on potential gender differences regarding the effects of 
maternal employment on cognitive development of children found in other studies, the 
same analysis is repeated for boys and girls separately (Table 4-8 presents only the 
coefficients of the treatment effects of the reform). 
Even though sample sizes become rather small in this subgroup analysis, the 
estimates seem to indicate that boys react more strongly to the reform than girls, 
especially when looking at the group of mothers with higher LFP rates. While both 
post-reform girls and boys have higher test scores on average, the coefficient for the 
boys is almost three times as large as that for girls. Furthermore, the effect remains only 
significantly different from zero for the male subgroup as the coefficients are too 
imprecisely estimated in the female subgroup (the effect on reading and science test 
scores for males corresponds to about 0.3 and 0.4 standard deviations). These results 
would be in line with potential differences in needs and in development between girls 
and boys at very young ages causing boys to benefit comparatively more from maternal 
care between the age of one and two. As before, the results for the pooled sample are 
rather small and insignificant and the results for the group of mothers with lower LFP 
rates have a negative sign. 
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Table 4-7: Difference-in-Differences estimation results (boys and girls) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Full sample Full sample High LFP 
mother  
High LFP 
mother  
Low LFP 
mother  
Low LFP 
mother  
Mathematics       
Treatment effect -0.406 2.000 17.158* 16.067* -7.106 -5.021 
 (6.855) (6.698) (9.685) (9.177) (9.554) (8.829) 
Post June 0.182 -2.541 -21.675* -19.536* 8.308 5.954 
 (7.008) (6.768) (10.889) (9.904) (8.577) (7.985) 
Born May -2.335 -4.190 -11.698 -14.114 1.044 0.195 
 (5.856) (5.599) (8.948) (8.600) (5.996) (5.712) 
Born July -3.804 -2.946 8.361 5.116 -9.964 -8.397 
 (5.193) (4.754) (8.805) (8.625) (6.691) (5.151) 
Year 2006 4.993 3.943 -6.723 -6.249 8.143 8.345 
 (6.436) (5.844) (10.352) (8.933) (6.810) (6.386) 
Constant 503.812*** 418.476*** 528.176*** 457.109*** 494.827*** 407.570*** 
 (12.363) (18.962) (14.228) (23.328) (12.398) (20.766) 
Reading       
Treatment effect -7.362 -4.138 22.710* 21.220* -19.811* -17.144* 
 (8.589) (8.093) (12.390) (11.672) (10.442) (9.450) 
Post June 4.555 1.302 -24.609* -22.431** 15.431* 13.508* 
 (7.596) (7.279) (12.399) (11.074) (7.930) (7.473) 
Born May 6.910 4.674 0.601 -2.670 8.447 8.182 
 (4.948) (4.701) (10.120) (8.886) (5.723) (5.763) 
Born July -1.769 -0.869 16.953 13.304 -11.251 -9.860 
 (5.743) (5.295) (10.178) (10.022) (7.927) (6.011) 
Year 2006 6.476 4.842 -13.517 -12.230 12.997* 12.764* 
 (6.958) (6.423) (11.796) (11.183) (7.518) (7.140) 
Constant 515.920*** 408.674*** 545.670*** 447.464*** 505.305*** 399.338*** 
 (13.032) (22.197) (15.666) (27.492) (13.621) (24.844) 
Science       
Treatment effect -1.009 2.103 23.713** 22.951** -11.102 -8.454 
 (7.623) (7.411) (10.329) (10.020) (9.939) (9.041) 
Post June 0.686 -2.749 -22.041** -20.678** 8.964 6.426 
 (7.004) (6.814) (10.603) (9.660) (8.579) (8.011) 
Born May 3.855 1.607 0.473 -2.685 4.232 3.384 
 (5.944) (5.677) (7.782) (6.878) (6.900) (6.757) 
Born July -1.083 -0.068 13.061 9.648 -8.223 -6.618 
 (5.294) (4.953) (8.716) (8.708) (7.492) (5.770) 
Year 2006 22.148*** 20.497*** 5.236 5.398 27.570*** 27.240*** 
 (6.812) (6.154) (10.186) (8.797) (7.330) (6.902) 
Constant 495.036*** 388.403*** 520.461*** 419.676*** 485.895*** 380.347*** 
 (12.660) (18.083) (14.611) (24.012) (12.929) (18.672) 
Observations 2,840 2,840 943 943 1,897 1,897 
Controls        
Parental 
background  
-  -  -  
Notes: All regressions control for gender. The control variables on parental background include dummy variables for 
mother‘s and father‘s educational attainment, school location, and migration background. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses (clustered by school programme, school location, and gender). Estimations weighted by individual 
inverse probability weights provided in the PISA data set. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: PISA data set 
(OECD), own calculations. 
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Table 4-8: Difference-in-Differences estimation results by gender. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Full 
sample 
Full 
sample 
High LFP 
mother  
High LFP 
mother  
Low LFP 
mother  
Low LFP 
mother  
   MALES   
Mathematics 0.092 0.264 17.935 15.832 -8.420 -9.027 
 (7.906) (8.087) (12.438) (12.282) (13.177) (11.769) 
       
Reading -7.309 -6.808 34.009** 33.118** -27.664* -26.634** 
 (9.794) (9.750) (15.154) (14.985) (14.516) (12.868) 
       
Science -2.063 -1.232 41.033*** 40.396*** -23.698 -23.251* 
 (9.177) (9.208) (10.875) (11.447) (15.409) (13.379) 
       
Observations 1,426 1,426 482 482 944 944 
   FEMALES   
Mathematics -0.493 4.104 18.164 16.001 -5.617 -2.023 
 (11.066) (10.743) (15.450) (15.184) (14.318) (13.281) 
       
Reading -7.416 -1.890 13.368 13.905 -12.800 -8.914 
 (13.684) (12.585) (19.744) (19.082) (15.466) (13.978) 
       
Science 0.561 5.762 7.778 6.330 1.670 5.818 
 (12.139) (11.878) (16.723) (15.817) (14.109) (13.126) 
       
Observations 1,414 1,414 461 461 953 953 
       
Controls        
Parental 
background 
-  -  -  
Notes: The upper panel includes only male, the lower panel only female students. All regressions include 
dummy variable controls for survey year, birth months and for all children born post June. The control 
variables on parental background include dummy variables for mother‘s and father‘s educational 
attainment, school location, and migration background. Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered 
by school programme, school location, and gender). Estimations weighted by individual inverse 
probability weights provided in the PISA data set. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: PISA data set 
(OECD), own calculations. 
 
Given the trade-off between a larger sample size which could help to increase 
precision of the estimates on the one hand and the need to keep the estimation window 
as narrow as possible to reduce the influence of possibly confounding factors (the 
school-entry effect due to the proximity to the school entry cut-off date, age-at-test 
effect, seasonality), the regressions in Table 4-7 are repeated for wider samples which 
are gradually reduced to the more narrow window of four months (two pre- and two 
post-reform months) presented above (the widest sample includes children born 
between March and October).
118
  
                                                          
118 Results using the narrowest window possible – i.e. children born in June or July– are reported in Table 
A 4-3, column set (B) in the appendix. These estimates are even larger and have a higher level of 
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The results for the symmetric extension of the sample (four/three/two months 
before and after the reform) are shown in Table 4-9 and are reported separately by 
maternal labour force participation subgroups (columns (3) and (6) correspond to the 
results from the two previous tables, Table 4-7 and Table 4-8). Looking at the first three 
columns for mothers with higher education it becomes evident that increasing the 
sample size symmetrically to the left and to the right of the cut-off leads to smaller 
coefficients; in other words, a narrower window around the cut-off date leads to a 
comparison of more similar students resulting in larger effects. As a result and although 
the coefficients remain positive, the estimates in the top panel for the pooled male and 
female sample based on the wider window become insignificant. Nevertheless, the 
estimated effects for boys remain highly significant and positive, while those for girls 
get much smaller and even switch signs. Similarly, the results for the low LFP subgroup 
become less negative (or more positive) the more months are included in the analysis. 
Nevertheless, most of the results remain negative albeit often insignificant; the strongest 
effects are still found for boys.
119
 
Table 4-10 summarizes further checks on whether these results are influenced by 
children born after the school-entry cut-off age (after September 1) and who are thus in 
lower grade levels than the other students. This time, additional months were added 
only to the left of the reform date, i.e. before July, while holding the number of months 
to the right constant (July and August). However, although the estimated coefficients 
are slightly larger (for the high LFP subgroup), the general picture remains the same. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                          
significance than the estimates based on the four months sample, which could be driven by the omission 
of August children who are more likely to be in lower grade levels (and thus have lower test scores on 
average). 
119
 Since the share of children aged 0-2 in childcare during the 1990s in Vienna was much higher than in 
the rest of Austria, the regressions from Table 4-9 were re-estimated excluding students from Vienna. 
These estimations could serve as a rough check on whether the mechanism of the reform was mainly 
through replacing informal care by maternal care (unfortunately, the data does not contain information on 
the place of birth, but only on location of the school). The results in the appendix, Table A 4-5, seem to 
support this hypothesis: the estimated effects for children from the group of mothers with higher LFP 
rates are slightly larger (especially for the regressions including birth months May to August). On the 
other hand, the negative coefficients for the male subsample from the group with lower LFP rates become 
much smaller. This would be in line with the argument that in Vienna, the reform generated more of a 
trade-off between formal versus maternal child care and that this replacement might have had more severe 
effects for children (especially sons) of mothers with lower levels of education. Excluding this region 
from the sample should consequently reduce the pronounced negative effect of the reform. 
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Table 4-9: DID estimates based on symmetrically extended estimation samples (up 
to four pre- and post-reform birth months)  
 
 High LFP mothers  Low LFP mothers 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 Mar-Oct Apr-Sep May-Aug  Mar-Oct Apr-Sep May-Aug 
 MALES + FEMALES  MALES + FEMALES 
Mathematics 5.678 9.944 16.360*  2.248 0.526 -5.634 
 (7.713) (7.315) (9.274)  (6.483) (7.313) (9.140) 
        
Reading 9.222 13.141 20.604*  -8.113 -9.716 -16.309* 
 (9.455) (9.811) (11.724)  (6.831) (7.656) (9.245) 
        
Science 11.661 15.918* 23.068**  -3.119 -5.116 -8.805 
 (8.650) (8.938) (10.076)  (7.087) (7.706) (9.140) 
        
Observations 1,887 1,425 943  3,772 2,840 1,897 
  MALES    MALES  
Mathematics 13.328 13.487 15.832  -2.974 -3.577 -9.027 
 (11.192) (9.667) (12.282)  (8.868) (10.290) (11.769) 
        
Reading 27.162** 28.860** 33.118**  -16.769 -20.926* -26.634** 
 (11.567) (12.027) (14.985)  (10.094) (12.214) (12.868) 
        
Science 32.614*** 34.360*** 40.396***  -16.917* -18.967 -23.251* 
 (10.420) (9.864) (11.447)  (9.709) (11.123) (13.379) 
        
Observations 953 716 482  1,866 1,397 944 
  FEMALES    FEMALES  
Mathematics -0.186 5.977 16.001  7.340 4.872 -2.023 
 (10.628) (11.017) (15.184)  (8.960) (10.040) (13.281) 
        
Reading -9.740 -1.316 13.905  3.965 2.321 -8.914 
 (14.472) (14.614) (19.082)  (9.056) (9.913) (13.978) 
        
Science -8.190 -2.603 6.330  11.648 9.335 5.818 
 (11.611) (12.598) (15.817)  (10.141) (11.132) (13.126) 
        
Observations 934 709 461  1,906 1,443 953 
Notes: The reported estimated treatment effects stem from separate estimations of different specifications. 
All regressions include dummy variables for month of birth, a year dummy for 2006, a dummy variable 
for all children born after June. Estimations from columns 1, 2, 4, and 5 include a further dummy variable 
for all children born between September and December to account for the school entry cut-off date in 
Austria and an interaction effect of this dummy variable with the year 2006 variable to account for 
potential general trends in school entry or repetition norms. The control variables on parental background 
include dummy variables for father‘s educational attainment, school location, and migration background 
of the family. Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by school programme, school location, and 
gender). Estimations weighted by individual inverse probability weights provided in the PISA data set. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: PISA data set (OECD), own calculations. 
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Table 4-10: DID estimates based on sample adding more pre-reform birth months 
while holding the number of post-reform birth months constant  
 
 High LFP mothers  Low LFP mothers 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 Mar-Aug Apr-Aug May-Aug  Mar-Aug Apr-Aug May-Aug 
 MALES + FEMALES  MALES + FEMALES 
Mathematics 6.037 10.427 16.360*  2.381 0.767 -5.634 
 (7.720) (7.383) (9.274)  (6.534) (7.356) (9.140) 
        
Reading 9.609 13.807 20.604*  -8.117 -9.529 -16.309* 
 (9.380) (9.694) (11.724)  (6.964) (7.756) (9.245) 
        
Science 12.066 16.600* 23.068**  -3.046 -4.961 -8.805 
 (8.565) (8.852) (10.076)  (7.184) (7.759) (9.140) 
        
Observations 1,407 1,178 943  2,830 2,367 1,897 
  MALES    MALES  
Mathematics 13.612 13.594 15.832  -2.555 -3.134 -9.027 
 (11.056) (9.807) (12.282)  (8.798) (10.209) (11.769) 
        
Reading 27.569** 28.932** 33.118**  -16.415 -20.235 -26.634** 
 (11.609) (12.154) (14.985)  (10.110) (12.242) (12.868) 
        
Science 33.445*** 35.290*** 40.396***  -16.873* -18.723 -23.251* 
 (10.514) (10.098) (11.447)  (9.680) (11.060) (13.379) 
        
Observations 718 594 482  1,424 1,174 944 
  FEMALES    FEMALES  
Mathematics 0.947 6.821 16.001  7.340 4.731 -2.023 
 (10.881) (11.234) (15.184)  (9.294) (10.293) (13.281) 
        
Reading -8.025 0.064 13.905  4.100 2.223 -8.914 
 (14.513) (14.782) (19.082)  (9.328) (10.085) (13.978) 
        
Science -6.790 -1.662 6.330  12.025 9.341 5.818 
 (11.657) (12.657) (15.817)  (10.495) (11.267) (13.126) 
        
Observations 689 584 461  1,406 1,193 953 
Notes: The reported estimated treatment effects stem from separate estimations of different specifications. 
All regressions include dummy variables for month of birth, a year dummy for 2006, a dummy variable 
for all children born after June. The control variables on parental background include dummy variables 
for father‘s educational attainment, school location, and migration background of the family. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses (clustered by school programme, school location, and gender). Estimations 
weighted by individual inverse probability weights provided in the PISA data set. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1. Source: PISA data set (OECD), own calculations.   
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4.6.3 Difference-in-Difference-in-Differences estimations (DDD estimations) 
The DID estimation strategy assumes that the age-related differences across 
birth months (season-of-birth, age-at-test, school-entry effect) are constant over time or 
at least over the period of three years that lies between the two PISA waves (the 
‗treatment cohort‘ tested in 2006 and the ‗control cohort‘ tested in 2003). As a further 
check and control for possibly confounding changes in relative birth month outcomes, 
an additional control group will be included in the analysis that participated in the PISA 
test in both relevant years, but was not affected by the parental leave reform in 2006. 
Austria‘s neighbouring country Germany has a very similar schooling and tracking 
system (Schneeweis and Zweimüller 2009) and both countries are also very close in 
terms of their child care institutions as well as cultural values and attitudes towards the 
role of families and mothers (Neyer 2003). Furthermore, the PISA test language in both 
countries is German and thus Germany seems to be a suitable candidate to act as 
additional control group in the analysis.  
By including a further control group to the analysis, the effect of the parental 
leave reform on child outcomes will be estimated using the following triple difference 
estimation specification, which adds another country variable, as well as interaction 
effects between this country variable and ‗Post June‘ births and the year dummy 
variable 2006 and the triple interaction term of the ‗Post June‘, ‗Year 2006‘ and 
‗Austria‘ dummy variables. 
                                                      
                                                      
                                                                                      (4.5) 
The OLS estimate of the treatment effect      now becomes (AUT – stands for 
Austria (treatment country, in which the reform takes place); GER – stands for Germany 
(control country)): 
                                                             
                                                                   .         (4.6) 
Table 4-11 displays the estimated treatment effect of the parental leave reform in 
Austria based on the DDD regressions. Generally the DDD results correspond to the 
DID estimates. Children of mothers with higher labour force participation, seem to have 
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benefited from the parental leave extension – the estimated coefficients are positive for 
all children, but only significant and larger for boys (the estimated coefficients for males 
are slightly larger than the DID estimates corresponding to approximately between 0.4 
and 0.7 standard deviations). Although the average estimated effects of the pooled 
sample of males and females are slightly larger than the DID estimates, they are slightly 
less significant for the May to August sample. Hence, although the additional 
observations from Germany help to almost double the sample size, they do not help to 
increase the precision of the estimation. In contrast, a comparison of the standard errors 
across the wider and narrower samples (March-October versus May-August) shows that 
the wider sample helps to reduce the standard errors slightly, but the estimated effect 
also decreases when children further away from the cut-off are included in the analysis.  
The three columns on the right for the low LFP group of mothers show negative 
effects for the pooled male and female sample which are only significantly different 
from zero for the reading test scores. However, splitting the sample into male and 
female students reveals that this negative effect seems to be mainly driven by the boys. 
In contrast to the previous DID results, the DDD estimates of the male subsample now 
become much larger and more significant. The estimates for the girls are generally not 
very large (albeit positive) and insignificant. 
To check again whether the estimators are influenced by the group of students 
born after August who regularly attend a lower class than children born earlier in the 
year, the DDD estimations are repeated including (a) only July and August and (b) only 
July as ‗post-reform‘ birth months in the regression sample (the results are reported in 
the appendix, Table A 4-6 and Table 4-7 respectively). The results based on the sample 
including July and August to the right of the cut-off date are very similar to the results 
in Table 4-11. However, once July is the sole ‗post reform‘ birth month in the analysis, 
the results change slightly: for the high LFP group coefficients increase in size and 
become more significant in the pooled and in the male sample (only the mathematics 
test score for boys becomes insignificant; the coefficients in the female sample become 
larger, but remain insignificant). As regards the effects for children whose mothers have 
lower LFP rates, the coefficients become smaller (in absolute terms, i.e. less negative), 
but the results for the male subgroup becomes more significant. This strong negative 
finding for boys of mothers with lower education is indeed surprising (especially since 
the effects for the girls are close to zero).  
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Table 4-11: DDD estimations including German students as further control group 
  High LFP mothers  Low LFP mothers 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 Mar-Oct Apr-Sep May-Aug  Mar-Oct Apr-Sep May-Aug 
 MALES + FEMALES  MALES + FEMALES 
Mathematics 19.210* 22.205* 22.765  -6.174 -9.851 -17.131 
 (9.922) (11.276) (14.804)  (10.027) (11.674) (14.101) 
        
Reading 18.640 20.605 25.079  -23.189* -26.549* -30.991* 
 (13.503) (15.201) (17.315)  (12.286) (13.369) (15.499) 
        
Science 29.104** 33.547** 37.808**  -14.867 -16.967 -20.919 
 (11.817) (13.318) (15.267)  (11.326) (13.141) (14.809) 
        
Observations 4,228 3,212 2,158  6,519 4,968 3,325 
  MALES    MALES  
Mathematics 28.476** 32.697** 38.109**  -33.133** -34.056* -37.219** 
 (12.966) (13.427) (18.223)  (15.778) (17.211) (16.667) 
        
Reading 32.198* 36.062* 40.010*  -55.182*** -56.815** -57.088** 
 (16.737) (18.282) (22.573)  (19.308) (21.203) (22.137) 
        
Science 48.607*** 56.602*** 66.932***  -51.510*** -53.240*** -53.071*** 
 (10.574) (12.055) (15.812)  (16.249) (18.578) (18.600) 
        
Observations 2,157 1,634 1,113  3,209 2,438 1,636 
  FEMALES    FEMALES  
Mathematics 11.050 11.602 9.412  16.207 10.129 2.579 
 (16.350) (18.952) (23.564)  (11.318) (15.010) (21.739) 
        
Reading 0.896 3.155 13.632  7.913 1.553 -8.546 
 (18.381) (21.168) (21.205)  (12.644) (16.166) (23.939) 
        
Science 9.298 9.523 10.392  16.910 14.040 9.852 
 (18.943) (21.459) (23.252)  (13.299) (17.327) (22.128) 
        
Observations 2,071 1,578 1,045  3,310 2,530 1,689 
Notes: The reported estimated treatment effects are from separate estimations of different specifications. 
All regressions include dummy variables for month of birth, year and country fixed effects, a dummy 
variable for all children born after June, interaction effects between year and the ‗post June‘ dummy, year 
and country, country and ‗post June‘. Estimations from columns 1, 2, 4, and 5 include a further dummy 
variable for all children born between September and December to account for the school entry cut-off 
date in Austria (and a year interaction). The control variables on parental background include dummy 
variables for father‘s educational attainment, school location, and migration background of the family. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by school track (more/less academic)
120
, school location, 
and gender). Estimations weighted by individual inverse probability weights provided in the PISA data 
set. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: PISA data set (OECD), own calculations.  
                                                          
120
 Since Austrian and German school types are not fully comparable, an alternative, comparable school 
type measure was constructed which differentiates between schools that do or do not provide access to 
university or college after graduation (academic track versus non-academic track).  
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4.7 Further robustness checks 
This section presents the findings from several alternative estimations, placebo 
tests and sensitivity checks in order to test the robustness of the previous results. To 
reduce the extensiveness of the tables, only results from the regressions by gender 
subgroup will be presented: the question is whether the previously found strong effects 
for boys prove robust.  
4.7.1 DID using German students as alternative control group 
A first alternative estimation strategy is to use only data from the PISA test 2006 
and to implement a DID estimator using German students as a control group (instead of 
Austrian students from the pre-reform year 2003). This estimation strategy replaces the 
assumption of a common birth month trend across years by the assumption of a 
common birth month trend across regions. Again, the results for the children of the high 
LFP group of mothers correspond to the previous findings (see Table 4-12; although the 
coefficients are slightly larger than in the original DID regressions and the effects on 
test scores in mathematics for boys become significant). For the group of mothers with 
lower LFP rates the effects remain negative, but insignificant for boys. However, the 
coefficients for the female subgroup of less educated mothers increase in size and in the 
specifications using the extended sample (i.e. children born after the Austrian school-
entry cut-off date) the coefficients become even significantly positive. Nevertheless, 
these positive effects are much smaller and less significant when using only the standard 
four months window (May-August). In contrast to Austria, the school-entry cut-off date 
in Germany is determined separately in each of the 16 federal states and thus varies 
across the country.
121
 Still, in many federal states the cut-off date is June 30 (Keil 
2005), which would coincide with the reform cut-off date. This could potentially lead to 
a violation of the common trend assumption if this causes a drop in average test scores 
around this threshold in the German sample. While the DDD estimates accounted for 
this potential drop by differencing across years, this might be a problem in the DID 
regression set up (by artificially raising the ‗treatment effect‘).  
 
  
                                                          
121
 Optimally, one could have limited the German sample to those regions, which are culturally closest to 
Austria (i.e. Bavaria, which shares a common border with Austria). Unfortunately, the international PISA 
data files do not contain regional identifiers.  
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Table 4-12: Robustness check. DID estimations using only PISA 2006 data and 
Germany as a control group. 
 
 High LFP mothers  Low LFP mothers 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 Mar-Oct Apr-Sep May-Aug  Mar-Oct Apr-Sep May-Aug 
  MALES    MALES  
Mathematics 22.887* 31.897** 34.045**  6.172 1.653 -10.321 
 (11.024) (11.212) (14.802)  (13.336) (15.374) (15.686) 
        
Reading 31.732* 40.370** 44.189*  -2.666 -7.632 -15.874 
 (16.611) (17.236) (22.632)  (16.095) (17.192) (17.525) 
        
Science 34.776** 44.846*** 51.963***  -4.358 -10.952 -21.228 
 (13.091) (12.187) (16.236)  (11.271) (12.525) (12.549) 
        
Observations 1,202 911 618  1,621 1,226 826 
  FEMALES    FEMALES  
Mathematics 15.409 15.938 21.866  22.334*** 17.954** 11.546 
 (16.665) (17.766) (18.373)  (5.781) (8.156) (11.338) 
        
Reading 5.420 4.990 12.259  14.473** 9.908 8.082 
 (14.225) (15.269) (15.076)  (6.885) (9.419) (12.153) 
        
Science 8.694 9.160 13.475  20.077** 18.477* 19.073* 
 (14.292) (15.279) (15.227)  (7.969) (9.619) (10.982) 
        
Observations 1,151 888 596  1,675 1,261 843 
Notes: The reported estimated treatment effects are from separate estimations of different specifications. 
All regressions include dummy variables for month of birth, a dummy variable for all children born after 
June. Estimations from columns (1)–(4) include a further dummy variable for all children born between 
September and December to account for the school entry cut-off date in Austria. The control variables on 
parental background include dummy variables for father‘s educational attainment, school location, and 
migration background of the family. Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by school 
programme, school location, and gender). Estimations weighted by individual inverse probability weights 
provided in the PISA data set. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: PISA data set (OECD), own 
calculations. 
4.7.2 Placebo tests 
In this subsection the results of three placebo tests are presented: First, a DID 
regression using exclusively the German subsample and treating July 1990 as pseudo 
reform month in Germany (column set (A) in Table 4-13), second, a DID regression 
using only data from the non-reform year 2003 for Austria and Germany, treating July 
1987 in Austria as pseudo reform month (column set (B) in Table 4-13), third, using the 
original DID estimation strategy based on Austria and the years 2006 and 2003, but 
using alternative months as pseudo cut-off dates of the reform, namely May 1990 and 
June 1990 (Table 4-14).   
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Table 4-13: Placebo tests using the German subsample 
 
 (A) 
DID using Germany 
only (2006 and 2003) 
 (B) 
DID using 2003 only; 
(Austria and Germany) 
 High LFP 
mothers 
Low LFP 
mothers 
 High LFP 
mothers 
Low LFP 
mothers 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 May-Aug May-Aug  May-Aug May-Aug 
 MALES  MALES 
Mathematics -18.912 28.261**  -5.108 27.613** 
 (13.572) (9.814)  (19.843) (9.970) 
      
Reading -4.714 28.811  4.011 40.045*** 
 (13.985) (16.458)  (18.768) (11.639) 
      
Science -24.595* 28.987**  -15.874 31.872** 
 (13.076) (12.100)  (18.373) (11.878) 
      
Observations 631 692  495 810 
 FEMALES  FEMALES 
Mathematics 4.981 -3.058  15.117 7.042 
 (16.789) (10.460)  (21.769) (14.299) 
      
Reading -1.027 -0.012  -0.965 13.276 
 (11.016) (8.516)  (21.035) (16.328) 
      
Science -6.044 -3.224  4.422 8.101 
 (13.003) (11.323)  (21.984) (14.966) 
      
Observations 584 736  495 846 
 
Notes: Each cell reports the treatment effect estimated using different specifications. All regressions 
include dummy variables for month of birth and a dummy variable for all children born after June as well 
as controls for father‘s educational attainment, school location, and migration background of the family. 
The regressions in the left two columns include furthermore a year dummy as well as year-post June 
interaction effect. The two columns on the right contain a country variable for Austria and an Austria-post 
June interaction effect. Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by school programme, school 
location, and gender). Estimations weighted by individual inverse probability weights provided in the 
PISA data set. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: PISA data set (OECD), own calculations. 
 
The results of the first test based on PISA data for Germany only are mostly 
insignificant for children of mothers with higher education as they should be given the 
pseudo reform assumption of the test (Table 4-13). Only the coefficient for the science 
test scores for the male sample is negative and significant at the 10 percent significance 
level. What is more worrying are the significantly positive effects of the pseudo 
treatment on maths and science test scores for sons of mothers with lower LFP rates (the 
coefficients for the girls are very small and insignificant). These results indicate that for 
 218 
 
this particular group there is a positive trend in Germany over time and this could 
possibly lead to an artificial inflation of the negative coefficients in the DDD regression 
framework. The second test, using Austrian and German PISA data from the non-
reform year 2003 again shows no significant effects for the group of children with high 
LFP mothers. This result gives more credibility to the positive effects for boys found in 
the DID regressions using Austrian and German data from 2006 (see Table 4-12). 
Furthermore, these results do not seem to support the hypothesized problem of the 
German school-entry cut-off dates. On the other hand, the results for boys of the low 
LFP group are disturbing: there seems to be an increase in test scores for this particular 
group in this regression comparing Austria with Germany which again could bring 
about the stronger negative results in the DDD framework. Hence, as long as the high 
LFP group is concerned these two placebo tests using German data tend to support the 
validity of the previous results and the use of the German data as additional control 
group. Regarding the results for children from the lower LFP group it seems that there 
might be confounding trends in Germany, which casts doubts on the reliability of the 
DDD estimates for this subgroup.      
The third placebo test using alternative pseudo reform dates is presented in 
Table 4-14. The three columns in column set (A) come from DID regressions using 
May 1, 1990 as pseudo reform date and compare the test scores of children born two 
months prior and after the pseudo reform cut-off date (born March-April versus May-
June). None of the estimated effects is significantly different for the male subsample 
(irrespective of maternal labour force participation rates). As regards the female 
subsample, all coefficients except for one are not significantly different from zero (the 
exception is a significantly negative effect for the reading score in the group of mothers 
with high LFP rates). Thus, overall, but especially regarding the male subsample, it 
seems that the placebo test supports the idea that the DID effects found in the original 
regressions are not driven by statistical outliers or seasonal/yearly patterns or trends.  
 
  
 219 
 
Table 4-14: Placebo tests using other months as pseudo reform dates 
 (A) 
Pseudo cut-off is May 1, 1990  
DID 2006+2003 
 (B) 
Pseudo cut-off is June 1, 1990 
DID 2006+2003 
 Full 
sample 
High LFP 
mothers 
Low LFP 
mothers 
 Full 
sample 
High LFP 
mothers 
Low LFP 
mothers 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 Mar-Jun Mar-Jun Mar-Jun  May-Jun May-Jun May-Jun 
  MALES    MALES  
Mathematics 4.007 -5.903 10.418  -39.341*** -69.630*** -29.584* 
 (10.081) (14.688) (12.885)  (12.065) (19.648) (15.088) 
        
Reading 7.702 -14.833 19.133  -33.873** -69.286** -23.999 
 (11.491) (17.469) (14.598)  (14.916) (26.523) (18.220) 
        
Science 1.185 -15.328 10.248  -38.284** -58.028** -34.799* 
 (11.928) (13.059) (15.292)  (17.216) (23.587) (19.251) 
        
Observations 1,432 462 970  716 226 490 
  FEMALES    FEMALES  
Mathematics 1.437 -26.332 18.209  -16.537 -33.782 -12.179 
 (11.353) (15.491) (16.229)  (15.080) (25.184) (15.695) 
        
Reading 2.017 -39.974** 25.166  -13.607 -23.318 -13.127 
 (13.365) (15.263) (19.199)  (13.753) (25.679) (13.450) 
        
Science -1.225 -23.605 12.143  0.846 -9.598 3.672 
 (9.896) (13.953) (12.958)  (14.874) (31.326) (14.183) 
        
Observations 1,361 450 911  680 222 458 
Notes: Each cell reports the treatment effect estimated using different specifications. All regressions 
include a year dummy (2006) and control for mother‘s and father‘s educational attainment, school 
location, and migration background of the family. The three left columns include furthermore control 
variables for birth months, a dummy variable for all children born after the pseudo cut-off date May 1, 
2006 (May and June) as well as year-post April interaction effect. The three columns on the right contain 
a dummy variable for all children born after the pseudo cut-off date June 1, 2006 and an interaction of 
this dummy with the year dummy 2006. Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by school 
programme, school location, and gender). Estimations weighted by individual inverse probability weights 
provided in the PISA data set. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: PISA data set (OECD), own 
calculations. 
 
However, turning to the three columns on the right which treat June 2006 (the 
month prior to the actual reform) as pseudo reform date and including only one pre and 
post pseudo-reform months (May and June) the picture looks less promising. Although 
the placebo test would require all coefficients to be insignificant, the estimated pseudo-
reform effects are significantly negative and quite large for the male subgroup (although 
the samples become extremely small) and negative but insignificant for the girls. This 
finding is puzzling and the question is, whether June 2003 or June 2006 are outliers in 
the data who drive the original effects (if there is a negative June effect, than the 
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estimated positive treatment effect of the reform on July 1 for sons of higher LFP 
mothers might be driven by this negative pre-reform effect). The significant June effects 
are worrying and require a further repetition of the original DID estimates excluding 
children born in June to test to what extent the June effect seems to be driving the result 
(see next section). 
Generally, it could also be that June 2003 is an outlier and it would be helpful to 
test this possibility by repeating the DID analysis using another control year with PISA 
test scores from Austria instead of PISA 2003. Alternative robustness checks could have 
involved data from the Austrian PISA tests 2000 and 2009 (i.e., birth cohorts 1984 and 
1993). However, several problems with data from these two years made them unsuitable 
for this purpose.
122
 First of all, the sample of schools included in the sample frame in 
the year 2000 was biased, since students enrolled in ‗combined school and work‘ 
vocational programmes were systematically underrepresented. Furthermore, substantial 
revisions of the student background questionnaire between 2000 and 2003 make it 
impossible to construct comparable and consistent categories of parental education. As 
regards the 2009 data,  
“a dispute between teacher unions and the education minister in Austria led to 
the announcement of a boycott of PISA which was withdrawn after the first week of 
testing. The boycott required the OECD to remove identifiable cases from the dataset. 
Although the Austrian dataset met the PISA 2009 technical standards after the removal 
of these cases, the negative atmosphere in relation to education assessments affected the 
conditions under which the assessment was administered and could have adversely 
affected student motivation to respond to the PISA tasks” (see footnote 122).  
An even bigger problem that impedes the inclusion of the 2009 data into the 
analysis comes from the fact that the cohort of included children (born in 1993), were 
the first cohort to be affected by stricter school entry rules (entry into first grade) that 
came into effect at the beginning of the school year 1999/2000. An amendment to the 
school law caused an increase in compliance with the school-entry cut-off date 
regulations. As a consequence the rate of children entering school late became much 
smaller. It is possible that these stricter school entry regulations led to an increase of 
repetition rates for children, who would have otherwise started school one year later. 
These changes and consequences affected mainly children born shortly before the cut-
off date of September 1, i.e. born in August or July. Thus, there is a different trend over 
                                                          
122
 See also the information on ‗Anomalies in PISA data‘ available on the OECD web-site, 
http://www.pisa.oecd.org/document/53/0,3746,en_32252351_32235731_38262901_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
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time regarding the relative composition of July and August children in terms of age at 
school entry and subsequent school experiences in comparison with children born in 
other months of the year. 
4.7.3 DID estimates excluding June children 
As explained above, it is possible that the estimated treatment effect found in the 
earlier regressions is driven by an unexpectedly negative trend in test scores of June 
children (while these could be driven either by June 2003 test scores being unnaturally 
high or June 2006 test scores being unnaturally low). This is why the previous DID 
estimations are repeated without including June children in the estimation sample. 
Certainly, given the rather small size of the estimation sample, dropping observations 
from an entire birth month affects the precision of the estimates. Furthermore, the post-
reform results – including the potentially problematic August and September children 
due to the school-entry effect – receive relatively more weight. Table 4-15 shows the 
main results for the different sample specifications (symmetric extension to the left and 
to the right of the reform cut-off, as well as including only July and/or August as post-
reform months) and also for the DID estimates using only 2006 and German students 
instead of Austrian students from 2003 as control group (the two columns on the right 
of the table).  
Once June is excluded from the sample, the estimated coefficients for children 
from the group of mothers with higher maternal LFP rates become much smaller in size 
and mostly insignificant. In fact, the estimated treatment effects become negative for 
girls across all subjects and for boys with respect to mathematics test scores. 
Nevertheless, the estimated treatment effects on reading and science for the male 
subsample remain positive and are partly significantly different from zero on the ten 
percent level (column two and four). The estimated treatment effects for children whose 
mothers have a lower LFP rate become more negative. In contrary, the re-estimated 
DID estimates based on the 2006 data with Germany as control region remain 
significantly positive for boys of mothers with higher LFP rates (columns eleven and 
twelve). 
  
 
2
2
2
 
Table 4-15: DID estimates excluding children born in June from the regressions 
 DID estimates (Austria 2006/2003)  
DID 2006 estimates 
(Austria/Germany) 
 High LFP mothers  Low LFP mothers  
High LFP 
mothers 
Low LFP 
mothers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)  (11) (12) 
 Apr-Sep Apr-Aug May-Aug Apr-Jul May-Jul  Apr-Sep Apr-Aug May-Aug Apr-Jul May-Jul  May-Aug May-Aug 
MALES             
  
Mathematics -3.562 -3.053 -11.802 3.795 -5.300  -7.246 -6.937 -22.481 -6.216 -20.677  41.468* -18.153 
 (12.295) (12.512) (18.361) (15.792) (20.934)  (12.541) (12.471) (13.925) (12.390) (15.499)  (22.332) (23.099) 
               
Reading 11.644 12.055 6.050 30.448 25.624  -23.291 -22.913 -37.972** -15.547 -29.394*  50.809* -33.143 
 (12.504) (12.905) (17.999) (17.910) (22.745)  (14.776) (14.860) (13.744) (13.800) (14.822)  (27.692) (25.717) 
               
Science 18.735 20.302* 17.775 29.408* 26.449  -24.883* -24.807* -39.587** -27.274** -40.945**  55.520** -33.025* 
 (11.360) (11.718) (16.363) (14.842) (19.116)  (13.158) (13.097) (15.462) (12.149) (16.484)  (21.224) (18.487) 
Observations 618 496 384 359 247  1,154 931 701 707 477  476 633 
FEMALES               
Mathematics -7.214 -6.956 -5.076 -11.251 -10.699  5.338 5.207 -7.976 3.350 -10.154  7.875 13.223 
 (13.109) (13.306) (20.421) (31.011) (34.851)  (9.369) (9.538) (12.049) (15.356) (18.596)  (20.875) (9.925) 
               
Reading -14.864 -13.951 -1.744 -16.931 -5.742  5.035 4.971 -15.054 0.264 -22.413  -6.757 -5.276 
 (15.295) (15.410) (24.619) (25.117) (33.059)  (10.851) (10.917) (16.558) (17.410) (23.475)  (17.222) (15.172) 
               
Science -10.327 -9.636 -1.957 -14.274 -7.914  12.026 12.053 7.861 12.846 6.944  -10.257 17.605 
 (16.195) (16.227) (25.967) (24.400) (32.539)  (11.488) (11.535) (14.290) (18.790) (22.166)  (16.709) (11.550) 
Observations 604 479 356 354 231  1,201 951 711 691 451  461 655 
Notes: Each cell reports the estimated treatment effects from separate DID regressions controlling for the standard set of background variables as in the original regressions in 
Section 4.6. Children born in June are excluded from the estimation sample. Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by school programme, school location, and gender). 
Estimations weighted by individual inverse probability weights provided in the PISA data set. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: PISA data set (OECD), own calculations.
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To sum up, omitting June children from the estimation reduces the estimates. 
The previously positive treatment effects for boys from better educated mothers become 
insignificant in most specifications. Since these regressions gave relatively more weight 
to the post-reform birth months, the remaining question is to what extent the findings 
(including and excluding June) are affected by the proximity to the school-entry cut-off 
date and the corresponding higher fraction of students in lower grade levels in the post-
reform months. This will be analysed in the following section. 
4.7.4 DID estimates of other schooling outcomes and the role of retained students  
To better understand the underlying mechanisms of the previous findings as well 
as the potentially confounding role of the school-entry cut-off age effect two further 
analyses are conducted. The first set of regressions repeats the DID estimations using 
alternative schooling outcomes, namely whether a student is in a lower than regular 
grade level given his birth month and whether a student is enrolled in the academic 
track. The research question motivating these regressions is whether the reform had an 
effect on these schooling outcomes as well. If so, the estimated treatment effect of the 
reform based on test scores might partly be driven by these mechanisms and the 
consequential grade composition of students for each birth month (more or less regular 
or retained students in the post-reform months July and August). Unfortunately, the data 
do not allow disentangling the reasons why students are in a lower than regular grade 
level. This could be either due to deferred school entry or to grade repetition.  
The regression results for the effect of the extended maternal leave period on the 
two alternative schooling outcomes are reported in Table 4-16. Overall, the effects for 
both outcomes are small and in most of the cases not significantly different from zero. 
Nevertheless, there seem to be differences between the two groups of mothers: for the 
group of mothers with lower LFP rates (column 3) the results suggest that the extended 
leave period increased the likelihood that treated children are significantly more likely 
to be in a lower than regular grade level. This effect is significantly positive in the 
pooled male and female sample, but seems to be even more pronounced for girls than 
for boys. In line with these findings the coefficients of the reform on the propensity to 
be enrolled in the academic track are all negative. However, none of these estimates is 
significant.  
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In contrast, the results for children whose mothers have higher LFP rates are 
close to zero and are all not significantly different from zero. In the pooled male and 
female sample (column 2, top panel) the signs of the coefficients point to a potentially 
negative effect of the parental leave reform on the likelihood to be retained and a 
positive effect on being enrolled in an academic track school (none of the results for this 
group of mothers is significant though).  
 
Table 4-16: Probability of being in lower than regular grade level (grade retention) 
or being enrolled in the academic track (linear probability models) 
 DID 2006 and 2003 
Two months window 
May – August 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Full sample High LFP mothers Low LFP 
mothers 
  
MALES + 
FEMALES 
 
Retained 0.055 -0.022 0.089** 
 (0.035) (0.059) (0.041) 
    
Academic track -0.042 0.004 -0.067 
 (0.034) (0.059) (0.043) 
    
Observations 2,840 943 1,897 
  MALES  
Retained 0.019 -0.031 0.042 
 (0.051) (0.090) (0.049) 
    
Academic track -0.044 -0.005 -0.064 
 (0.036) (0.062) (0.047) 
    
Observations 1,426 482 944 
  FEMALES 
 
Retained 0.089** 0.002 0.137** 
 (0.040) (0.077) (0.062) 
    
Academic track -0.047 0.019 -0.065 
 (0.057) (0.091) (0.073) 
    
Observations 1,414 461 953 
Notes: Each cell reports the estimated treatment effects from separate DID regressions controlling for the 
standard set of background variables as in the original regressions in Section 4.6. The dependent variables 
are two dummy variables indicating whether a student is enrolled in a lower than regular grade level 
given his birth date and whether the student is enrolled in the academic track. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses (clustered by school programme, school location, and gender). Estimations weighted by 
individual inverse probability weights provided in the PISA data set. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: PISA data set (OECD), own calculations.  
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There also appear to be some differences between boys and girls which however 
seem to be driven by the subgroup of girls from mothers with lower LFP rates. For the 
boys, all of the estimated effects are statistically significant and close to zero. The same 
is true for daughters of mothers with higher LFP rates (no significant effects). However, 
in the full sample (all mothers) of girls the results seem to suggest a positive and 
statistically significant effect of the reform on the likelihood to be retained. This result 
seems to be driven by the group with low LFP mothers though.  
To sum up, although the estimated coefficients are suggestive, they are all close 
to zero and mainly not significant. Most importantly, for the group of children from 
mothers with higher LFP rates there seems to be no effect of the reform on the two 
outcomes. In the full sample estimation for females as well as for the subgroup of 
mothers with lower LFP rates, there seems to be an effect on the likelihood to be in a 
lower than regular grade level. This could explain the respective negative findings in the 
test score regressions. 
The next test repeats the DID estimations for the test score outcomes from 
Section 4.6.2, but limits the estimation sample to students who are not retained but 
currently enrolled in the regular grade level according to their birth month and the 
school-entry cut-off regulations. This will generally increase the average test scores in 
each birth month, since students in lower grades have lower test scores on average as 
they have less years of formal schooling and have covered less material in school. In 
addition, this will probably reduce the variance of test scores in each birth month 
(especially in the months close to the school-entry cut-off where there are more children 
on lower grade levels). 
The first six columns in Table 4-17 are based on regressions including the 
potentially problematic month of June, while the six columns on the right side of the 
table are based on regressions excluding children born in June. Certainly, if the 
likelihood of a student‘s retention is in itself affected by the reform and thus an outcome 
variable of the reform, it is problematic to split the sample according to this variable. 
However, the previous results have shown that there is no significant reform effect on 
the probability of grade retention for children of mothers with higher LFP rates and on 
boys; the exception are daughters of mothers with lower LFP – and, hence, the results 
for this subgroup have to be interpreted cautiously.  
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The results in the first six columns from Table 4-17 can be compared to the 
results from Table 4-9 as these are estimated using the same estimation windows 
(samples with gradually narrowed birth month estimation windows). The general 
pattern of the estimated treatment effects corresponds well to the one using the full 
sample. However, the positive treatment effects for sons from mothers with higher LFP 
rates are slightly larger and slightly more significant, while the negative effect on sons 
of mothers with lower LFP rates become slightly weaker and less significant. The 
results for the female subsamples change only marginally, but remain insignificant. 
What is more interesting: repeating this set of estimations excluding children born in 
June does not affect these findings dramatically. The effect of the parental leave 
extension remains positive and large (and is significantly different from zero in many 
specifications) for sons of mothers with higher LFP rates. The estimated effects for the 
girls are not significantly different from zero through all specifications and for all 
subjects. On the other hand, the negative effect of the reform on children from mothers 
with lower LPF rates becomes slightly larger and partly significant; however, only in 
the May to August specification do the boys‘ test scores on reading and science seem to 
be significantly affected by the reform. 
Hence, although the parental leave reform has only negligible and insignificant 
effects on the likelihood of being retained for the subsample of children with mothers 
with higher LFP rates (as shown in Table 4-16), the restriction of the sample to ‗regular‘ 
students seems to reduce the sensitivity of the results with respect to the exclusion of 
June. However, if anything, boys with higher LFP mothers seem to be less likely to be 
retained as a result of the reform (even though the coefficient is not significant), 
meaning that restricting the sample to ‗regular‘ students should actually work in the 
other direction (making the reform effect less positive). Overall, even though it could be 
critical to restrict the sample to ‗regular‘ students, it helps to get an impression of how 
grade retention of students close to the school-entry cut-off date affect the DID results 
(namely through a possible downward bias). 
 
  
 
2
2
7
 
Table 4-17: DID estimates using only students in „regular‟ grades (including and excluding June births) 
 Regressions based on regular students, including June  Regressions based on regular students, excluding June 
 High LFP mothers  Low LFP mothers  High LFP mothers  Low LFP mothers 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9)  (10) (11) (12) 
 Mar-Oct Apr-Sep May-Aug  Mar-Oct Apr-Sep May-Aug  Mar-Oct Apr-Sep May-Aug  Mar-Oct Apr-Sep May-Aug 
MALES                
Mathematics 22.924 25.806* 34.498*  3.848 3.164 -1.665  12.712 10.751 14.553  1.114 -1.890 -18.257 
 (14.680) (12.610) (17.440)  (8.758) (10.706) (13.062)  (16.200) (14.773) (22.068)  (8.979) (12.115) (11.744) 
                
Reading 37.448*** 40.073*** 46.034**  -13.098 -17.583 -22.845  27.349** 26.243** 26.485  -14.438 -21.957 -37.660** 
 (8.680) (8.678) (16.907)  (12.289) (14.401) (15.197)  (10.483) (10.880) (20.688)  (12.810) (16.652) (13.297) 
                
Science 49.459*** 54.125*** 66.762***  -9.099 -11.633 -16.041  40.195*** 41.450*** 51.701**  -12.028 -17.283 -33.328** 
 (11.867) (10.108) (15.647)  (9.836) (12.252) (15.431)  (13.594) (12.075) (21.050)  (9.551) (12.645) (12.222) 
Observations 704 504 305  1,496 1,076 707  637 437 238  1,308 888 519 
FEMALES                
Mathematics -2.633 4.970 12.703  7.594 2.813 3.047  -12.112 -4.003 -1.171  6.050 -1.977 -7.861 
 (17.865) (17.758) (21.009)  (8.225) (9.050) (12.725)  (20.275) (20.296) (25.229)  (8.215) (8.525) (11.914) 
                
Reading -10.685 -1.671 13.178  2.323 -0.630 -2.665  -20.881 -12.360 3.265  1.105 -3.845 -12.066 
 (20.900) (20.847) (25.449)  (9.911) (10.597) (15.513)  (21.133) (20.729) (27.753)  (9.930) (10.229) (17.009) 
                
Science -4.932 1.055 9.103  10.972 5.710 9.090  -10.736 -4.429 4.575  11.294 3.445 7.326 
 (19.124) (20.332) (22.878)  (11.378) (12.151) (13.979)  (21.303) (23.818) (31.441)  (11.835) (13.492) (17.153) 
Observations 746 555 351  1,576 1,162 740  661 470 266  1,379 965 543 
Notes: Each cell reports the estimated treatment effects from separate DID regressions controlling for the standard set of background variables as in the original regressions in 
Section 4.6. The estimation sample includes only children in regular grade levels (according to their birth months). Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by school 
programme, school location, and gender). Estimations weighted by individual inverse probability weights provided in the PISA data set. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: 
PISA data set (OECD), own calculations. 
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4.8 Conclusions 
The objective of the empirical analysis presented in this chapter was to 
investigate whether a substantial extension of the paid and job-protected Austrian 
parental leave mandate – from the child‘s first to the child‘s second birthday – had any 
medium-term effects on the cognitive development of children. What makes the 
Austrian parental leave reform particularly suitable for a causal Difference-in-
Difference (DID) analysis is that it was implemented with a strict and unanticipated cut-
off date: only those mothers who gave birth to their child on or after July 1, 1990 
became eligible for the more generous 24 months parental leave duration. As a 
consequence of this unexpected cut-off date the allocation of mothers and their children 
into treatment (24 months parental leave entitlements) and control (12 months parental 
leave) group was ‗as good as random‘. This exogenous discontinuity in parental leave 
duration helps to control for the problem of the otherwise endogenous return-to-work 
decision. Another advantage of this particular Austrian reform is that it did not seem to 
have any effects on medium or long-term labour market outcomes of mothers and only 
a small positive effect on fertility (as shown by previous studies). 
To assess the effect of the parental leave extension on child outcomes the 
empirical analysis made use of mathematics, reading and science test scores from the 
standardized PISA test (using the cohort born in the year of the reform 1990 as well as a 
control birth cohort which was not subject to a reform, 1987; the corresponding PISA 
tests were conducted in the years 2006 and 2003). Since the data do only contain 
information on maternal and paternal educational attainment, but neither on parental 
leave eligibility nor on actual leave taking, the estimated effects resemble intention-to-
treat estimates (net reduced form effects).  
The results of the DID analyses and several robustness checks reveal that there 
seem to be heterogeneous effects of the parental leave reform on PISA test scores across 
estimation samples and subgroups. When using the full sample, the estimates suggest 
that the 12 months parental leave extension did not have any statistically significant 
causal medium-run effects on cognitive skills. This finding for Austria is in line with the 
results of most of the studies using changes in parental leave mandates to identify the 
causal effect of early maternal employment on child outcomes (in particular, Canada 
 229 
(Baker and Milligan 2010a, b), Denmark (Würtz Rasmussen 2010), Germany (Dustman 
and Schönberg 2010) and Sweden (Liu and Nordstrom Skans 2010)).  
However, when splitting the sample into two groups of mothers with higher and 
lower labour force participation rates respectively (i.e., higher and lower educational 
attainment), interesting findings emerge: for the children of mothers with higher labour 
force participation rates and who are thus more likely to have been eligible and affected 
by the reform, there appears to be a significantly positive effect of the parental leave 
extension on the PISA test scores at age 15. This positive result seems to be especially 
driven by the large and significant effect on boys. Such a positive reform effect among 
the group of more eligible mothers would generally correspond to the findings by 
Carneiro, Løken and Salvanes (2010) for Norway: while their analysis using the full 
sample produces insignificant results, the estimated effects using the subsample of 
eligible mothers (which they can identify in the data) reveals significantly positive 
effects of a prolonged parental leave period up to the child‘s first birthday. Furthermore, 
Liu and Nordstrom Skans (2010) also find positive effects for their assessed parental 
leave extension in Sweden when restricting the sample to children of mothers with 
higher education. The other studies do either not test or simply do not find any 
differences according to maternal parental leave eligibility or educational status. The 
same is true for gender differences: while there exists some evidence of heterogeneous 
health outcomes of girls and boys with respect to early maternal employment, the 
previous evaluation studies of parental leave on cognitive child outcomes have not 
tested or not found corresponding gender effects. Against this background, the 
presumably stronger effect of the Austrian parental leave extension on boys points to an 
interesting aspect which should be explored in more detail in future research. 
Although these empirical results are robust to various sensitivity checks – 
including Difference-in-Difference-in-Differences estimations using Germany as an 
additional control region which was not affected by the 1990 parental leave reform – the 
findings seem to be sensitive to the exclusion of children born in the pre-reform month 
June 1990. Hence, although the results suggest a significantly positive and causal 
reform effect for children of mothers with higher labour force participation rates one has 
to be cautious about drawing any final policy conclusions. Nevertheless, as already 
highlighted and demonstrated by Carneiro, Løken and Salvanes (2010) for Norway it 
seems to be very important for the analysis to differentiate between mothers who are 
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eligible or ineligible for parental leave. Furthermore, the estimated reform effects are 
only informative about the net impact of the parental leave extension on cognitive child 
outcomes at age 15 (reduced form estimations). This is true for the present as well as for 
the majority of the cited evaluation studies (which all lack relevant information on 
eligibility, actual leave taking and maternal time investments in child rearing). Hence, it 
remains an important task for future research to investigate in more depth the 
transmission channels through which parental leave mandates might affect child 
outcomes. Besides the role played by maternal care for children another important 
transmission channel might work through – potentially reduced – paternal time with 
children if fathers adjust their time allocation between family and work in response to 
the extended leave duration of mothers. Such a reduction in paternal child care – which 
might be particularly relevant in low-income families – could actually offset any 
positive effects of additional maternal time.  
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4.9 Appendix to Chapter 4 
 
Figure A 4-1: Seasonal birth pattern (average number of live births per day across 
months) 
 
Notes: Birth data refer to the resident population of Austria (permanent residents), irrespective of 
citizenship, and do not include births registered abroad. Migrants having stayed in Austria less than 3 
months are not counted in the resident population. Source: Human Fertility Database (monthly birth 
numbers). Daily number of births based on own calculations. 
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Table A 4-1: Female labour force participation rates in selected countries (% of 
female population ages 15-64) 
  1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2009 
Australia 52.0 54.4 61.9 64.2 65.5 68.2 70.1 
Austria 49.9 50.8 55.3 62.2 62.3 65.5 68.4 
Denmark 71.7 74.8 77.6 73.3 75.4 75.8 76.5 
France 55.2 56.5 57.7 60.5 62.3 64.8 65.5 
Germany 52.0 52.3 57.8 61.5 63.5 68.0 71.2 
Italy 39.7 39.9 43.6 42.5 46.2 50.4 51.8 
Netherlands 48.2 48.4 52.4 58.2 65.6 70.0 73.7 
Norway 61.8 67.1 69.9 72.2 76.2 74.5 75.7 
Spain 33.1 34.5 41.4 45.8 51.8 58.2 63.1 
Sweden 75.0 78.9 81.9 77.3 74.8 76.4 77.0 
Switzerland 64.9 66.0 68.2 69.1 71.7 74.3 76.4 
United Kingdom 56.3 61.0 66.1 65.9 67.7 68.7 69.4 
United States 59.8 63.9 67.5 69.4 70.4 68.6 68.1 
Notes: Labour force participation rate is defined as the proportion of the economically active population 
aged 15-64. Source: World Bank (2011). Gender Statistics Database. 
 
 
Table A 4-2: Overview of reduction of original sample size due to sample 
restriction and item-non-response  
 
 
2006  2003 
 
Children born  Children born 
  
January-
December 
May-
August 
 January-
December 
May- 
August 
Original sample size 4,906 1,640  4,597 1,574 
... after excluding students not born 
in Austria 
4,456 1,503 
 
4,126 1,410 
... after excluding students in 
schools for children with special 
needs 
4,439 1,499 
 
4,102 1,401 
... after excluding students with 
missing educational information 
of mother 
4,372 1,480 
 
4,034 1,379 
Final sample with non-missing 
information of included control 
variables 
 
1,480 
 
 
1,360 
This corresponds to % of original 
sample 
 
90.2% 
 
 
86.4% 
Notes: The table informs about the reduction of the original PISA 2006 and 2003 samples due to sample 
restrictions and missing observations. Source: PISA data set (OECD), own calculations. 
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Table A 4-3: DID estimates, further specifications  
 
 
 (A) 
Additional controls for school 
programme  
Two months window (May-Aug) 
 (B) 
One month window (Jun-Jul) 
Main specification (standard 
control variables) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 Full 
sample 
High LFP 
mothers 
Low 
LFP 
mothers 
 Full 
sample 
High LFP 
mothers 
Low 
LFP 
mothers 
 MALES + FEMALES  MALES + FEMALES 
Mathematics 5.802 20.335*** -1.843  15.827 46.545*** 3.851 
 (4.643) (6.742) (6.559)  (11.000) (17.205) (14.990) 
        
Reading -0.463 24.799** -13.269*  11.118 55.814*** -8.905 
 (6.264) (10.191) (6.643)  (11.624) (18.600) (14.871) 
        
Science 5.841 26.334*** -5.070  11.370 45.131*** -3.056 
 (5.559) (7.816) (6.793)  (11.633) (15.713) (15.429) 
  MALES    MALES  
Mathematics 6.482 18.951** -1.565  22.142* 59.477*** 3.493 
 (6.176) (8.810) (9.276)  (12.254) (13.847) (18.967) 
        
Reading -1.770 32.890** -19.939*  22.062 89.072*** -7.507 
 (8.348) (14.420) (9.674)  (15.176) (24.605) (21.125) 
        
Science 4.479 41.727*** -16.264  19.684 80.092*** -8.818 
 (7.316) (9.158) (10.110)  (15.128) (17.602) (22.173) 
  FEMALES    FEMALES  
Mathematics 6.005 17.721 -1.131  8.832 29.720 1.123 
 (6.815) (12.052) (9.133)  (17.555) (32.105) (24.157) 
        
Reading 0.230 15.905 -6.717  0.361 25.030 -8.991 
 (9.373) (16.923) (8.592)  (16.869) (25.715) (22.423) 
        
Science 7.763 7.868 7.344  3.288 6.676 3.341 
 (8.234) (12.725) (9.874)  (17.108) (23.328) (24.125) 
        
Controls         
Parental background        
School programme     - - - 
Notes: The upper panel includes only male, the lower panel only female students. All regressions include 
dummy variable controls for survey year, birth months and for all children born post June. The control 
variables on parental background include dummy variables for mother‘s and father‘s educational 
attainment, school location, migration background and for the five different school types. The sample size 
for the pooled samples (top panel; row 1 and 3) are 2,840 and 1,386 respectively. Robust standard errors 
in parentheses (clustered by school programme, school location, and gender). Estimations weighted by 
individual inverse probability weights provided in the PISA data set. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: PISA data set (OECD), own calculations. 
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Table A 4-4: DID estimates, including only one „post-reform‟ month (July) 
 
 
 High LFP mothers  Low LFP mothers 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 Mar-Jul Apr-Jul May-Jul  Mar-Jul Apr-Jul May-Jul 
 MALES + FEMALES  MALES + FEMALES 
Mathematics 8.229 12.587 18.436  1.140 -0.269 -6.783 
 (15.021) (15.374) (16.278)  (9.949) (10.906) (13.139) 
        
Reading 17.776 22.329 28.804*  -7.819 -9.188 -16.252 
 (13.783) (14.203) (15.804)  (10.120) (10.705) (12.468) 
        
Science 15.428 20.104 26.311*  -5.060 -6.768 -10.773 
 (12.239) (12.719) (13.670)  (10.978) (11.397) (13.389) 
        
Observations 1,145 916 681  2,346 1,883 1,413 
  MALES    MALES  
Mathematics 20.046 20.516 22.530  -2.083 -2.593 -8.195 
 (13.042) (13.605) (15.253)  (10.263) (11.900) (14.752) 
        
Reading 45.181*** 47.766** 52.335**  -9.156 -12.951 -18.941 
 (16.062) (17.502) (19.672)  (11.375) (12.760) (15.171) 
        
Science 41.839*** 44.333*** 49.019***  -19.719* -21.487* -25.685 
 (12.292) (13.026) (14.065)  (11.359) (12.091) (15.982) 
        
Observations 581 457 345  1,200 950 720 
  FEMALES    FEMALES  
Mathematics -3.534 1.535 10.342  5.569 3.115 -3.839 
 (28.181) (29.468) (31.116)  (15.939) (17.161) (20.301) 
        
Reading -11.181 -3.387 10.113  -0.699 -2.565 -15.003 
 (22.966) (23.740) (26.898)  (16.582) (17.788) (21.782) 
        
Science -11.819 -7.059 0.125  12.778 10.421 6.205 
 (20.282) (21.443) (23.573)  (18.620) (19.504) (21.794) 
        
Observations 564 459 336  1,146 933 693 
Notes: The reported estimated treatment effects stem from separate estimations of different specifications 
based on the Austrian PISA data 2006 and 2003. All regressions include dummy variables for month of 
birth, a year dummy for 2006, a dummy variable for all children born after June. The control variables on 
parental background include dummy variables for father‘s educational attainment, school location, and 
migration background of the family. Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by school 
programme, school location, and gender). Estimations weighted by individual inverse probability weights 
provided in the PISA data set. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: PISA data set (OECD), own 
calculations. 
  
 235 
Table A 4-5: DID estimations excluding observations from Vienna. 
 
 High LFP mothers  Low LFP mothers 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 Mar-Oct Apr-Sep May-Aug  Mar-Oct Apr-Sep May-Aug 
  MALES    MALES  
Mathematics 15.760 17.056 15.945  3.062 6.102 1.903 
 (12.834) (11.867) (15.894)  (9.063) (9.876) (10.871) 
        
Reading 32.536** 36.820** 42.002**  -12.455 -11.839 -15.642 
 (13.646) (14.137) (16.713)  (10.876) (12.445) (11.604) 
        
Science 35.190*** 40.442*** 44.329***  -9.637 -7.091 -9.195 
 (12.157) (12.663) (14.160)  (9.581) (9.339) (10.815) 
        
Observations 784 586 391  1,590 1,205 824 
  FEMALES    FEMALES  
Mathematics 6.716 11.041 24.195  2.743 0.766 -2.255 
 (10.694) (11.801) (16.923)  (9.447) (10.843) (14.919) 
        
Reading -1.750 3.669 20.118  5.595 2.452 0.509 
 (15.200) (15.160) (20.835)  (9.983) (11.019) (15.014) 
        
Science -4.031 -0.906 9.784  8.535 5.756 6.486 
 (12.914) (13.848) (17.708)  (10.845) (12.040) (14.731) 
        
Observations 785 602 396  1,695 1,273 845 
Notes: The reported estimated treatment effects stem from separate estimations of different specifications 
based on the Austrian PISA data 2006 and 2003. The sample excludes children living in Vienna. All 
regressions include dummy variables for month of birth, a year dummy for 2006, a dummy variable for 
all children born after June. The control variables on parental background include dummy variables for 
father‘s educational attainment, school location, and migration background of the family. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses (clustered by school programme, school location, and gender). Estimations weighted 
by individual inverse probability weights provided in the PISA data set. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: PISA data set (OECD), own calculations. 
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Table A 4-6: DDD estimates, including only two „post-reform‟ months (July and 
August) 
 
 High LFP mothers  Low LFP mothers 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 Mar-Aug Apr-Aug May-Aug  Mar-Aug Apr-Aug May-Aug 
 MALES + FEMALES  MALES + FEMALES 
Mathematics 18.991* 21.884* 22.765  -5.564 -9.276 -17.131 
 (9.963) (11.259) (14.804)  (10.109) (11.773) (14.101) 
        
Reading 18.470 20.374 25.079  -22.205* -25.883* -30.991* 
 (13.437) (15.170) (17.315)  (12.420) (13.402) (15.499) 
        
Science 28.977** 33.443** 37.808**  -14.057 -16.326 -20.919 
 (11.869) (13.328) (15.267)  (11.478) (13.253) (14.809) 
        
Observations 3,143 2,645 2,158  4,877 4,111 3,325 
  MALES    MALES  
Mathematics 28.337** 32.937** 38.109**  -32.050* -33.276* -37.219** 
 (13.109) (13.506) (18.223)  (16.075) (17.255) (16.667) 
        
Reading 32.141* 36.247* 40.010*  -53.978** -55.936** -57.088** 
 (16.556) (18.176) (22.573)  (19.885) (21.458) (22.137) 
        
Science 48.457*** 56.952*** 66.932***  -50.191*** -52.185** -53.071*** 
 (10.736) (11.991) (15.812)  (16.658) (18.681) (18.600) 
        
Observations 1,615 1,350 1,113  2,410 2,014 1,636 
  FEMALES    FEMALES  
Mathematics 11.277 11.569 9.412  16.768 11.147 2.579 
 (16.250) (18.794) (23.564)  (11.624) (15.431) (21.739) 
        
Reading 1.167 3.640 13.632  8.589 2.491 -8.546 
 (18.502) (21.409) (21.205)  (12.821) (16.398) (23.939) 
        
Science 9.526 9.598 10.392  17.281 14.894 9.852 
 (19.197) (21.652) (23.252)  (13.708) (17.689) (22.128) 
        
Observations 1,528 1,295 1,045  2,467 2,097 1,689 
Notes: The reported estimated treatment effects stem from separate estimations of different specifications. 
All regressions include dummy variables for month of birth, year and country fixed effects, a dummy 
variable for all children born after June, interaction effects between year and the ‗post June‘ dummy, year 
and country, country and ‗post June‘. The control variables on parental background include dummy 
variables for father‘s educational attainment, school location, and migration background of the family. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by school track (more/less academic), school location, 
and gender). Estimations weighted by individual inverse probability weights provided in the PISA data 
set. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: PISA data set (OECD), own calculations. 
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Table A 4-7: DDD estimates, including only one „post-reform‟ month (July) 
 
 High LFP mothers  Low LFP mothers 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 Mar-Jul Apr-Jul May-Jul  Mar-Jul Apr-Jul May-Jul 
 MALES + FEMALES  MALES + FEMALES 
Mathematics 23.787* 27.064* 28.006  -12.450 -16.021 -24.164 
 (13.928) (14.826) (17.540)  (12.830) (14.956) (17.880) 
        
Reading 29.370* 31.610* 35.799*  -20.369 -23.877 -29.145 
 (16.311) (17.557) (18.973)  (14.704) (16.108) (18.571) 
        
Science 36.203** 41.148** 45.302***  -19.369 -21.599 -26.645 
 (14.061) (15.300) (16.807)  (14.772) (16.903) (19.038) 
        
Observations 2,566 2,068 1,581  4,017 3,251 2,465 
  MALES    MALES  
Mathematics 26.028 30.699 35.408  -37.074*** -37.652** -41.197*** 
 (21.021) (20.366) (23.135)  (12.042) (14.257) (14.221) 
        
Reading 43.741* 48.882* 52.053*  -51.579*** -52.982*** -53.417*** 
 (22.900) (24.392) (27.165)  (16.004) (17.679) (18.416) 
        
Science 54.234*** 63.334*** 73.115***  -57.985*** -59.688*** -60.479*** 
 (18.995) (18.917) (20.420)  (10.752) (13.951) (15.451) 
        
Observations 1,306 1,041 804  2,002 1,606 1,228 
  FEMALES    FEMALES  
Mathematics 21.529 22.319 21.237  10.292 4.967 -4.348 
 (21.740) (24.856) (30.430)  (20.344) (23.908) (30.504) 
        
Reading 6.228 8.959 18.564  3.392 -2.553 -14.082 
 (18.633) (19.764) (21.419)  (23.260) (27.553) (34.500) 
        
Science 16.580 17.040 18.002  15.769 13.669 7.646 
 (19.553) (22.626) (26.049)  (24.241) (28.202) (32.892) 
        
Observations 1,260 1,027 777  2,015 1,645 1,237 
Notes: The reported estimated treatment effects stem from separate estimations of different specifications. 
All regressions include dummy variables for month of birth, year and country fixed effects, a dummy 
variable for all children born after June, interaction effects between year and the ‗post June‘ dummy, year 
and country, country and ‗post June‘. The control variables on parental background include dummy 
variables for father‘s educational attainment, school location, and migration background of the family. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by school track (more/less academic), school location, 
and gender). Estimations weighted by individual inverse probability weights provided in the PISA data 
set. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: PISA data set (OECD), own calculations.  
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5 Conclusions 
This thesis has empirically investigated three distinct research questions in the 
fields of subjective well-being and human capital formation. The main objective was to 
shed light on the causal effect of specific determinants of job and life satisfaction as 
well as of cognitive skills. To this end, each of the three chapters took advantage of 
specific exogenous events which allowed the implementation of quasi-experimental 
research designs. 
The first research question of the thesis (Chapter 2) posed the question whether 
the observed positive gap in job satisfaction between public and private sector 
employees in Post-Soviet Ukraine reflect rents by public sector workers or whether this 
alleged satisfaction premium is simply caused by a non-random self-selection of 
inherently ‗happy types‘ into this sector. To solve this question the empirical analysis 
implemented a new identification strategy using instrumental variable techniques taking 
advantage of the rich retrospective information provided in the Ukrainian Longitudinal 
Monitoring Survey (ULMS). Based on the quasi-natural experiment of the large-scale 
mass privatization accompanying the transition process, industry and industry-region 
specific privatization probabilities were constructed and assigned to individuals based 
on their pre-determined Soviet industry(-region) affiliations. Since private ownership 
was not allowed during the Soviet Union, since choices with respect to jobs as well as 
place of living were limited at that time and since the incentive and remuneration 
system differed substantially from typical market economies, it seems plausible that 
there was no self-selection of particular personality types according to whether a job 
would become a state or a private sector job only later. The findings based on this 
empirical strategy show that the observed and significantly positive public sector 
satisfaction premium indeed reflect rents enjoyed by public sector workers in Ukraine. 
In other words, the higher job satisfaction in the state sector is driven by genuine 
differences in average job characteristics between the two sectors (implying causality). 
The analysis also reveals that part of these genuine differences in jobs can be attributed 
to social and financial fringe benefits which are much more prevalent in the public than 
in the private sector. However, after correcting for self-selection and accounting for 
various job (dis)amenities and fringe benefits, there remains a sizable satisfaction 
premium the source of which needs to be addressed in future research.   
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The second empirical study (Chapter 3) was devoted to the analysis of the long-
term effects of the 1986 nuclear disaster of Chernobyl on life satisfaction and mental 
health in Ukraine in the years 2003 to 2007. The explosion of one block of the nuclear 
power plant in Chernobyl on April 26, 1986 caused radioactive fallout and 
contamination in regions scattered across Ukraine, as well as Belarus and Russia. The 
severity of the accident is reflected in the fact that, wind and rainfall caused a dispersion 
of radiation also in more distant areas of Northern and Western Europe. Due to the 
unforeseeable and unexpected nature of the disaster as well as the uneven geographic 
spread of the radioactive fallout in 1986 this study has argued that the catastrophe 
affected a random part of the Ukrainian population and thus represents a ‗natural 
experiment‘. To assess the long-run effects of the nuclear accident the study employed a 
self-reported measure of ‗being affected by the catastrophe‘ as well as objective 
measures of 1986 regional effective exposure doses which were assigned to survey 
respondents according to their place of living in 1986. The empirical results of both 
types of measures based on the ULMS data as well as another large Ukrainian micro 
data set (repeated cross-sections of the Ukrainian Household Budget Survey, 2004-
2008) reveal that there is a significantly negative causal effect of the Chernobyl 
catastrophe on subjective well-being as well as mental health even after 17 to 21 years. 
These results are robust to instrumental variable regressions (2SLS) in which the self-
reported measures are instrumented with the objective radiation data as well as to 
several sensitivity checks. In fact, the 2SLS estimates suggest that the naive regressions 
using the potentially endogenous self-reported measures of ‗affectedness‘ represent a 
lower bound estimate of the true underlying effect. These lower bound estimates were 
used to calculate the corresponding average individual compensating income 
differential which amounts to the tremendous sum of around ten percent of Ukraine‘s 
GDP. In addition, the empirical analysis also assessed whether the negative subjective 
well-being and mental health effects triggered behavioural reactions by respondents. 
Indeed, the findings provide evidence that persons who were affected by the Chernobyl 
catastrophe report a lower subjective life expectancy and are less likely to engage in 
risky health behaviour (smoking). To study fatalistic or precautionary behavioural 
responses in greater detail is left for future research.  
The third research question which was assessed in Chapter 4 asked to what 
extent a generous paid and job-protected parental leave system has a positive or 
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negative spill-over effect on cognitive outcomes of children at age 15. The empirical 
challenge of such an analysis is to overcome the potential endogeneity problem related 
to the actual duration of the mother‘s parental leave (parents are free to choose the time 
when a mother or a father returns to work after childbirth). The identification strategy to 
solve this problem was to exploit an Austrian reform which increased the officially 
granted paid and job protected parental leave period from 12 to 24 months for all 
mothers whose children were born on or after the reform cut-off date July 1, 1990. This 
cut-off date generated an ‗as good as random‘ allocation of mothers and children into 
treatment (post-reform, maximum lengths of 24 months of paid and job protected 
parental leave) and control group (pre-reform, maximum parental leave duration of 12 
months). To account for possible seasonality and age effects, the estimation strategy 
followed a Difference-in-Difference (DID) approach using an additional pre-reform 
cohort of children born in 1987. Using information on the children‘s birth months to 
identify maternal eligibility to the more generous parental leave mandates, the resulting 
estimates represent reduced form or intention-to-treat effects. The results of the DID 
estimates of the 12 months parental leave extension on standardized PISA test scores 
vary across subgroups. Using the full sample there are no statistically significant 
medium-run effects of the more generous parental leave regime on cognitive skills. This 
finding is in line with the results of most of the studies using changes in parental leave 
legislation to identify the causal effect of early maternal employment on child outcomes 
(in particular, Canada, Denmark, Germany and Sweden). When dividing the sample 
according to maternal labour force participation rates (proxied by educational 
attainment) the results suggest that there is a significantly positive effect of the parental 
leave extension for children (especially boys) of mothers with higher labour force 
participation rates (who are also more likely to be affected by the reform). This result 
proves robust to all sensitivity checks except for a test excluding the pre-reform month 
of June. Against this background and given that the estimated effect only represent net 
reduced form effects not allowing to identify any particular transmission channels, it 
seems too early to derive any conclusive policy suggestions. Given that most of the 
other evaluation studies face the same problem as they lack information on actual leave 
taking or time spent on child care, it remains a challenging task for future research to 
pin down and to analyse the actual mechanisms through which parental leave and early 
maternal employment influence the development of cognitive and non-cognitive skills 
and to explore possible effect heterogeneity according to the gender of the child.  
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